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1. Introduction: challenges of today, citizens of tomorrow 
 
Once geometric urban centers now networked information systems; on the quest 
towards functional optimization, 20th-century representations of modern urban 
planning have reshaped the grid from Garden to Smart Cities. In addition to the 
preponderant role of top-down master planning, both paradigms coincide on the 
concern for environmental protection via demarcating specific zones for concentric 
development (i.e. ‘smart hubs’). Moreover, even if its utopic value is still highly 
questioned, due to dystopian outcomes (depending on the scope and scale of 
analysis), its transnational influence well beyond the UK seems undeniable. How did 
such ideals reach global expansion? - we wonder. Why, if researchers and policy 
makers have abundantly argued the need of understanding life quality improvements 
starting from localized contexts, do think tanks and IOs keep asking if the Global 
South is capable of coping? Born and bred amidst rapidly expanding neoliberalism, 
critiques to the Smart Cities (SCs) paradigm range from the privatization of personal 
information (big-data, stalker economy (Taylor 2016)) to the negligence of public 
services (formerly duty of the state). What are the conditions upon which inhabitants 
of certain locations gain or are rather deprived of the ‘smart citizenry’ category? 
Which rights are at stake amidst such hierarchical differentiation of citizenship? 
 
Especially in Asia much has changed since industrial capitalism globalized; not only 
colonial powers, but especially ‘developing nations’ became focal locations for rapid 
urbanization as well as technological development. As African and Asian 
demographics and economies grow the fastest – accompanied by rising inequalities; 
unsurprisingly, not Wall Street’s 1%, or Europe, the world’s largest consumers, but 
cities in the Global South are crafted as faces of decay (Vidal 2018). Yet in parallel, 
with the aim to control its populations and resources, in a similar colonial fashion, the 
South is pressured by its presumed responsibility for global environment. No longer 
can ‘crowds in the South’ (Pearce 2018) be governed by infrastructural and 
bureaucratic chaos. The Urban Age has to be managed by ‘world class government’ 
(Kakabadse et al. 2011). What does this imply for citizenship imaginaries? Kavita 
Philips (2010) asks: “We see a transition from colonial modernity, but to what? The 
3rd World comes of age - she responds- as it becomes an equal citizen in the age of 
globalization earning subjectivity under the sign of the brand”. In contemporary India, 
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more concretely, this means that the growing number of consumer and lifestyle 
aspirations grant it not only the ‘biggest democracy’ title, but- while planning 
expertise towards the use (and abuse) of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) is determinant to sustain optimism on ‘cities-as-engines-of growth’ (P. Khanna 
2016), which displaces sentiments of environmental, thus civilizational disasters – 
policy makers and investors crucially started seeing India as one the world’s ‘biggest 
smart market’. From this viewpoint, it does not only seem feasible to build and 
multiply SC in the Global South, it also entails an excellent business (WEF 2016).  
 
As cities become the main site to enact technological solutions (Merricks White 2016, 
584), for technocrats any kind of issue- from inefficient waste management to 
happiness (Brdulak and Brdulak 2017)- becomes a challenge to be tackled. The idiom 
of crisis and renewal in urban planning (Ponzini 2016) is utilized by World Bank 
(2012), UN-Habitat, consultancies and corporations, in order to promote SC as the 
sole convenient path anywhere: “where they do not exist, they should be created” 
(Slavova and Okwechime 2016, 15). Emerging in the 90s in California, yet quickly 
proliferating across the US, EU and UK; the paradigm now reaches promotion climax 
across the Global-South (Bouskela et al. 2016; Manda and Backhouse 2016; Kumar 
2017). Who would have expected, i.e. that the Bandung Conference (originally 1955 
aimed to fight colonialism) would denominate its most recent Asian-African Summit 
as “Smart Cities for Civilization Advancement”  (Saragih and Dipa 2015)? Hence, 
even if SC priorities are traceable to– a rather politico-economical, than geographical-
Global North (Datta 2015); we may attend possibilities for fresh inter-Asian (Pandey 
2014) dialogues. India, after China (Chandrasekar, Bajracharya, and O’Hare 2016) 
the world’s second smartphone market (Russell 2017), and soon to become the third 
largest market, in general (Rapoza 2017), could not be disregarded but had to be 
primordially included in this $ 1,5 trillion business (Liu and Puentes 2015, 58).  
  
In June 2015 India launched its ‘100 Smart Cities Mission’. However, the only 
novelty (in comparison to JnNURM) of this policy turned out to be its competitive 
format, wherein 100 cities would be selected as loci for Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP) investments. As the SCs framework further legitimizes corporatizing policy-
making it is expectable that, apart from financial inclusion, not much will change for 
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already marginalized groups in spatial, economic and digital senses. Nonetheless, 
there have been significant efforts to promote a presumable participative, sustainable, 
and inclusive approach. How is this e-governance discourse performed? Are apps, 
pictures of meetings and future infrastructure; or diagrams of consultations enough to 
simulate participation and, thus, pacify right to the city (RTC) reclamations? 
 
Since the digital is not immaterial (but should at least be thought in terms of industrial 
relations), it cannot be apolitical. One of the clearest examples derives from analyzing 
the entanglements between IT and water politics. Beyond intrinsically linking land 
dispossession (expansion of the city, shrinking of agricultural land) (AP News 2011), 
both are negotiated along caste/class, gender hierarchies, which consequently 
facilitate or restrict someone’s positioning in the knowledge (IT) economy (Dasgupta 
2015). The point is by the time governments and corporates advertise SCs, India1 
faces the ‘worst water crisis in [its] history’ (Banerji 2018). Meanwhile National 
Geographic tells us not to exaggerate (Richter 2012), yet not only when water is 
exported can it create profits. Paradoxically, ‘investments in technologies and 
programs’ are advocated as the ‘only way out of water scarcity’, and the ‘best way to 
make money’, in parallel. Yet there is a significant difference between 24/7 
circulation- concentrated in middle-/upper class sectors- and limited water access, 
abusive sensors or no service for ‘illegal encroachments’, which due to increasing 
contamination could be even more expensive for the poor: too risky to take from 
public pipes, if possible buying from tankers. Earlier the developmentalist discourse 
(exemplified by Nehruvian India, i.e.) at least demanded social welfare. Now the 
digital wave of modernization attempts to obliterate all kind of reclamations for basic 
infrastructure improvements by setting SCs as a higher goal. Nonetheless, extending 
much beyond ‘the urban’, ICTs increasingly connect subjects (in addition to social 
networks) through big-data sensors. Consequently, even if we have learned that over-
emphasizing dichotomies is a common Euro-/anthropocentric strategy for domination 
(coloniality/modernity two sides, same coin) as it enables denying (human/nature, 
north/south, i.e.) interdependencies (Santos 2014); totally blinding urban/rural divides 
can incur in universalizing experiences. Yes, Neil Brenner and Christian Schmid 
(2013) present strong arguments to conceive overall trends and flows within a process 	1 Similarly to South Africa: businesstech.co.za/news/it-services/216683/wi-fi-to-be-seen-as-a-utility-in-2018/ 
thestar.com.my/tech/tech-news/2018/01/07/wifi-but-no-water-can-smart-tech-help-a-citys-poor/     
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of  ‘planetary urbanization’. However, the Urban or the Digital Age is not enjoyed by 
all human beings the same. Therein relies the relevance of so-called subaltern 
differences. As Ananya Roy (2015) reminds us, not only is the urban separated from 
the rural- its ‘constitutive outside’-, in order to establish ‘categories of governance’, 
but at the same time acknowledging the historical, hence, incomplete character of the 
urban prompts us to focus in inequalities, since these entail a diverse source of 
ontological struggles, a vast potential for alternative futures. For some celebrated as 
effective management (Christensen 2006), others would denounce SCs as the 
embodiment of a society of control (Krivý 2018); at what point does housing, rather 
than surveillance occupy concerns for ‘smart citizenry’? 
 
1.1 Research question: a modernist loop? 
 
Housing, beyond water (a fundamental human right, in India attached to the Right to 
Life), highlights material interdependencies of digital/SC discourses. Three years after 
launching the Mission, Modi’s government has been five times slower than the former 
in constructing housing (Vivek 2017). Thus, taking into consideration the intrinsic 
relationship between adequate housing, health, working, and education opportunities, 
which should be granted rights, in order to exercise (smart) citizenship fully - we ask: 
does the SC paradigm enlarge or restrict the RTC in India? Furthermore, on what 
conditions does the RTC rely? For whom (HLRN 2017)? Are we talking about 100 
SCs or 100 smart enclaves? In this dissertation, I propose three dimensions for 
empirical research: epistemic - Who’s to decide what a proper environment is? (SC 
globalization and its introduction in India); material - Who is to profit from it? (PPP 
scheme); and civic - To what extent fitting-in or subverting the grid? (Participation).  
 
Due to the novelty of the policy, only two ethnographic studies published to date have 
analyzed SC politics in India from the perspective of a variety of actors, whose lives 
are already (not merely in a future scenario) affected, considering they have been 
deeply related to territorial contestations: from opportunist land dealers (Varghese 
2017), to peasant/land rights movement (Datta 2015). Throughout Varghese’s 
research on the developmental discourse in Kerala, i.e. “the virtual did have real 
effects, as land acquired or as the gross ecological and livelihood transformations 
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across the region”. Further, in light of the Kadambra River’s co-option for PPP- 
tourism and IT, Varghese concludes, “the materiality of urban processes is best 
exemplified in regional contexts and personalized narratives of inclusive exclusions” 
(2017, 89). On the other hand, Datta describes how peasant movements in Gujarat act 
as bottlenecks to the Delhi-Mumbai Corridor. In spite of such relevant contributions, 
none considers the institutionalization of e-governance as another strategy for 
capitalist accumulation. By not only harmonizing normative visions on urban 
infrastructure, but also on citizens’ behavior, this research is principally concerned on 
the way the construction of ‘smart citizenry’ facilitates or endangers the RTC.  
 
Inspired by the empirical and conceptual attention that Henry Lefebvre dedicated to 
the reconfiguration of RTC struggles through daily life interactions, wherein citizen’s 
‘tactics’ challenge top-down ‘strategies’ (De Certeau 1984)- usually feared for 
determining citizens whereabouts – I attempt to demonstrate that even in Chandigarh, 
an acclaimed icon of modernity, which optimal planning was supposed to dispense 
with politicization; the SC has not been introduced without contestations of a history 
characterized by inclusive exclusions: celebrating elitism while denying citizenship, 
and generic exceptionality: concentration of resources within an aspirational hub by 
arguing uniqueness. Choosing Chandigarh as a case study, consequently, points at 
questioning the epistemologies, materiality and civics of master planning, much 
deeper and prior to SCs. What Le Corbusier fanatics do not tell is that despite 
isolationist efforts, such experiment could not detach modern infrastructure (roads and 
buildings), from conservative social structures; anchored in the patriarchal history of 
Partition and caste feudalism (Kalia 1987). Similarly, digital nationalism is nurtured 
by the international discourses and imaginaries of smart as pro-active citizens, 
however the same grid (planned city) that separated modern residents from those, who 
constructed it- working classes inhabiting the temporal, the informal (Sarin 1986) – 
now marks the difference between users/consumers and their servers. Consequently, 
instead of being a limitation for SC’s inclusiveness, the segregationist identity of 
Chandigarh offers stable grounds for the SC’s proposal to cement inequalities, while 
the seal of heritage may be useful to displace questionings. Nonetheless, if this 
city/citizenship model is entirely successful for disciplining subjects is a question, 
which cannot be predicted, but learned from empirical contestations.  
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As mentioned above, Garden Cities, the Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM), 
and now the Smart Cities Challenge entail significant transnational attempts to 
establish universal norms of ‘urban living’. Unfortunately, the ‘genius’ of its thinkers 
has concentrated attention in iconic examples (commonly metropolis), while there has 
been much less research on precisely how, when, why did adaptation paths vary across 
a broader radio of influence throughout (post-) colonial territories. Prototyping cities 
has not resulted in entirely top-down exercises, as Laura Bigon (2016) reminds us, but 
the ‘variegation, multiplicity, and transformative capacity of scale-specific, locally 
‘embedded’ projects depending on distinctive national, regional, cultural, institutional 
contexts entail a rich source for diversified conceptualizations of ‘the good city’. In 
parallel, ongoing negotiations of rights so as conflicts, due to citizenship reclamations 
in arguable segregationist endeavors; might explain the shift that SCs undertook from 
an initial focus on technology and infrastructure, towards incremental efforts to justify 
citizen-centeredness. In order to understand whether the RTC is (systematically) 
enlarged/restricted, we will initially ask: how is smart citizen-ry constructed (inter-
nationally)? What has been the Indian path and expansion scope? 
Secondly, bearing in mind that the SC paradigm undoubtedly exceeds ‘the urban’ in 
terms of process (labour and resources), this explorative research has been  
importantly informed by smart or world-class/slum, informal/planned, physical-labor 
/knowledge-worker interdependencies. At the same time the search for ontological 
differences, which would privilege ‘other’ practices, knowledges, rights, and needs 
has been also a common theme to inquire whether SCs further endanger the RTC of 
the already marginalized. Thus, how are SCs contested? Is the ‘smart’ scenario fertile 
(for the ‘right to centrality’ regarding housing and work, e.g.) or rather wretched for 
diminishing socio-spatial injustices (manifestations of hegemony-subalternity)? Does 
Chandigarh as case study corroborate the optimism on a so-called “chatur citizen-ry? 
 
Chandigarh is the living proof that planning (far from objective, or scientific (Rittel 
and Webber 1973)) requires faith (J. C. Scott 1998). It is further accompanied by 
myths, for example that ‘slums’, either don’t exist or accommodate a lazy mafia. 
Consequently, technocratism should not only be questioned on the basis of 
“transparency”, i.e. whether ICTs could help decision-making process; but what kind 
of content and political will (i.e. tackling gentrification (Hoyng 2016)) is implicit? 
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This is how the SC’s policy coincides with Slum-Free demolitions even if no one 
voted for the precise ‘reallocation’ (marginalization) of ‘rehabilitation’ projects, 
which by the way have repeatedly been awarded. This reminds us about Kavita 
Philip’s (2010) critique of Lyotard’s division of humanity in “one part facing the 
challenge of complexity, the other that ancient and terrible challenge of its own 
survival.” However, the “new rhetorical split: between the fetishized constructions of 
a new kind of technohuman, transcending the organic, and the displacement of an 
elder construction of pre-technological subjects without history, mired in the muck” - 
does no longer sound to a 1st/3rd world divide. If there are two Indias as Ravinder Kaur 
(2012) suggests, ‘smartness’ traces the line, so that inequalities are not shameful, but 
credentials to demand or even to aspire a certain lifestyle are granted only on the 
‘world-class’ corner. SCs are rarely about flagging off sustainable innovations, rather 
they intend showing there is no need to go to Canada or Europe, if ICTs facilities are 
at home, in Chandigarh. The SC is herein questioned not, due to a future warning, but 
because past and present (socio-spatial) injustices seem to remain untouched. 
However, even if SCs tend to attempt performing democratic procedures, claims for 
unfulfilled rights (gender, basic services, housing) to/in the city will not be eradicated 
that easily. Not everyone is capable of paying for the basics, nor is trained or 
legitimated to foreground fights. Notwithstanding, for the exercise and recognition of 
‘smart’ citizenship rights, more than ICTs, socio-economic resources are paramount. 
Empirical research shows unregulated autonomy, because of exceeding control, is 
highly menacing for the SC ideology. The auto-constructed city does not oppose to 
technological advancements (say infrastructure), in fact, once in place, successfully or 
not, ‘citizens will crack it’ by learning/adapting very quickly (Bhan 2015). Yet as the 
trend goes: expansion of the SC paradigm, restriction of resources, ergo failure on its 
implementation; it cannot be expected only hegemonic tools or categories work; but 
for activists it is vital to build alliances and trust outside, rather than within smartness. 
As for now the recognition of chatur citizenship has not shaped RTC reclamations, 
but especially right to housing is defended, because the city grows at the expense of 
their work. Even if the credential economy expands its domain (IT/on English), not 
only ‘urban’, but also aspiring citizens with one foot in the village or small town, 
another in the ‘smart hub’, might see this as an empowering opportunity. If simulating 
or differing from elites’ aspirations that is an issue for further research. 
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1.2  Methodology 
 
I divide the research question into two parts. The first one (chapters 2 to 4) deals with 
the top-down theorization of ‘smart citizenship’ as it can be observed throughout 
corporation strategies, consultancy reports, and even academic depictions of a 
globalized ‘smart’ utopia. Mandatorily citizenship is redefined via an increasing use 
of ICTs upon which not only inequality divides, but also novel civil rights rely. 
Chapter 2 illustrates how even though the imaginary of ‘smart urbanism’ is 
naturalized as inescapable modernity, such is historically traced to a Cold War 
rationality (following Halpern (2014) should not be taken as reason) transposed into 
Silicon Valley’s neoliberal dynamics. The development of the discourse ‘from 
planetary urbanization to human-centeredness’ shows its resilience, yet not its depth. 
Collaborative enterprises are seldom grass-rooted enough to trust as anti-hegemonic. 
The following chapter (3), therefore, calls into question the potential of the SCs idiom 
to enlarge or restrict the Right to the City, particularly from the perspective of 
subalternity, as an umbrella term for those who are yet considered to be on the 
opposite side of ‘smartness’ (rural, poor, old, Global-South). Significantly, Indian 
scholarship has enriched our understanding of subaltern urbanism, which describes 
how political (instead of simply civil) societies (Chatterjee 2004), actively 
(performative) reclaim their rights (instead of patiently expecting such recognition). 
By analyzing available ethnographic studies on the smart cities project in India so far, 
we will contest the construction of a smart (‘chatur’) subalternity; indeed useful for 
excluded categories from the smart ideology. Chapter 4, more concretely, looks at the 
implementation path of India’s 100 Smart Cities, which certainly implies exclusive 
roles and benefits for a restricted section: ‘smart people’; meaning it’s not for all. In 
order to examine how the Indian state visualizes the smart Transform-nation, we will 
critically analyze the Mission Guidelines throughout epistemic, material, civic 
dimensions, which lead us to understand to what extent PPPs endanger the RTC of the 
subaltern. Newspaper articles, graphic exemplars, and expert interviews (Indian and 
European bureaucrats) support our skepticism towards ‘smart’ promisy-making of 
sustainable and inclusive futures. Chapter 5 involves the major substance to respond 
to the second part of our research question: how is the vision of ‘smart-citizenry’ 
contested by bottom-up engagement? Complemented by historical and contemporary 
accounts on Chandigarh’s (a famously acclaimed, yet not less criticized experiment of 
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modernist planning) uniqueness, the case is elaborated upon the voices of activists, 
scholars, citizens, and technocrats showing how such imposition of “smart urbanism” 
is, in fact, trembling, due to the citizen’s skepticism towards Indian bureaucracy, in 
general, and due to a tradition of middle-/upper-class lifestyle, which characterizes the 
apathy of comfortable citizens to changes, more precisely, based on the aesthetic and 
classist myths about the legitimate citizens of Chandigarh in contrast to dehumanized 
outsiders. Paralleling the discourse of modernist master planning, ‘smart’ policy-
making becomes instrumental to advance capitalist luxuries (city experience) amidst 
at times hidden, mostly celebrated (heritage; cultural superiority) socio-spatial 
inequalities. Numerous interviews confirm the fallacy of optimism on ‘smart 
technologies’ if hoping living conditions (intrinsically RTC) of the working classes 
(Le Corbusier and even less the current state ever thought about) improve through 
‘smart urbanism’. On the contrary, the diversity of empirical sources points at an 
inefficient and corrupt administration serving PPPs commands. The highly promoted 
collaborative endeavor is uncovered as a farce, once the performance of e-
democracy/e-governance is criticized by experienced activists, who altogether (in 
spite of varied backgrounds and focus) rather advocate for constructing a long-term, 
grass-rooted dialogue with the marginalized. Finally, the discussion sums up all the 
arguments that support distrust on the SC model, as well as on the constitution of a  
‘smart citizenry’ as a viable way to exercise the RTC, especially favoring those who 
need infrastructure, services and accountability improvements the most. Yet, activist 
coalitions do not merely ask for inclusion in the SC, rather their opposition to 
smartness is constructed via subversive channels, topics, and solutions proposed by 
the Mission. Nonetheless, in parallel, ICT education becomes a determinant source for 
credentials to work, participate (e-governance), and even contest the (smart) city.  
 
The entire research process was oriented by interviews and participant observations, 
wherein doubtlessly my geographical and institutional background, together with the 
description of my research purpose played important roles. The fact that I am a young 
woman, for instance, favored me (contrary to expectations), since it generated an idea 
of naivety and openness, which allowed interviewees to extensively (the dominant 
logic and dynamics of the city, e.g. had to be explained to me from the beginning) 
justify their position (leading questions where formulated for each occasion, still 
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flexible to spontaneous interests as can it be noted in the appendix), without 
perceiving me as a competitor. This was especially useful to combat distrust, because 
I was not identified with an Indian (JNU, i.e., would have generated repudiation), but 
with a German institution. The pride of been taken into account by a researcher from 
Humboldt University, however, often vanished in the faces of bureaucrats once seeing 
that my phenotype does not fit with German stereotypes. On the other hand, my South 
American origin was crucial, particularly for activists, who, got the impression I 
understand how cities from the Global South work (in terms of neoliberal dynamics; 
shameless PPPs and state abuses). Within Chandigarh, charaterized by a recent 
history and small social circles (often public figures), the communication with 
forthcoming interviewees was facilitated on a recommendation basis. Only that way I 
made contact with high-profile bureaucrats, although it has to be emphasized that it 
was almost impossible to reach the top ones. I faced hostilities from experts (old-men) 
once challenging their vision of the city (especially pride), hence their political/human 
ideology. As a reaction, responses would be less bland, firmer (i.e. realizing their own 
contradictions when developing ideas and arguing further). A common way of 
starting interviews, which worked all across class and space was: Since when or how 
come Chandigarh? English was unproblematic for bureaurats (anyways expected to 
articulate national policies in common idiom), activists (except for a couple, who 
prefered Punjabi), IT workers, and citizens in the mall (language clear sign of class). 
Otherwise, I would have appreciated the possibility to dialogue with street vendors 
and understand the conversations in the bastis, which in most cases attracted the 
attention of citizens from all ages; often not mere curiosity, but an evident desire to be 
heard. Even though the experience and support (as guides and mediators) of activists 
(chiefly GASM) was vital, since I do not speak Hindi (in contrast to most migrants 
coming from neighboring states), it was very hard to initiate conversations directly on 
‘smart cities’. Although the term is not clear to the majority; ‘smartnes’ is already 
loaded with meaning: tech/modern/civilized/clean. Altogether, this sets the limits of 
the current, while initiates possibilities for further research; looking at daily 
negotiations/contestations, such as the formation of digital working classes (Qiu 2016, 
2018), in a much deeper, relational, and comparative manner, i.e. by following the 
interaction, mobilization, and use of ICTs – in their own languages and purposes – in 
order to consider diversifying ways of reclaiming space, meaning and resources. 
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2. From smart mandate to citizen-centeredness: a genealogy 
 
Initially mentioned in the 60s, yet truly becoming influential during the last decade, 
this chapter explores the incremental evolution of SC formulations by positioning  
‘smart citizenry’ at the heart of our inquiry. Initially “top-down, techno-centric, and 
technocratic examples of solutionism serving the interests of corporations and 
governments rather than actually improving the quality of life for actual citizens” (de 
Waal and Dignum 2017, 263) concerned critical scholars and social movements. 
Prompt responses on the part of its proponents, mainly corporates, consultancies and 
policy makers, who increasingly rely on research papers, in order to justify the smart 
enterprise (Cosgrave, Doody, and Walt 2014; Neirotti et al. 2014) were forced to 
include social justifications, in order to defend citizen-centeredness. The manifold 
ways of conceiving the forms, channels, and degree of citizen participation is an 
evident sign of unceasing contestations to a paradigm, which is certainly not a 
universal, nor determinant monolithic. Abstract definitions and multiple connotations 
could indeed facilitate a fruitful scenario for citizens to intervene and reclaim broader 
RTC recognition. Yet, simultaneously, the variety of smart policy configurations 
exemplifies resilience, which sustains neoliberalism, instead of making it tremble due 
to the lack of creativity of it defenders. A quick view at SC presentations held by 
IBM, Frost & Sullivan, as well as India’s Ministry of Urban Development suffices in 
order to realize visual and conceptual commonalities. SCs are defined by an 
accumulation of technological services that facilitate management (pic.1), wherein 
smart citizens are user/consumers subsumed to the list of services, whose 
participation is counted, validated, simulated through the use of ICTs. Further, charts 
of geographical extension give the impression that one is on the right path, such trend 
is inescapable (pic.2). Analogously, scholarly discussions on ‘smart citizenry’ not 
only shape our questions, motivate our skepticism, and offer us terminology, but they 
also encourage us to inquire to what extent does the Indian SCs’ path inherently 
develops from recipes and conventions tried out elsewhere. Altogether, the debate on 
smart citizen-centeredness informs the context wherein Indian policy makers could 
anticipate or respond to former critiques, by relying on consultancies and handholding 
agencies, which should assure that each Smart Cities Proposal is in tune with the 
overall (politico-economical) objectives of India’s Transform-nation Mission. An 
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interesting example is how a Lighthouse Cities report (NIUA 2016) makes 
‘participatory decision-making’ an obligatory quantifiable criteria, even though no 
qualitative illustration could show how precisely these dialogues evolved and if they 
are expected to sustain. Overall, this short SCs’ genealogy attempts to demonstrate 
how, instead of embracing expert knowledge in such an arrogant manner so that 
citizen perspectives are entirely rejected, the main difference between modernist 
planning (à la Le Corbusier) and SCs is that in the latter policy makers face growing 
pressures to include citizen participation. From this viewpoint, rather than a hotbed 
for grass-rooted propositions, SCs epitomize huge politico-economical laboratories 
nurtured by transnational discussions on ‘smart governance’, wherein concepts and 
PPP modalities are incorporated, in order to facilitate the acquisition of land (for 
greenfield development, special economic zones, or IT hubs). Whether this 
materializes without uprisings is a broad, mid-, and long-term matter of discussion. At 
this stage, however, we opt to concentrate on scholarly debates on what defines a SC? 
Initial pilots (Carvalho 2014) have been largely criticized, due to its evident 
authoritarian ideology. Yet this has not stopped scholars to think whether increasing 
‘local embeddedness’ would lead to ‘smart initiatives’, which could actually favor 
communities. Still, none of these perspectives argue the need of becoming or 
constructing a ‘smart citizen-ry’. 
 
2.1.   Climate change, untapped markets and other crises  
 
Booming only a decade ago, the scholarly literature on SCs is mainly characterized by 
normative (Ramaswami et al. 2016), even apocalyptic visions of a future, which either 
for the sake of ‘sustainable growth’ or ‘risk reduction’ has to be urban, digitally 
managed and highly interconnected by ICTs. To put it differently, in spite of a myriad 
of SC definitions it is particularly the extension of ICTs use in urban governance what 
defines a ‘smart’ enterprise (Batty et al. 2012, Dameri and Benevolo 2016, Zhuhadar 
et al. 2017, Kummitha and Crutzen 2017). Yet, as smart grids usually rely on 
extremely expensive technologies, how could ‘smart’ purchases grow so much since 
the end of 2000s amidst a “negative economic climate, corporate cost-cutting 
measures, and general anti-CEO/business sentiments”? Basically, an IEEE 
publication suggests; “you never let a serious crisis go to waste” (Costello and 
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Laplante 2011). Beyond the 2008 financial crisis, however, which doubtlessly served 
to globalize the ‘smartness mandate’ (Halpern, Mitchell, and Geoghegan 2017). Smart 
urbanism (SU) is “foremost a rhetoric battleground” (McFarlane and Söderström 
2017) overall encouraged by pessimistic apprehensions, especially due to climate 
change. Hereby ad-hoc arrangements entail useful dispositifs to deviate critiques; 
‘there’s no crises that can’t be managed’ (Wakefield and Braun 2014). SU is 
inherently self-referencing to the extent that solely best-practices within the ‘smart’ 
idiom are recognized (Anthoupoulos 2016). Moreover there is no common ground on 
basic indicators; whether economic or social sustainability (Ahvenniemi et al. 2017), 
these just keep being added (Höjer and Wangel 2014; Berardi and Monfaredzadeh 
2015; Marsal-Llacuna 2016). Thus, SCs prescribe augmenting and improving digital 
deployment, in order to solve any infrastructural issue (Ojo, Dzhusupova, and Curry 
2016) any city could face. Consequently SCs entail a conceptual proxy to norm how 
to take advantage of ICTs with the aim of optimizing (Powell 2016a) urban 
governance (Goodspeed 2015; Deakin 2014). Consequently, even if SCs commonly 
vary in their formulations (Albino, Berardi, and Dangelico 2015), in regard to 
increasing citizen involvement (i.e. through collaborative planning approaches 
(Castelnovo, Misuraca, and Savoldelli 2016; van Waart, Mulder, and de Bont 2016)); 
it has to be emphasized that the ‘smart governance’ imaginary (Rodríguez and Meijer 
2016) privileges a technocratic perspective. Smart is what is already solved for us: 
sensible, predictive, individual. Hence, even though most academic depictions 
simulate being “non-ideological, commonsensical and pragmatic” (Kitchin 2015, 132) 
its historicity and economic instrumentality inescapably call for critically questioning 
the ‘expertocratic’ basis of a paradigm, which in spite of striving for clean and 
efficient technologies for environmental control (Halpern and Günel 2017), it is 
hardly ever accountable to citizens. The following sections illustrate how SC 
discussions evolved from techno- to citizen-centric approaches, as the paradigm has 
been steadily targeted by critiques of diverse character, yet coinciding in a general 
concern: undemocratic governance. An initial body of uncritical literature (2.2.) aims 
to serve urban policy makers (sole politico-economically powerful enough entities 
capable of contracting ‘smart grids’ (Glasmeier and Christopherson 2015)) as it 
exposes, in light of big data developments, the varied ways high-technological 
services can further institutionalize territorial management (Garcia-Ayllon and 
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Miralles 2015). The control over goods (i.e. energy, water, transportation, security) 
flows points to the reduction of subjects to additional resources to track (Hashem et 
al. 2016). Further, even whence citizens are addressed as co-creators or innovators of 
smart items, such entrepreneurial modality does not guarantee citizens become active 
part of the decision making process since the complexity of big data analysis virtually 
annihilates hopes of a deliberative public sphere (Cowley, Joss, and Dayot 2018) 
(2.3). Altogether, this explains why no SC promoter talks about the RTC as a 
common ground or a common fight (2.4). Rather, as the next chapter examines, the 
access to digital devices and e-governance become conditional for the recently 
conceived ‘right to the digital/smart city’. It seems safe to anticipate that without “a 
radical political willingness to think beyond the horizon of neo-liberal capitalism 
toward a global revolution that reintegrates the labor of the urban as well as the rural 
poor in the sustainable reconstruction of their built environments and livelihoods’ 
(Davis 2010, 45). Else, SCs will fail on channelizing grass-rooted struggles capable of 
tackling self-destructing extractivism (Jose 2018), beyond India, characteristic of the 
current human experience. 
 
2.2.  Planetary urbanization: from a planet of slums  to a smarter planet  
 
Once defined (approx. 60s, 70s) as “the alternative or antidote to sprawl (…) opposite 
of ill-planned, ill-coordinated development” (Beatley and Collins 2000, 289); in 
recent decades “Smart Growth” has rather consolidated a tripartite (state, market, 
consumers) alliance “bringing together industry, regulators and users in the field of 
telecommunications” (Ryser 2014, 447). Meanwhile, Agenda 21 on ‘sustainable 
growth’ gave further meaning to the Silicon Valley-based “Smart Communities” 
concept (Coe, Paquet, and Roy 2001). Indeed, SCs could fund in the rhetoric of 
environmental policies (particularly exemplified by the Kyoto Protocol and by the 
EU’s energy strategy (Cocchia 2014, 14)) fertile grounds to expand the paradigm 
across the Global-North. However, what really seems to have pushed SC’s ‘corporate 
storytelling’ to global confines (Söderström, Paasche, and Klauser 2014) is the 2008 
“Smart Planet” campaign by IBM ( Palmisano 2008; Dirks and Keeling 2009; Kehoe 
et al. 2011), allegedly holding across 100 SC Forums and currently involving 2000 
worldwide (Hollands 2015, 68). Ironically, such context of a globalized banking crisis 
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welcomed the mandate of austerity politics at a national level, while attention shifted 
to sustainability, resource efficiency, growth and innovation, enabled sealing PPPs at 
a city level. This tendency kept pace until today: gigantic ICT corporations (in 
addition to IBM (Paroutis, Bennett, and Heracleous 2013), CISCO, Intel, Siemens, 
etc.) took advantage of the recession scenario to sign millionaire contracts with a low 
profile. In parallel the provision of e-services increasingly established as an indicator 
for life quality and fitness for future business (Kuk and Janssen 2014). Accordingly, it 
is worth highlighting the ‘Informed and Interconnected: Manifesto for Smarter Cities’ 
(Kanter and Litow 2009) as an alliance between academia (Harvard Business School) 
and IBM, in order to permeate much lower scales of governance. Even if the authors 
convoke ‘smarter communities’ it seems impossible to distract us from its anchor in 
IBM’s top-down SC imaginary. To start with, the “creation of information-rich, 
interconnected, communities” also coincides with the 2008 crisis scenario. Still, 
communities, instead of policy makers are made responsible for difficulties2 faced; 
poverty is reframed as ‘social isolation’, wherein a smart solution would not imply 
tackling the socio-economic sources of it, but facilitating business continues, in spite 
of a rampant housing crisis. In fact, since poorer migrants are accused of bringing 
problems with them, technologies could now solve connectivity and comfort issues, in 
ways that transport would have not. “Through IBM’s dynamic workplace model, 
about 40% of its U.S. work force works virtually on any given day (…) via remote or 
work-at-home options” (ibid.6). What is more, the broad illustration of ‘smarter 
citizens’ entirely blinds the class structure, while unity, instead of conflict or 
competition is advocated. “The human side of change” is defined as an “infrastructure 
of collaboration across boundaries or jurisdictions and sectors”. Further, a “sense of 
mission” has to be propelled, in order to “identify and link influential knots in the 
social fabric”. In sum, technologies3 are not posed at the disposal of communities for 
their autonomous development, but local leaders are sought for the means of nurturing 
IBM’s, the corporate class or the state’s big-data network. 	
2 Herein: “geographic sprawl, residential mobility, the location of jobs, the organization of government 
departments and the contracting process, non-profit fragmentation, lack of overarching strategic impact 
goals, and weakened civic leadership”. Pollution and labour conditions do not represent valid concerns. 
3 New technology capabilities – such as data warehousing, data mining, automatic language translation, 
voice recognition, and cloud computing –could provide data to inform decisions and enable 
professionals and providers, with data in hand, to better serve people, from the at-risk to the affluent. 
Networks could provide interconnectivity, offer databases of best practice information, enable e-
government and e-procurement to flourish, connect people to job training and job opportunities.	
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Dan Hill’s (2013) attempt to pragmatically (assuming techno-culture/-politics are 
unavoidable) differ between tacit benefits and the hype around civic collaboration 
results in a much different manifesto. Hill ridicules both, ‘passive citizens’ (waving at 
smart buildings’ sensors, while expecting recognition instead of solving it manually) 
and technocrats, who are very far from taking advantage of digital media innovations 
to channelize citizens interest to participate in “bottom-up civic entrepreneurship”. 
Yet, Hill warns us there is nothing inherently democratic in digital media. Instead of 
rescuing a ‘sense of public good’ delivery services are increasingly privatized. 
Financial markets significantly profit from the contemporary ‘attention economy’, 
rather characterized by status-seeking behavior and selfish individualism. Speaking 
from the UK context, which ‘could be seen as a Big-Society-driven abnegation of 
urban services, in favour of 1000 start-ups blooming to take care of the city’, Hill 
observes an ‘ideological backdrop’ in opposition to ‘state-led innovation’, since it 
‘usefully substitutes municipal taxes’. Instead of making ‘the same mistakes we made 
50 years ago, which we are still paying for’, Hill concludes policy makers should 
‘unlock the city’s technological potential’ if a next opportunity to ‘dovetail active 
citizens with active governments’ is not to be missed, but enhanced to discover ‘better 
cultures for producing good sustainable decisions’.  
 
2.3. (Digital) citizenship in-the-making 
 
As consultations (via apps or social media i.e.) are increasingly used to legitimate 
either civic support or the efficiency of government operations, Martijn de Waal and 
Marloes Dignum (2017) call our attention to Do-It-Yourself initiatives, since these 
“mainly attract higher educated and well connected citizens”, yet commonly under the 
name of “a right to the city (…) [which] is rather common than an individual one”. 
SC technologies, therefore, could add novel organizations models and interactions, in 
order to envision and enact practices of citizenship. We should keep in mind, however 
that ‘citizenship’ should not be ‘understood as a formal set of rights and obligations’, 
but rather as a constantly challenged and reshaped institution ‘through which 
individuals and social groups claim expanding or losing rights’ (ibid.). The provision 
of digital participation channels, consequently, does not inherently include all citizens 
in the same manner within the decision-making process. Certainly, could ICTs be 
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useful for ‘contesting the rules and norms of belonging, by making visible the 
invisible, and thus including people/practices that have no proper place in the city, as 
such are connected in an autonomous network’ (Iveson 2011). However, as illustrated 
above, digital media can also be used for controlling (‘on behalf of good citizens, 
identifying and containing anti-social urban inhabitants’) and responsibilizing 
(‘providing better information to shape choices’) citizens, simply to give the 
impression that they have a say even if policy options are already pre-defined (ibid.). 
Digital media, incorporates the potential to reconfigure the relationship between 
governors and citizens- from administrator and residents (Cities 1.0), to ‘service 
provider’ and ‘consumer’ (Cities 2.0), ‘facilitator’ and ‘participants’ (Cities 3.0) and, 
recently, between ‘collaborator’ and ‘co-creator’ (Cities 4.0) (Foth 2017) – so that 
incrementally the initial purpose of facilitating communication is driven by and for 
the benefit of communities, instead of being absorbed by large power holders. The 
larger ‘smart’ propositions are, i.e. by striving to cover entire cities or countries (such 
as India), instead of concise initiatives, the higher the risk of losing sight over the 
commodification of knowledge/information, expressed under the rubric of ‘data’. 
 
2.4.  Collaborative, yet manageable: participation read as big-data 
 
Beyond overtly surveillance concerns (van Zoonen 2016, Vanolo 2016) developed 
upon the corporate-driven SC pilots, Songdo in South-Korea, Masdar in the UAE and 
PlanIT Valley, in Portugal (Hollands 2015); herein I suggest putting attention to 
concrete interventions policy makers draw from a certain rhetorical and technical 
SCs’ tool-box, in order to simulate participation. In spite of various attempts, based on 
rankings and indexes, technocrats have failed in universalizing a strategy to measure 
SCs (De Santis et al. 2014). However, in daily business, what interests policy makers 
and investors is the collection and analysis of data, in order to adjust their sales. 
Therefore, even when arguing human-centeredness (Lara Pardo et al. 2016; Beinrott 
2015), tools and platforms are often meant to predict and respond to market desires 
(Kioes et al. 2015, Alizadeh 2017). As remarked by Grossi and Pianezzi, i.e. even if 
digital initiatives have expanded matters and participation channels, “the neoliberal 
ideology influences the framing of these problems by favoring business-led 
technological solutions rather than long-term urban planning” (2017). Accordingly, if 
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the sole convenient role for a “smart community” (Stratigea 2012; Jung 1998; Eger 
2007) in technocratically based knowledge capitalism (Rooney 2005) is to participate 
either as consumers (ICT users, e.g.) or facilitators (embodying sensors) of 
knowledge, but rarely critical of hegemonic maintenance. Thus, the organization and 
diversity of grass-rooted synergies is threatened to be handicapped or even sabotaged, 
rather than empowered (Galdon-Clavell 2013). Nonetheless, not only neoliberal 
politicians and corporates have the capacity to develop ICT-based initiatives, in order 
to favor local needs (Palleis 2013). Rather the characteristic freshness of ‘smart 
strategies’ debates emphasizes these are “open, experimental and potentially 
modifiable” towards new forms of urbanism “under the leadership of communities, ad 
hoc volunteer groups and local organisations” (Marvin, Luque-Ayala, and McFarlane 
2016). “Alternative smart cities” could, indeed, develop from prioritizing a “socially 
just use of digital technology”, once especially the knowledge and needs of the urban 
poor and the marginalized are put at the center (McFarlane and Söderström 2017). 
Hence, it may be too soon to sentence the evils of smart technologies. Although 
convenient ‘solutions can often be low-tech’, following Alison Powell’s (2016) 
prospects of a “subversive citizenship in the smart city”. Yet the same time, she 
reminds us to “take into account the structuring power of the frames that are used to 
transform data into action” particularly in regard to the implications of data use for 
citizenship rights. “In a supposed ‘age of austerity’”- Powell (2016b) warns us, 
technologies have been used to give the impression that “a citizen is an individual 
subject whose relation to a state can be disintermediated”. Besides surveillance, 
hence, citizens can be seized as sensors, since for the sake of optimization of service 
delivery data collection relies upon ‘algorithms constructing portraits of individual 
users/consumers (…) into all areas of experience’ (ibid.) ‘It's more about the 
individual as a creator of data- Powell clarifies - which in aggregate becomes valuable 
as it shows all sorts of things about what people are doing’ (Strong 2014). Data is not 
hegemonic per se, since it can also be useful for autonomous organization of blinded 
groups (Appadurai 2001), yet, whence citizens are urged to participate within a 
mediated network, in order to behave well, the “right to communicate” is replaced by 
the “duty to share” (Powell 2016a, 8). For the means of subverting the SC, therefore, 
rather than ‘rights claims’, which are increasingly targeted for private gains (pic. 3) 
(Taylor 2016), Powell motivates us to discuss ‘mechanisms of action’. 
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3. Reclaiming rights in the city: is ‘smart’ compatible ‘subaltern urbanism’? 
 
A symptomatic reading of ‘the urban age’ characterized by fragility, uncertainty, and 
ever-increasing complexity is described by Ash Amin (2017), in order to explain how 
SC promoters find in smart urbanism a way to reconcile optimism on a ‘prosperous, 
secure, sustainable’ future that via the use of ‘smart’ technologies becomes 
manageable. Notwithstanding, while the city is understood as an all-predictable and 
malleable machine, Amin reminds us, the SC underestimates collective agency and 
cognitive capacities, which have been cultivated along a history of (un)conscious 
resilience. In other words, as SCs privilege ‘operational details’, in order to perform 
certain services (i.e. ‘cleanliness’) more efficiently, ‘sociotechnical systems’ (i.e. 
‘labor involved in urban maintenance’) are ignored. Again master planning loses the 
opportunity to learn from ‘situated practices’. If the purpose of material preparedness 
is supporting social agency, the typical inequality amidst ‘technical robustness, 
[commonly] tuned to protect some urban spaces and subjects more than others’, could 
be avoided. Yet legitimating, instead of fighting inequalities is precisely the purpose 
of SC enterprises- as shown above or herein in Amin’s words: 
 
“Sometimes this variety and definitional plays to a politics of urban protection seeking not only to 
tackle the real risks and hazards, but also reorient the city, towards particular interests and dispositions, 
in the name of risk mitigation, with decidedly unpleasant outcomes for subjects deemed to be 
suspicious, dangerous or unable to protect themselves.” (ibid. 4) 
 
More than expressing the failure or absence of planning, policy makers impose the 
category of ‘informality’ on undesired citizens and practices, in order to impede them 
(i.e. by designating the territories they inhabit as ‘illegal settlements’) of contesting 
decision-making over concentration of resources; land and services. However, this 
should not be confused as a ‘smart’ novelty. In fact, the arbitrary restriction of 
citizenship (e.g. via designating policies’ geographic extension) develops upon the 
idea of the ‘good city’ articulated by modernist planning - either in colonialist or 
nationalist rationale –in a top-down, segregationist manner. Thus, despite efforts to 
portray ‘smart solutions’ as objective techno-scientific arrangements, SCs undeniably 
affect the RTC because it presuppose decisions along epistemic, material and civic 
dimensions, globally structuring this research’s theoretical and empirical analysis. By 
deepening on the implications of constituting ‘smart citizenship’ as a category that 
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differentiates certain citizens’ access and participation to the SC, while it excludes 
others’ RTC; this chapter sketches the theoretical tool-box, generally inspired by 
Lefebvre and de Certeau’s empirical loyalty to follow ‘walking tactics’, which 
eventually leads to refuse the idea of citizens’ absolute subordination to the grid (3.1). 
Aiming to demonstrate SCs are neither a totalitarian ‘control room’, nor an entirely 
inclusive or participative ‘creative city’, further connections between ‘smart growth’ 
and the strive for land (accordingly molding purposes, technical solutions, and 
beneficiary/disadvantaged subjects) are explored. Chiefly, India’s governing party, 
BJP, relies upon increasing politicization of data, as well as oppression of dissent, and 
privatization of education, which altogether pose serious doubts about a democratic 
exercise of smart citizenship. Indeed, as argued along empirical studies in the US, UK 
and India, achievements as well as obstacles to smart materialization vary according 
to the interests of the ruling classes (3.2). The arbitrary designation of  (in)formality, 
(il)legality, and (de)regulation within an idiom of exceptional ‘smart’ planning 
authorizes highly exclusive RTC, fulfillment of citizenship. The material guarantees 
for civic input to re-shape smart utopia (epistemically) is reserved for a tiny minority. 
How do housing rights (or its deprivation) condition RTC? Thereupon, relations of 
subalternity framed within the SC become our focus (3.3). Ayona Datta (2018) argues 
the ‘chatur citizen’ opens up space for vernacular versions of SCs. Yet, does the RTC 
start when capable of arguing smartness or is it hampered by such requisite (3.4.)? 
 
3.1  Theoretical construction of grass-rooted demands 
 
The concept of the ‘right to the city’ is, for the most part of academic citations, 
accompanied by a reference to Henri Lefebvre, whose work “Le Droit à la Ville” 
signalizes one of the most influential acknowledgments within the context of May 
1968: “the revolution in our times has to be urban or nothing” (Harvey 2012, 25). 
Almost half a century later, scholars, yet especially social movements keep inquiring 
the potential of such paradigm. Especially in India (Kumar Vaddiraju 2016), i.e., 
without being legally declared a universal human right yet, it is increasingly argued as 
state duty (Parnell and Pieterse 2010). However, as insightful as the efforts of 
researchers may be on providing historical, philosophical or politico-economical 
grounds to sustain the RTC theoretically, David Harvey insistently reminds us that 
		 25	
‘what has been happening on the streets (…) is far more important than Lefebvre’s 
legacy’ (2012, xii). In spite of such courageous articulation, consequently, Lefebvre’s 
role remains one of an observer, who “depicts a situation (irruption), which was not 
only possible but almost inevitable” (ibid. xi). Similarly, Harvey explains the 
resurgence of the term- all around the planet – as “some kind of response to a brutally 
neoliberal international capitalism that has been intensifying its assault on the 
qualities of life since the early 1990s” (ibid.). The World Social Forums organized in 
Brazil, India or Venezuela (HIC-AL 2008) noticeable showed that “the struggle over 
the city as a whole framed the particular struggles denouncing homelessness, 
gentrification and displacement, criminalization of the poor and the different” (ibid.). 
The desire for “greater democratic control over the production and use of the surplus” 
(ibid. 22) was proven to be a globalized concern – pertaining the Global-North as 
much as the South. In Quito’s Habitat III Conference, e.g., “it became clear that there 
had been a conjuncture of policies concerning the right to the city4” (Verso editors 
2017, 12). Interestingly, the overall agenda, which was prepared in advance and 
solely expected to be ratified, already included the SCs paradigm (UN-Habitat, 
UNDP, ITU 2015). Thus, as we recognize the relevance of historical discussions on 
both concepts, the RTC and SCs, we should be careful of avoiding theoretical 
impositions (Uitermark, Nicholls, and Loopmans 2012) by empirically documenting 
contestations, in order to expand our understanding of these struggles. Aiming to be 
institutionalized, both discourses require to be performed, since these entail at the 
same time “a particular set of visions on the city, as well as a collection of concrete 
practices enacted by coalitions of actors” (de Waal and Dignum 2017, 264). 	
 
Together with Lefebvre’s writings inspired by the context of May ‘68, the work of 
Michel de Certeau advocates for a radical shift from analyzing the conditions, which 
shape the (im)possibilities of behavior (in accordance to Foucault, already set by 
infrastructure, surveillance and punishment technologies), in order to focus on the 
interaction between individuals and space, dedicating hence, foremost attention to 
subjective agency (Sacré and de Vissher 2017). This means that while top-down 
planning determines strategies (“treat the city as a planned, readable, and stable 
totality that is visible from above and subject to intentional operations of power”), 	4 See: http://www.forumue.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Habitat-for-People-de1.pdf 
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social actors embody tactics as a counter-reaction. Only by performing an action 
(“walking across the grid, transgressing and leaping across boundaries”) in space, the 
latter exists (Gieseking and Mangold 2014). Walking implies an act of constantly 
“updating possibilities”, particularly when actions overcome expected mechanics set 
by the strategist. “Processes of subversion and appropriation, which imply a deviation 
from the norm and could (yet not must) remit to grey zones of illegality stand for 
‘practices of repurposing’ (Bernardy and Klimpe 2017, 181). It is this conscious act of 
being-in-the-world (ontology) and acting upon it (praxis), which enables to transform 
environments (ibid. 173). A myriad of everyday experiences unnoticed, unpredicted 
or even undesired from above (ibid. 184); are highly valuable, because they are a 
source of creativity. Thus, Certeau’s work can be read as a “tribute to the periphery”, 
(ibid. 182) in terms of radically acknowledging each person’s capacity to transgress 
and reshape the meaning and of uses of space. Even in profoundly planned cities like 
Chandigarh subverting the purpose designated for a certain area (i.e. squatting or 
displacing slums in the periphery) depends on the capacity to reclaim the right to 
make the city (Bhardwaj 2015). Indeed, Chandigarh’s high income concentration 
attracts all kind of migrants (wealthy or not), whose quality of life aspirations 
unceasingly fuel RTC contestations. In order to inquire such, I propose the following 
RTC dimensions: 
 
• Civic: ruling classes determine inconvenient ‘informality’ as ‘illegality’, sanctioning 
an ethical judgment on populations, who allegedly do not deserve good quality (if 
any) of public services. Notwithstanding the RTC is not a static institution recognized 
solely on paper, but rather we align with Lefebvre’s perspective, wherein “belonging 
is a revolutionary act” (Verso editors 2017, 14). If we consider that ‘citizenship has to 
be struggled for, recreated anew, hence such is not rubber-stamped’ (Merrifield 2017, 
18). Even if some groups are privileged, this does not impede, but encourages 
disadvantaged ones to reclaim a saying on the production of space. 
• Epistemic: while SCs are justified by the need of ‘risk mitigation’, instead of 
supporting an infra-structure of solidarity (Simone 2004) “the fear of losing out on 
future credit and investment” pressurize adapting to a global agenda of acquisition of 
“expensive intelligence systems and expertise” (Amin 2017). In contrast to this, from 
a RTC perspective, citizens are empowered to manifest either individually or 
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collectively the desire to improve their living conditions, by positioning themselves: 
their needs, aspirations, and experiences at the center of city making.  
• Material: without romanticizing the agency of deprived communities it is vital to 
acknowledge “the very real experience of infrastructural exclusion and associated 
frustrations of housing, water, energy, health, education, insurance, connectivity, and 
mobility” (ibid.). Approaching socio-spatial ubiquity, ‘distributional fairness’ could 
further equip citizens to support each other. Otherwise, “if you take one person’s 
home, you take this person’s everything”, as mentioned by an interviewed activist in 
Chandigarh. Therefore, our case study focuses on SC contestations based on struggles 
for the Right to Housing, which encompass a whole bond of rights (Rolnik 2014). 
Adequate housing, especially in India, remains a massive issue (Duggal 2010, 9).  
 
3.2    Privatizing rights to the digital/smart city 
 
The “ideal space” for the “digital right to the city” is the “sharing economy” to the 
extent that “achieving a right to the smart city”- more than “maximizing wellbeing for 
all the citizens” -points at “data sharing”, in order to produce “multiple kinds of value 
across the collaboration of different groups” (Dean 2017). Hence, without reference to 
further Human or Civil Rights the “digital right to the city” could contribute to; the 
focus is put on the government’s (not citizen’s) need to “open their kimono to create 
an ‘information-sharing culture’, since business innovation is nurtured by open data. 
Earlier, however, it has been argued that the “citizen’s right to the digital city” 
(Foth, Brynskov, and Ojala 2015) depends on the right for information, freedom of 
expression (ibid. 138), and crucially on privacy rights (ibid. 170). This enters into 
conflict whenever citizens decide “to distrust, challenge and take over control”, yet 
police monitoring or corporatization of data hampers opportunities for “autonomy 
participation and social innovation” (Rekow 2015). Questioning the so-called 
independent nature from ICT giants scholars suggest that resisting “new informational 
monopolies”, like Google, consists of “embracing ownership and self-management 
technologies” (J. Shaw and Graham 2017). However, in a “world saturated with the 
automated aggregation of analytic mechanisms that are not, even in principle, open to 
any continuous human interpretation or review”, this seems largely unfeasible. Data 
transparency implies revealing the ‘logic of calculation, ownership and use of data’ 
(Powell 2016a), which is commonly inconvenient for private interests.  
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Certainly, either for corporative or ‘grass rooted’ attempts to benefit from ‘open 
government’, data needs intermediaries (Schrock and Schaffer 2017). Similarly, smart 
citizenship presupposes the need of a new kind of specialized education (Martelli 
2017). Yet amidst the current politico-economical context in India, unfortunately, this 
also seems inconceivable. In fact, even if the recognition of the Right to Education 
was recently (2009) institutionalized; it does not serve as a guarantee against 
surveillance (Spiegel 2018) or privatization of schooling. Aspirations of English-
medium education all across the strata spectrum have made of meager quality 
education targeting at low-income families, a profitable business (Nambissan 2017). 
Moreover, the deluge of data (‘dashboards, mobile apps and indexes that rank states, 
cities and villages on every conceivable indicator from the ease of business to the ease 
of living’) recently became the hallmark of BJP’s (“more than any of its predecessors, 
deft at using data to score political points”) governance. Despite large collections of 
data, consequently, the state is “stubbornly silent” on central political issues, such as 
the debate on India’s ‘jobless growth’, at times depicted as a myth (Vyas 2018). As 
argued above, therefore, the democratic use of data depends on independent, third-
party evaluations of administrative data on flagship schemes. Notwithstanding, even 
if scholars have been working on this for decades, the ongoing abuses of an 
alarmingly authoritarian state- whose intolerance demonizes dissent as ‘anti-national’, 
‘urban naxals’-discourage the creation of a similar data-ecosystem (Aiyar 2018). 
 
Progressively, as we approach the acknowledgment that beyond the specificities of 
data, SCs represent a dispute for land, I propose considering these statements: 
“Under the acronym PPP, one often hears of public private partnerships- says Wayne Crews (2018), 
an experienced Forbes ideologue- but here's hoping for greater emphasis on private-private 
partnerships, driven by private financing, and relaxation of antitrust so mega-deals and mega-scale 
infrastructure projects can happen, and novelties like user ownership of grids (…) You may not be 
ready to sell off all the roads, but think about what is not yet built.”  
 
Richard Raj Sebastian – principal consultant for digital transformation at Frost & Sullivan, confesses in 
an interview to also privatized International Telecommunications Union that “while most smart city 
initiatives in Asia-Pacific are government-driven, we’re likely to see the private sector taking the lead, 
whether it’s in the form of a PPP model or private companies acting on their own” (Tanner 2018). 
 
“From listening to smart growth advocates, one could easily gather the impression that people, who 
oppose it are ‘pro sprawl’, right-wing ideologues, anti-environmentalists, or have vested interests in 
the home building, real estate, auto, or road building industries. But this couldn’t be further from the 
truth”. Rather the Afro-American farmer denounced further (historical) denial of land revenues: “What 
little land we now have represents wealth and potential wealth— When you take that from us, then 
you’ve robbed us/them of everything that we/they’ve slaved and labored for all those years, which is 
the promise that somewhere down the road, this property might produce wealth” (Berlau 2002). 
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All in all, besides the time and space variation of ‘smart’ frameworks, the cited 
perspectives confirm the paramount relevance of bounding digital discourses 
materially, as well as territorially (Ash, Kitchin, and Leszczynski 2018). Rather than 
starting with technology, hence, if smart urbanism is supposed to respond to citizens’ 
needs, it “should be grounded on actually existing cities; their specific populations, 
resources, and problems” (McFarlane and Söderström 2017, 313). Turning to a short 
examination of few, yet highly pertinent empirical studies of ‘smart citizenship’ in the 
US, UK, and India, prompts us to abandon Orientalizing prejudices on a Global-South 
allegedly characterized by structural and bureaucratic deprivations. So far, even in the 
so-called Global-North SCs tend to blind the inequalities they reinforce. 
 
Indeed, from a RTC perspective, data, and technology are not the only central issues, 
but planning for the benefit of certain classes over others. To put it differently, “the 
problem is less with data and more with the uncritical, ahistorical, and aspatial 
understandings of data often promoted within SC imaginaries, recycled from earlier 
attempts to make urban studies and planning ‘more scientific”. Consequently, based 
on the observation that “the assemblage of actor, ideologies and technologies 
associated with smart city interventions bears little resemblance to the marketing 
rhetoric and planning documents of emblematic, greenfield smart cities (built from 
scratch in peripheral locales)”, Taylor Shelton, Matthew Zook and Alan Wiig invite 
us to inquire  “how is the smart city paradigm becoming grounded (…) in the more 
mature cities and economies of the global north” (2015, 14). Taking highly segregated 
cities in the US, such as Louisville, Kentucky, and Philadelphia as case studies, the 
authors conclude that in spite of access to mobile phone Internet -promoted by IBM 
and policy makers as “new pathways to relevant skill sets for entry-level jobs that 
would ultimately bridge longstanding socio-economic divides”- inequalities persist. 
SCs reproduce inequalities, firstly because creating a PPP hub required removing both 
socially and spatially, “the poorer neighborhoods that the smart city project was 
meant to help”; and secondly because “this initiative did not extend beyond education 
and digital literacy programming” (ibid. 20, 21). At a smaller scale, there might be 
successful examples (Foth, Forlano, and Bilandzic 2016), but expectations of a 
panacea to any urban issue turn into disappointments whence deepening on stories of 
already vulnerable groups. 
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In tune with Bigon’s (2016) approach to transnational colonialism and neoliberalism; 
Robert Cowley, Simon Joss, and Youri Dayot (2018) suggest that “the opportunistic 
nature of SCs’ development gives rise to unique local assemblages, [while] 
simultaneously holding hostage to broader societal and economic agendas”. Alone in 
six cities in the UK the authors highlight varied modalities of ‘publicness’. Thus, it is 
overall argued that a SC is neither one-dimensional nor “attempts to exclude the 
public” any longer, but “institutional protagonists do have vested interests in 
[enacting] democracy” (ibid. 72). However, researchers resist concluding that under a 
SC regime a ‘qualitative recasting of the public’ takes place, since large 
infrastructural projects lacked civic engagement, while entrepreneurial activities were 
dominated by ambitions to ‘create wealth through hi-tech innovation’. Opportunities 
to ‘enable or engender more formal political participation’ were entirely unexplored 
by SC technologies. What is more, amidst a context of austerity politics, the 
‘experimental nature’ of SCs turns deeply problematic, considering the “world-view 
of a society of entrepreneurs and service users” has a particular easiness of ‘bypassing 
traditional democratic processes’ (ibid. 73). 
 
In the meantime, Paolo Cardullo and Rob Kitchin’s (2018) concentrate in SCs 
initiatives in Dublin, Ireland, where they develop a scaffold of participation 
(consumerism, tokenism, citizen power), which further corroborates to vanish the 
optimism on the production of a ‘citizen-centric’ SC. Even though citizens were 
supposed to be empowered by technologies, they are treated as “consumers, testers - 
sources of data, which can be turned into products” (ibid. 10). Oriented on a 
neoliberal conception of individual autonomy, instead of being grounded in civil or 
political rights, citizenship in the SC remains largely tokenistic: “rooted in 
stewardship, civic-paternalism (and) prioritiz[ing] consumption choice ” (ibid. 2). As 
administrations and corporations continually own and control “technology-led 
entrepreneurial urbanism”, therefore, an expectable/acceptable behavior, in their 
accordance, is constrained to providing feedback on a development plan, instead of 
challenging, replacing, or transgressing its political rationality (ibid. 10). 
 
Finally, coming back to India, even if conscious that “ICTs and supporting 
infrastructures can entrench existing urban asymmetries by fueling elitism, exclusion, 
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enclaves” (splintering urbanism), David Sadoway and Satyarupa Shekhar (2014) 
propose optimist examples of Smart Citizenship, such as initiatives ran by the ‘civic-
cyber non-profit action-research group’ Transparent Chennai. As a means to counter 
the global commercialization agenda driven by ICT firms, this Smart Citizenship 
approach “call[s] for engaged, active and critically reflective civic-cyber debates, as 
well as deeper discourses among a diversity of citizens – and not only the visions of 
digitally dominant ‘thought’ or business leaders”. In opposition to the SCs approach, 
thus, the authors suggest an idealized perspective of Smart Citizenship consisting of:  
 “Civic	leadership	negotiations	in	a	transparent	public	environment	through	‘client	relations’	and	local	needs	addressed	through	work	with/for	community	and	civic	groups.	Decentralized	citizen-driven	forums	and	civic-cyber	initiatives	nurtured	by	face-to-face,	ICT	and	urban	infrastructure	(internet)	provision	 shaped	by	principles	of	universal	 and	affordable	 ‘access	 for	 all’.	 Successes	are	publicly	debated	(in	terms	of	speech,	dissent,	privacy	rights)	(…)”	(pic.	4).	
 
However, once this ideal-type depiction is analyzed empirically, it rather serves to 
denote the abyssal difference between “alternative pathways to smart cities where 
ICTs have been used to strengthen communities, foster participation, and make cities 
livable”, which are not incorporated by Indian and international policy-making as 
Satyarupa Shekhar later recognized (Willis et al. 2016, 5). Whereupon Shekhar poses 
the fundamental question driving this research: ‘why do cities and city residents do 
not already exhibit the characteristics that can make ‘smart’ cities’? “At best- she 
replies – this corporate-led and commercially-driven process attracts investment and 
fosters consumerism” (ibid.). “Whose Right to the Smart City?” inquires the report, 
which is nurtured by SC experiences in Chennai, Pune, and Bangalore. Overall, the 
corporatization of governance is signalized as a general outcome. In Chennai the 
preparation of the plan was highly dominated by consultants, who relied on pre-
exiting plans. Pune’s elaboration of the plan, on the other hand, was “widely 
discussed and consultative”, however public consultations were very superficial and 
filled “with tensions between elected representatives and bureaucrats”. Lastly, 
Bengaluru’s chances to become a ‘world-class city’, as the JnNURM mission already 
aimed, are rather ruined by the “existing systematic governance and infrastructure 
lacunae”. Yet the SC proposal seems even more harmful. Following Shekhar, 
“technology might annihilate geographical distance, but corporative reliance (Special 
Purpose Vehicles, as argued next chapter) threatens to fracture communities” (ibid). 
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3.3.  Absent presence: subalternity and nationalist planning  
 
Rapid modernizing experiments intrinsically create margins. Within and outside of the 
colonial city aesthetic, sanitary, but principally power concerns (held by the ruling 
groups) divided urban experience into white and black towns, the old and the new, 
residential, commercial, and policed zones. Prior to Lefebvre or Foucault’s 
theorizations, therefore, the restriction of the ‘right to the city’ through territorilized 
‘governmentalities’ is arguably a constitutive phenomenon of the urban (Legg 2007). 
In regard to India, discussions on urban planning as well as on citizenship have been 
central to the Nation-building process. Douglas Haynes and Nikhil Rao (2013), i.e., 
describe how from the 1920s onwards the ‘increasing number of planning institutions, 
together with the range and scope of intervention increasingly controlled by Indian 
elites’ fueled clashes between class interests attempting to impose or to subvert a 
certain vision on the cityscape (ibid. 327). Moreover, the author’s observation that 
“Improvement Trusts often dishoused more people than they rehoused, [whereby] the 
‘temporary’ settlements inhabited by construction workers, often became permanent” 
could well describe peri-urban formations around the 60s and 70s when Chandigarh 
was majorly built, as well as ongoing or future squattings surrounding SC projects. 
What becomes clearer in recent decades, however, is that the village as a typical 
Indian socio-spatial organization (Srinivas and Shah 1960) is well left behind. The 
modern city, in contrast (Jodhka 2002), gained major terrain over nationalist 
distinctiveness, paradoxically being steadily mediated by international trends and 
aspirations. The examples of Chandigarh, Bhubaneshwar, and Gandhinagar are well 
known, yet as Haynes and Rao remind us, the Indian state built 118 towns between 
1947 and 1981 (2013, 330). Hence, even if Chandigarh, our case study, is 
characterized by an exceptional history of master-planning, marginalization dynamics 
(economic and urban growth through disposession and expulsion (Kuldova and 
Varghese 2017)) are similar across the country. As argued by Jan Nijman, ‘slums’- 
which arise because of rapid urbanization, simultaneous to “India’s lethargic formal 
manufacturing sector” represent a ‘structural feature of the country’s modern urban 
landscape’ (2015). In parallel, decadent labor and environmental conditions, coupled 
with immanent caste discrimination, motivate citizens to leave ‘the rural’, generally 
being treated as a “residual category” of ‘the urban’ (R. Bhagat 2005). Thus, even if 
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‘the rural’ is likewise growing (Charan Pradhan 2013) and diversifying (de Bercegol 
2017), the way lifestyles generate pull force aspirations as well as RTC reclamations 
(Bhagat 2017) remains a crucial matter for research. The socio-spatial category of 
‘slum’ (Arabindoo 2011), by inhabiting allegedly ‘informal/illegal’ (Datta 2012) 
spaces, incarnates day-to-day contestations to the RTC, since even savage 
neoliberalism has not stopped historically subaltern populations (generations denied 
to own the land they work, due to caste/class or gender hierarchies) to construct their 
city. In sum, our empirical research focuses on the connections between digital 
politics and the land question, due to three reasons: 
 
Firstly, contrary from dominant discourses, ‘informality’ is not the opposite (failure, 
absence) of planning, but rather a characteristic politico-economical strategy to gain 
from the privatization of land in undemocratic manners (i.e. whence PPP facilitates 
the business of disposessions). In the name of public purpose, as Ananya Roy 
explains, zones of exception- SEZs or SCs, indeed (Varghese 2017) – are explicitely 
anti-poor (2009, 79). Consequetly the real estate market, more than any other source 
of urban transformation, entails a central ground for unceasing contestations (Shatkin 
2011, 2014, 2015).  As exemplified by India’s SC mission (next chapter), not only do 
upper-classes (who generally have major influence over the direction of urban 
planning) use their RTC at the expense of ‘slums’ (Ghertner 2011a, 2011b; Srivastava 
2009), but exaggerating the fear of slums (Davis 2006; Gilbert 2009), i.e. blaming 
them for ecological crises or supposedly avoiding migration disorders, also work as 
justifications for privileges, instead of dismantling the neoliberal system. 
 
Secondly, scholarly discussions on ‘subaltern urbanism’ (Roy 2011, 2012; Denis and 
Zérah 2017) have been a valuable source for ‘Urban Theory’ (in general, not merely 
‘of the South’) (Oldfield and Parnell 2014), as it has been widely demonstrated that 
top-down projects are not capable of resulting in an absolute bureaucratization 
(governmentality) of life. Actually, if we consider slums as the territory (Rao 2006) of 
undesired citizens and their struggles; this ontological diversity entails the potential of 
subaltern resistance to challenge the planetary ambition (Ruddick et al. 2017) of SCs. 
Even if emerging autonomously, these are usually forged by relational and networked 
spatialities (Jazeel 2014), as we attempt to confirm in our empirical study.  
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Finally, by the time this research initiated, in spite of rich discussions about 
exercising citizenship ‘at the margins of the urban’ (Bautes, Dupont, and Landy 2014; 
Doshi 2013) (as mentioned in the introduction) the sole existing ethnographic studies 
on Indian SCs limit their scope to subaltern resistance to the subjectivity of farmers 
(Datta 2016). Resistance to SCs is, thus, only expected outside but not from within or 
in/between (‘gray zones’ (Roy 2011)) the urban.	Notably,	in her most recent paper (in 
fact after this dissertation’s empirical material was gathered) Ayona Datta (2018) 
introduces the imaginary of ‘chatur citizen’ as a vernacular and subaltern version of 
‘smart citizenship’. On what basis does such discourse legitimate RTC reclamations? 
 
3.4. Too soon to invoke a ‘chatur citizen(ry)’?  
 
Datta’s approach to ‘the digital turn in postcolonial urbanism’ addresses the question 
of smart citizenship - in the making – through three key processes: enumerations, 
performances and breaches. Importantly complementing the examination of policy 
documents and the results of online citizen consultations (made public) with a series 
of observations at stakeholder workshops in Varanasi, Chandigarh, Navi Mumbai, and 
Nashik; one of Datta’s major contributions is a deep empirical elaboration on how the 
policy-shift towards ‘focusing on smart citizenry’, not only depends upon the 
‘discursive emphasis on inclusive and citizen empowerment’, but crucially the 
constitution of a ‘smart citizenship’ necessitates to be performed through statistics, 
meetings, and consultations, as well as via content on social/digital media (ibid. 8). 
Despite the fact that “80% of its citizens are currently outside the digital divide”, 
Datta explains that as a “prelude to ‘smart citizenry’” ‘digital subjects’ have to be 
enumerated by becoming, namely, legible, fast tracked or “drawn into the digital 
space, in order to produce a ‘user base’ for the smart city services”(ibid. 2). 
Notwithstanding, even if Datta is cautious of “smart citizen becoming an euphemism 
for an elite citizenship built on class, religious, and caste privilege”, the author 
decidedly inquires the possibilities for subaltern citizens to “breach the boundaries 
between digital and urban publics that define their exclusion from the future city” 
(ibid. 10). Relying on the intervention of a slum-dweller’s representative in Navi 
Mumbai, who denounces that “in general, the government is trying to create a 
separate city for the rich and a separate city for the poor”, Datta highlights this local 
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leader’s reclamation for “a share in the economic success of the smart city” (ibid. 11). 
Accordingly, this citizen’s breaching act consists of “an alternative characterisation of 
the smart city as economically and ethically just”, instead of entirely opposing the 
segregationist root of a paradigm, which departs from a differenciated recognition of 
citizenship by alluding to ‘smartness’: a category implying cognitive, technical, as 
well as classist connotations. The cited subject certainly contests the meaning of 
‘smart’: “we are smart because we do hard work for our living (…) if we get ten 
rupees, [and] spend it all today, then how will our children get food tomorrow? That 
is why we are smart, because we plan every move.” What caught my attention for 
futher inquireis this citizen’s need to reclaim the recognition of his socio-economic 
capacities of survival, in Hindi, to an audicence that was willing to listen to him 
(research workshop), hence, outside of the terminology and the channels proposed by 
the state, in order to validate his voice for influencing SCs’ decision-making.  Even if 
the ‘chatur citizen’ imaginary illustrated above expresses solely one citizen’s attitude 
towards the SCs’ program, to what extent are his attempts to be recognized as a 
‘chatur citizen’ representative of broader social sentiments? Further, is such 
discursive (epistemic) level of reclamation sufficient for been granted material 
benefits within India’s SCs framework? The Administration of Navi Mumbai itself 
abandoned the Mission “because of irreconciliable differences with the federal state 
over the use and control of urban revenues in SC projects” (ibid. 11). If the 
justification of cognitive or labor capacities, such as in the cited example, becomes 
conditional for demanding the recognition of housing, information, education, water, 
etc. (besides legal, ethical rights (Baxi 2011) here encapsulted as his RTC, is it 
foreseable that the SCs’ scenario is advantageous for reorienting Indian politico-
economical planning towards a more democratic direction, wherein- based on the 
Constitution- especially subaltern citizens would receive exceptional support? Along 
the next chapters, we will extensively discuss how does the inseparable juncture 
between material resources and class interests seem to foreground the designation of 
‘smart citizenship’ at the national (policy-making) (4), and at the local (in 
Chandigarh) levels of policy-implementation and contestation (5). If ‘smart 
citizenship’ inclusion/exclusion is structurally determined, will the recognition of 
certain (i.e. productive or cognitive) capacities be useful for expanding acces to 
‘smart services’, as much as influence on the participation of subaltern populations?  
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4. Smart Citizenry within India’s Transform-nation Mission  
 
Throughout the aforementioned chapters we have illustrated how the SCs’ discourse 
permeates across multiple scales, from a universalistic ‘Smart Cities Challenge’ to 
more localized ‘smart communities’ initiatives. Critical insights show as well very 
diverse concerns; a big part sustained either by the lack or excess of imagination on 
the configuration of smart citizenship. How does the Indian Smart Cities Mission 
(SCM) envision it? Even if our empirical analysis focuses in one out of 109 enlisted 
cities (Bouissou 2017), this chapter argues how fundamental it is to acknowledge the 
degree (i.e. ideology, vocabulary, modality) of the central governments’ authority 
over a national scheme, which nonetheless was advertised as pluralistic, because of 
aiming at decentralization. Furthermore, in regard to the RTC and this Mission’s 
accordant or divergent ‘smart people’ imaginary, it is notable that the proposed notion 
of civic participation distances from collaborative or responsibilization approaches. 
Since scoring in the terms, nationally established by the Guidelines, is conditional to 
access funds, municipalities engage in a self-congratulating manner. Instead of 
democratizing the debate about Smart Cities Proposals (SCP), administrations 
monopolize its politicization, for citizen’s only recognized capacity is assenting.  
 
As we discuss whether the SCM is keen to expand or restrict the RTC, the (rather 
mutually reinforcing than singular) RTC dimensions proposed above, will serve us to 
structure our argumentation in: epistemic (4.1)- according to which ideological 
background ((inter-)national political-economy) are ‘smart cities’ defined? – material 
(4.2)- what socio-spatial strategies (i.e. funding) are put in place in order to construct 
smart city components?  Who is likely to profit, who will face disadvantages?  -, and 
civic (4.3) dimensions - who is/could be a smart citizen, what would imply becoming 
a smart citizen(ry)? How could governance evolve through novel methods of 
participation? How is ‘inclusion’ thought/sought? Whether the SCs master plan is 
materialized or not, it entails a crucial paradigm to study since it mobilizes power. 
While the nation-building mission evolves into nation-branding efforts, in order to 
attract corporate patronage (Kaur 2012), citizens are either conceived as consumers or 
entrepreneurs. Among a gamut of PPP services promoted from above, ICT use 
becomes the sole participation channel recognized, even if no influence is guaranteed. 
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4.1. Signifying ‘smartness’  
 
In spite of the insistence of bureaucrats I interviewed, SCs is not a concept India’s 
Prime-Minister Narendra Modi pioneered. In contrast to this common belief, SCs 
trace back to Manmohan Singh’s Congress administration as the 12th Five-Years-Plan 
(2012-2017) already put “inclusive and sustainable (…) smart cities” at the core of its 
urban vision (Planning Commission: 2013, 320). Nonetheless, the term SC, as shown 
in the previous section, has a much precedent history and use that trespasses the field 
of urban planning. In his research on India’s tourism and industry campaigns, i.e., 
Ravinder Kaur narrates how frequently he encountered the word ‘smart’: “often-used 
as a catchphrase and at first (…) seem(ing) meaningless (…) it appeared in all 
possible combinations: smart frame, smart image, smart feel, smart design or just 
being smart” (2016, 311). Further he says “the idea of smart packaging seemed to 
convey more an expression of a deeply rooted belief that every product can be made 
valuable and saleable if illuminated optimally” (ibid. 318);  ‘almost as a visual 
restoration of pride, particularly for young generations’ (ibid. 320). To put it 
differently, we are attending a nationalist enterprise expressed in globalized trends. 
“The SCs’ idea is not driven by a deeper understanding of an urban habitus”- 
observes one of the scholars interviewed - “rather, it’s driven by some belief that we 
can become the next Singapore”. How did such vision become India’s predilection? 
 
In “Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global”, the editors 
Ananya Roy and Aihwa Ong (2011), suggest three common practices that 
characterize the transformation of Asian cities (ibid. 14). a) Modeling - taking 
advantage of mega-projects for the sake of neoliberal planning (Shatkin 2011, 2015), 
b) inter-referencing- increasingly utilizing Shanghai, Singapore, or Dubai (rather than 
London or L.A.) as aesthetic/speculative inspiration (Ong 2011; Goldman 2011), and 
c) association - creating new solidarities among public and private elites, in order to 
impulse a specific lifestyle (mainly real-estate projects) for world-class citizens only 
(Ghertner 2011). While modeling and association constitute fundamental elements of 
the Indian path towards SC policy-making, this research could not corroborate the 
thesis that SCs are as well product of Asian inter-referencing. More concretely, even 
though Datta’s SCs analysis (2015) might be largely right on public governance and 
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corporate attempts to facilitate land privatization, from my point of view, she fails on 
pointing at Modi’s trips to China as catalysts for introducing the ‘smart’ idiom (ibid., 
7). Indeed, Modi’s ambitious promise to build no less than 100 SC might be a 
competitive answer to China’s urban development plan (Riva and Riva 2017, 127). 
However, judging from documents produced by the National Institute of Urban 
Affairs (NIUA, basically a public think-tank guiding government policy) references to 
SCs’ ‘best practices’ elsewhere (PEARL 2016) appear in the frontline. The influence 
of Western-cultivated approaches turns evident in four aspects: firstly, formatting it as 
a challenge, which is pretty much anchored in US-based approaches (DOT 2015, 
Alizadeh 2017) and is most probably connected to the guidance of Bloomberg 
Philanthropies, one of Modi’s main SC partners (2015; 2016). Secondly, the idea of 
competing and ranking middle-sized cities, typical of European campaigns (Centre of 
Regional Science 2007, Riva and Riva 2017, 14). And thirdly, as shown in the 
Guidelines, the Ministry of Urban Development clearly suggests the Japanese, British, 
German, French, and US development agencies (in addition to the World- and the 
Asian Development Bank) (MOUD 2015, 10) as handholding agencies; together with 
consulting firms’ assistance, a mandatory requirement for each SCP. Finally, series of 
workshops were organized by Germany and the EU, which worked as platforms for 
the exchange of political and technical know-how. Indian speakers were commonly 
invited, however a horizontal relationship of cooperation seems questionable, since 
the purpose was rather enabling business gateways (such as SCs Expo).  Hereby, I am 
not suggesting that drawing inspiration from experiences and discourses abroad 
implicitly endangers Indian citizens’ RTC, rather it seems pertinent to highlight the 
incoherency (renown architect Rem Koolhaas calls this “stupid” (2014)) of adapting 
deliberately flawed formulas to tackle inequalities- as exemplified above by case 
studies in the US and UK and (guided by the same rhetoric and actors, such as the 
WB and EU) expecting different outcomes. More than the geographic origin, in sum, 
the expansive institutionalization of ‘transfer[ing] authority’ to the private sector, 
currently ruling over public values (ibid.), represents an arguably dangerous 
epistemology. Analyzing the EU’s SCs framework, Alberto Vanolo, points out that 
one of the major menaces of “smartmentality” is ‘reducing the city to a single-
technology centric vision’; hence, ‘limiting the creation of alternative solutions to the 
problems of today and tomorrow’ techno-corporates decide to prescribe (2014, 895). 
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Similarly, within India’s SCM the emphasis is not put on the materialization, but 
rather in the expression (performance) of a certain SC vision, which should fulfill the 
national parameters as compiled in the Mission Guidelines (MOUD 2015), henceforth 
our focus of analysis. We can start by belying that municipal autonomy 
(decentralization) was ever intended, considering that altogether the challenge 
modality entails an India-wide race among municipalities, in order to access funds. 
The pressure to fulfill scoring criteria homogenizes the proposals, which are expected 
to rely on a PPP logic, since: “the success of this endeavor will depend upon the (…) 
revenue model and comfort provided to lenders and investors” (p. 13). Accordingly, 
the NIUA (2016) published a ‘Lighthouse cities’ report, which may serve to 
municipalities as examples to portray SCPs. Note that solely the Urban Ministry is 
entitled to enlist, rank or reject proposals, and as one of Chandigarh’s high officials 
confessed “no one wants to be called non-smart”. Still, alike the SCs’ genealogy 
discussed above, the SC’s definition remains very broad, while any sort of 
compromises with the disadvantaged are avoided. Even though the Bureau of Indian 
Standards has repeatedly tried to set certain principles upon which ‘life quality’ can 
be measured, the Ministry rejected them in name of India’s plurality (Sambhav 2017). 
Hence, instead of a clear-cut definition, the Guidelines refer to a “not one-size-fits-all 
approach”, for each municipality to “formulate its own concept, vision, mission, and 
plan (…) that is appropriate to its context, resources, and level of ambition” (MOUD 
2015, 5). Maintaining a vague definition de facto leaves space for neoliberal 
entrepreneurialism, whereby the technical (‘smart solutions’) can be distanced from 
the political (rising inequalities). 
 
A closer look at Digital India’s policy framework, especially since the BJP’s mandate 
(Sen 2016), most clearly positions the ‘smart’ adjective within the country’s public-
private growth alliance. Accordingly, the progress of the info-nation is measured by 
the number of users and services provided online, instead of critically examining how 
the influence of the universalization of such informational market plays for either 
diminishing or reinforcing existing socio-economic hierarchies.  Indeed, info-activism 
might enable some innovative ways of organizing collective agency (ibid. 94). 
However, examples of censorship, surveillance, and similar abuses of an authoritarian 
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state abound5, demonstrating that the development of an informational infrastructure 
via digital technologies is not an immediate sign of democratizing communication, 
political participation or material inclusion within ‘the nation’. In this vein, amidst the 
impressive extension of the Aadhaar identification system, which becomame in less 
than a decade the world’s biggest biometric system, the debate on the Right to Privacy 
urgently needs to go beyond judicial circles (The Wire 2017; Scroll 2017; Yamunan 
2018), in order to position the integration of cumulative digital services as a main 
concern for citizens (Singh 2017). Anyways, life in a city encompasses much more 
than an infrastructure of PPP services. However, from the perspective of those 
desiring its absolute management, the meaning of “smartness” matters much less than 
examples of “smart solutions” (such as water, waste and energy management, e-
governance, telemedicine, tele-education, security, trade facilities or skill 
development), which by relying on “robust IT connectivity and digitalization” intend 
to “provide core infrastructure and give a decent quality of life to its citizens” 
(MOUD 2015, 5, 6).  
 
Altogether, the Mission Guidelines highlight the corporative nature of this endeavor, 
which I could also confirm in Chandigarh. Instead of public consultations, expertise 
consultancies are quintessential; first to be selected, then to prepare a program that 
would satisfy the central governments’ vision. Decelerating the extension of India’s 
digital infrastructure, in order to encourage the quality of a public discussion in varied 
levels, is precisely the contrary of what the Indian industry and state attempt to 
facilitate. Rather diversifying the scope of e-commerce and e-governance services 
from telecom to logistics, waste or wellness, in order to facilitate the “ease of doing 
business”, in order to attract FDI delineates much precisely India’s “knowledge 
economy” growth calculations (CII 2017). “The key enabler in this regard is 
technology” as a major consultancy firm Deloitte and India’s Associated Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry conclude (Assocham 2015, 6). Therefore, together with the 
JAM trinity6, Skill India or Start-up India, SCs are presented as just another of dozen 
of government initiatives (CII 2017, 42) instrumental to fuel the ICT market.  	
5 “Intolerance Tracker” enables a geographic visualization throughout varied indicators, see website: 
http://intolerancetracker.com/ or Facebook page.  
6 Jan-Dhan Yojana, Aadhar, mobile is one of the programs created by India Stack, in order to integrate 
four digital layers so as to expand the digital financial market, absorbing users even in the remotest 
areas. See: http://indiastack.org; Raman and Chen 2017; Business Line 2017. 
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4.2. Fabricating ‘smartness’ 
 
If already from an initial conception, human rights were entirely ignored as a 
fundamental base for urban planning, according to a recent Housing Land Right’s 
Network report (2017) which analyzed all SCPs so far, it is extremely unlikely that 
this framework represents a fertile scenario for subaltern groups to reclaim their RTC. 
More concretely, moving to the politico-economical set-up of the Mission, this 
section corroborates concerns for the privatization of land, in addition to further 
services’, as illustrated in the aforementioned chapter. Hereby a techno-digital 
discourse is pushed forward, yet access to ICTs does not represent the major divide, 
but rather the capacity of land trading elites to solidify socio-spatial inequalities.  
 
Four mechanisms were conceived as implementation priorities (MOUD 2015, 8). 
Firstly, retrofitting refers to enabling “more intensive infrastructure services”, in order 
to make the city “more effective, more livable”. Further, redevelopment implies 
replacing the “existing built-up environment and co-creating a new layout using 
mixed land use and increased density”. Saifee Burhani Upliftment Project (formerly 
Bhadi Bazaar) in a) Mumbai (Goyal 2015) and East Kidwai Nagar in Delhi (Chapman 
Taylor 2018) were initially presented as examples. On one hand, these signalize real 
estate as the Indian SCM main raison d’être, which appeals to middle-/upper classes 
and private interests (Mahrotri and Antony 2016). While on the other hand, slum-
dwellers are repeatedly susceptible to “eviction and demolition of their properties 
without proper procedure and rehabilitation”. Moreover, during the SC’s construction, 
they denounce been forced to live under “unhygienic, deplorable conditions” (A. Jain 
2017). Greenfield development, thirdly, targets at “vacant areas”, where most of the 
Smart Solutions are supposed to be introduced. Promoted as paradigmatic ‘smart 
utopias’ built from scratch, Amravati7 and Dholera8- attached to Delhi-Mumbai’s 
Corridor (Datta 2015)- have also being strongly questioned, since the principle of 
“land-pooling” (voluntary handover of land) “generally results in loss of livelihoods 
and incomes to farmers, who are often coerced to give up their lands” without fair (if 
any) reconstitutions (HLRN 2017, 23). Consequently, as highlighted by both cities 
visual projections, SCs entirely displace agricultural lands as the hinterland of 	
7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-RahriAP3vg, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZTJ1Hg16A8  
8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tc_jsWt1IWQ, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jOFpWFLSqgU   	
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massive infrastructural projects (airports, highways, IT, and business hubs), which 
gain central attention. It is the flow of resources, rather than ‘smart citizen’ initiatives 
what matters. Finally, the pan-city principle calls for re-assuring that Smart Solutions 
cover larger parts of the city. However, most of this optimism has failed in praxis, as 
“a major chunk of central funds is lying idle with state governments” (Das Gupta 
2017). Greenfield and pan-city approaches evidently seem unachievable in such 
scenario. Even retrofitting and redevelopment strategies signalize a massive scam as 
most SCPs cover 2,7% of the candidate cities, not even of whole India (Vivek 2017).  
 
In fact, area-based development (ABD) dominates (according to a NIUA functionary, 
mostly 60-70%, and in some cities, more than 80%) the funding pattern. Whether 
loans are acquired through domestic or foreign capital, such entails a risky transaction 
for the commons, since firstly “interests increase the financial vulnerability of the 
local body”, secondly “cities have to try their best resources, in order to pay off”, and 
thirdly this involves “investing were most lucrative people live so you can finance 
project”. Further the privatization of land and services is not only discursively but 
also materially facilitated through ‘smart technology’. Another NIUA bureaucrat said: 
 
“Most cities are trying to reform their own systems of revenue recoverment, improving their own 
property taxation rules, mapping, telescoping, metering for water, for energy consumption, and then 
depending on their own land… so capturing the value once its developed to raise the procedures.”  
 
Elitist concentration and corporatization, therefore, are not casual mistakes, but main 
components of the SCM. The Guidelines clearly leave out socio-spatial and socio-
economic guarantees (public housing, public education, public health). Choosing 
instead singular areas, wherein infrastructural solutions are supposed to bring 
revenues to investors, not to any citizen, indicates a conscious choice to favor richer 
segments and ignore a large proportion of the population’s desperate needs for basic 
services and decent housing. However, “simply monetizing the land and building 
fancy enclaves does not make a city inclusive or sustainable or smart” (Dash and 
Chandran 2016). Yet even though expectable, it is still shocking to confirm –after 
HLRN updated its report (2018)-, that none of 99 SCPs prioritizes the rights of the 
disadvantaged, while supposedly aiming for sustainable inclusion (2017). Anyways 
“discussing issues of non-discrimination or equality” (p. 12) is not measured within 
“inclusive growth”, especially since it relies upon a fundamental contradiction: 
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inequalities are the source of such growth. Accordingly, not even in a long-term or in 
a utopian scenario, (when all technicalities are accomplished) a fair (to the necessities 
of marginalized groups) distribution of outcomes can be expected. On the contrary, 
low-income populations may face an even more hostile environment, since no social 
investment supports upward mobility, by radically improving public education, e.g. 
 
“If the best part of your project is dedicated to 5% of the area, the 95% has to survive 
with less than what it had previously.” In stark contrast, to ABD, only 2 to 3% of the 
funding is dedicated to pan-city interventions; which means one or two services- 
commonly, transportation or solid waste management- are supposed to reach the city 
at large “for the sense of inclusion”. Yet, due to the illegal status of ‘informal’ 
settlements, we could anticipate that those citizens, who need water, electricity, and 
sanitary infrastructure the most, will rarely (at least as intended by policy proponents) 
profit from the extension of such networks. Obviously, this leads to reinforcing 
inequalities: socio-economic positioning, instead of citizenship per se, determines the 
RTC. A techno-scientific rhetoric (as deployed by NIUA and Chandigarh bureaucrats, 
as we will see later) is fruitful to defend neoliberal planning: “we are proponents of 
managed urbanization, growing in a very coherent way”, says Praveen (pseudonym), 
as he rejects either beneficial or harmful outcomes deliberately based on class status: 
“SC are about making the right-, data-driven, evidence-based decisions”. Moreover, 
Praveen justifies the concentration of funds in minuscule demarcated zones, due to the 
lack of local bodies capacities “to undertake a bigger mission for a city-wide 
transformation”. Despite hard work poverty is reproduced through generations, still 
subaltern populations are supposed to patiently wait for the waterfall effect from well-
off sections to be assimilated elsewhere, and getting content with ephemeral access: 
 
“Cities are doing as much as they can. Most have picked-up densely populated areas and they want to 
transform them, but there are generally poor in those areas so whether people stay there or not it’s a 
different thing, but poor people still own their livelihoods there, in terms of street vendors, informal 
workers, so they still come to those areas, they still benefit from them. It may be too soon to make some 
sort of judgment that it will not be inclusive (…) there has to be a long-term evaluation that has to be 
set-up. To ascribe exclusion just to a SC is probably unfair. People were excluded even before the SC 
project started, what you need to see is whether or not this is going to be accessible.”  
 
Yet mere access, as argued above, is an insufficient promise for a democratic 
recognition of the RTC. Beyond walking through redeveloped sectors, the ‘right to 
centrality’ first of all would imply that poor people are legitimated for inhabiting the 
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same areas; they should be the principal not indirect (i.e. as informal workers in 
function of the middle/upper classes lifestyle) beneficiaries of public investment. 
Moreover, it is argued, “local bodies had to learn what a really high sustainable 
quality of life neighborhood looks like in a very short amount of time, in order to 
transfer these knowledge and skills to the city”. Buying this argument is not only 
naïve, but almost insulting, since municipalities know pretty well and exactly where 
housing, clean water, electricity, waste treatment (instead of mere management), e.g., 
are urgently needed. Technology and skilling towards the improvement of processes 
could literally save lives, i.e., by equipping sewerage labor with appropriate tools. 
Upgrading services, hence, has to be thought much beyond energy/budget efficiency, 
but deeply/in an interconnected manner, wherein improving the living and working 
conditions of daily laborers is paramount. Otherwise SCs will sediment poverty. In 
fact, evictions due to SC plans have already been denounced by Narmada Bachao 
Andolan (The Economic Times 2017), stretching from Gujarat (Benett 2016) to 
Bhubaneswar (Jaiswal 2017). This confirms that slum-dwellers (Dash and Chandran 
2016) and peasants are threatened the most, as usual. Employing SCs as rhetoric to 
expand and legitimate the regime of dispossession (Levien 2015), while arguing 
raising life quality standards, makes sense within a war against the poor, rather than 
against poverty (Sourabh 2015). And if millions of rupees thrown at elite segregation, 
smart surveillance and privatization of services are not outraging enough, remember 
this is not even “their (meaning the 1% of the 1%) money, [but] they’re doing this at 
the expense of everyone else’s (public)” taxes and land (Krause 2015). Yet who are 
“they” and who is “everyone else”? Next we’ll analyze the construction of smart 
people being secluded from the (invisibilized) rest. 
 
4.3. Embodying ‘smartness’  
 
By granting full politico-economical recognition to a tiny parcel of Indian citizens 
entitled to manage the conception, implementation, and monitoring of SCP, the 
government reiterates that an all citizens’ right to inhabit, participate, and make the 
city is rather inconvenient for its PPP growth horizon. As argued in the former 
sections, SCs’ proponents decidedly avoid defining policies, which confront existing 
inequalities as smart solutions. Smart infrastructure is not expected to be constructed 
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and enjoyed for all, and hence, or even worse, the Guidelines establish the 
undesirability of representing a diversity of interests contrary to the private sector and 
the government party. In parallel (to elected officials), the text mentions the 
constitution of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV), as the sole responsible entity to 
conceive and monitor each SCP not only the government of India, but also private and 
foreign investors are supposed to like. Consequently, SPVs are grounded as “Limited 
Company” (MOUD 2015, 37), which mandatorily have to be “headed by a full-time 
CEO” to be accompanied by some “nominees from the Central, State (…) and (local) 
governments” (ibid. 12). Cynically such is promoted as a “collaborative” endeavor, 
since it commingles “the objectives and funds of all government departments, while 
parastatals, private agencies and the citizens are dovetailed during the process of 
preparing SCP” (ibid.). As the Guidelines persist referring to the citizens and the 
people in such a superficial way, it turns even more imperative to inquire who is 
precisely meant by the loose rubrics of ‘smart citizenry’ (p.22)/‘smart people’? Thus, 
whose/which knowledges are excluded on a class or bureaucratic basis? 
 
In line with the purpose of ‘smart communities’ cited in the second chapter, the only 
explanation of the ‘smart’ component put in the same equation with ‘people’ refers to 
the use of ICTs for the means of optimizing governance. Nevertheless, as the text 
further specifies ‘participation’ as “doing more with less and oversight during 
implementing and designing post-project structures” (p.18), it is evident that ‘smart 
people’ are thought to be no one else than SPV members. This differentiation line gets 
even clearer when not smart, but simply ‘people’ are put into administrative brackets 
(Residents Welfare Associations, Tax Payers Associations, Senior Citizens and Slum 
Dwellers Associations) while their participation is not guaranteed, but solely 
consultations are offered (p.22). Aiming for citizen-friendly and cost-effective 
governance (p.7), online services to obtain feedback and monitor government sites are 
legitimate tools bureaucrats are supposed to use, in order to identify “issues, needs, 
and priorities of citizens and groups of people” (p.22). Yet behind CEO (currently) 
intermingling with big-data management (soon) it is terribly naïve to trust that 
“citizen-driven” solutions will be generated by vulnerable sections of society and will 
remain accountable for their benefit, even if (although it has not been a ‘smart’ 
compromise yet) open government data is made available (Wright, Prakash, and Shah 
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2010, 37). What the promotion of e-governance through ICT might achieve, however, 
is simulating the citizens’ (suspiciously broad and homogenous) consent with the 
SPV’s disposal over use and function of land; particularly if this strengthens local 
alliances towards neoliberalizing the streets by getting rid of hawkers (Jain 2013) 
and/or finally wiping out slums (Arabindoo 2011),  as shown in Chandigarh. 	Who	 precisely is considered a ‘smart citizen’? Due to minimal information in state 
publications, this is the main question that inspired this research precisely through an 
empirical approach. At the NIUA, as well as in Chandigarh, this was definitely the 
most sensitive topic to discuss. Arguing in the same technocratic line, Praveen 
initially tries to avoid the subject “I’m not given those philosophical questions, my 
task is with data only”, yet after denying having knowledge of such terminology in 
the Guidelines, Praveen guesses: a “smart citizen is probably someone educated, hard-
working… people who get economic value for their labor, have a good quality of life, 
enjoy living in cities”. This whole statement is sustained by the classist ideology 
‘smartness’ attempts to blind/naturalize. Especially in the Indian context, there is no 
guarantee that hard-working people, living (or attempting to do so) in cities, get high 
economic value from their labor so that they enjoy a good quality of life… as Praveen 
rightly points out, this depends on a precise kind of education almost exclusively 
achievable through implicit resources and social capital. Furthermore, considering 
that ‘e-governance’ is supposed to represent the sole interaction channel between 
‘smart citizens’ and municipalities, ‘smartness’ is not merely exclusive, but highly 
selective to the convenience of power-holders. Deeba (NIUA, pseudonym) reflects: 
“I personally believe that as for now we should forget the phrase “smart”, because a large section of 
the population does not have access to minimum basic services (…) So if you have a homogeneous 
population as you find in the West, everybody has a smartphone, but in India it’s only the elites (…) 
Until and unless we are homogeneous group in terms of the economy we are not ensuring that the 
facility reaches all, on the contrary we are increasing the disparity”.  
 
Besides acquisition, education on the use of ICT gadgets is required, which again this 
depends on class background, especially if these are meant to lead to some advantage: 
“If you are illiterate, how can I expect you to be ‘smart’? You should at least know the meaning of 
‘smart’. and if you’re literate but you’re poor, you don’t have smart appliances anywhere close to you. 
The basic foundation of smart cities is literacy, yet not how we define literacy on the census (the ability 
to read or write any language and be at least 7 years old)… something more… you should at least be a 
graduate, to earn for yourself, to understand the current state of technology and, not only to contribute, 
but also to gain from all the developments which are happening around you. Until and unless you 
really are into the system how will you get the benefits from the system? If I want to apply for a trade 
license to the local body, to the municipality, so I must have that much of resources to open a shop, for 
that I need to have access to a laptop and e-governance…”  
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Yet the massive investment in the health and education sectors, as advocated by 
Deeba “in order to bring the poor to that level” is entirely absent, not merely in reality 
but, as we have been capable to demonstrate through the SCM, also in planning. Even 
if SPVs, alias, ‘smart citizens’ are mainly driven by CEOs, SCs are thought as a much 
broader regime of governance, wherein even if disadvantaged or marginalized, the 
whole society is encompassed. Once counting with suitable economic capacities, 
everyone is welcomed within “the smart consumerist global jungle” (McCarthy et al. 
2009, 41). Sometimes, particularly the “remotest locations” (Assocham 2015, 18) are 
targeted, in order to expand by coupling the IT, ICT, and financial markets. This does 
not mean that technologies will create an entirely new ‘smart citizenry’ since ‘new 
technological cultures- as Kavita Philip has argued -are also instrumental on 
performing masculinity, caste or creed supremacy in the digital sphere’. 
Consequently, Philip underlines: 
 
“A [next] layer of political complexity adds to the growth of corporate interest in the world’s ‘bottom 
billion’ [while] poor and marginalized populations are increasingly seen as potential new citizen-
consumers, rather than as developmental lags or obstructions” ( 2016, 289). 	
Indeed, technological citizenship is not a novelty. Especially in India, as Itty Abraham 
and Ashish Rajadhyaksha (2015) argue, the National Population Register and 
Aadhaar systems have been implemented to “identify and separate citizens and 
residents in the interests of national security”, as well as aiming for identifying “the 
needy, resource-poor (…) as a first step towards providing them with social security”. 
Ideally, if hard data is used to fight exclusion, as an acclaimed Indian sociologist 
argues in an interview, then it should prioritize benefitting the marginalized: 
 
“The poor are the ones who want a source of certification more than anyone else. People like us would 
always have passports and other IDs, so we can claim our citizenship status. It’s the poor, who can 
make claims about coming to the city for 7 years to work and this is the evidence of it.” 
 
Notwithstanding, the aforementioned authors conclude in their study that the ‘alliance 
between the digitization of governance and the privatization of welfare (…) lead to 
worse outcomes for the poor by producing new costs and barriers’. Increased 
illegibility under neoliberal dominated digital governance did not “’bridge the last 
mile’ through greater transparency and efficiency ”, but strengthened already uneven 
distribution of resources and power privileges  (ibid. 83,84). 
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5. Chandigarh: ‘smart from the start’  
 
Today, India’s most iconic example of modernist planning is also enlisted as an 
aspiring SC. Chandigarh’s seven decades of history could certainly serve as a warning 
for future projects, as it is commonly observed that ‘plan and monument’ were not 
capable of guaranteeing ‘a city in full,’ “holding India’s popular imagination” such as 
Mumbai, i.e. (Raghunandhan 2018). Yet critical perspectives suggesting more 
democratic, rather than elitist visions of the city are usually displaced by Le 
Corbusier’s fervent admirers. Among policy makers and residents, mostly architects 
vehemently defend Chandigarh as a “world and living heritage”, which modernist 
philosophy, although being exempt from a ‘colonial hangover’, has to be explained to 
the layman (Parul 2014). The apparent inseparable junction between city and planner, 
Le Corbusier’s Chandigarh (or vice-versa (Prakash 2002)), was further strengthened 
by the SC discourse, principally since both coincide in “the insistence of order as a 
cardinal principle of modern town planning”. Chandigarh’s success, according to 
Rajnish Wattas(2018), relies on its “grid iron layout [which] represents a self-
sufficient urban module that can be repeated multiple times to create the total urban 
form”. However, if such order is distorted, due to ‘unbridled growth’, e.g., Wattas 
alerts:  “Chandigarh will become like central Paris, its safety walls will be settlements 
around…” (Parul 2014). Following our motivation to learn from the (un)expected 
outcomes of modernist utopias, hence, beyond the aesthetic relevance of CIAM or SC 
paradigmatic examples, the analysis of Chandigarh’s epistemic, civic and material 
limitations to RTC, illustrate the intrinsic politico-economical purpose of planning. It 
bears the power to safeguard a certain lifestyle for modern/civilized subjects at the 
expense of daily laborers: street-vendors, rikshaw-valas, cleaning personnel… they 
all compose that undesired caste but useful class; therefore allowed to enter, but not to 
stay in the ‘planned sectors’. Nonetheless, even if “in Corbusier’s mind the periphery 
was sacrosanct” (Chalana 2015, 72), for subaltern groups promises of modernity 
never materialized per se; obliging them to un-do planning, in order to construct a 
livelihood, still unceasingly threatened to be dismantled and further marginalized. At 
the same time, real estate within and especially around the peripheral satellite towns 
of Chandigarh has not stopped flourishing. Chandigarh’s current SC scenario, along 
with various master plans prepared in the region, corroborate Roy’s observation about 
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informality, instrumental to condemn the poor, yet a common practice among elites, 
who capitalize the RTC through alliances and, definitely, clashes as well. Yet the 
aspirations of better living conditions for the working classes are not given up without 
resistance. Rather, this research is heavily guided by empirical insights throughout a 
variety of actors, whose major basis for contesting the SC is the right to housing. 
Consequently, this chapter is structured along the following sections. The uniqueness 
of Chandigarh (5.1) demarcates 20,000 acres of supposedly isolated land from the rest 
of the country, especially from rural Punjab. However, the consumption lifestyle it 
demands highlights the constitutive interdependencies between the city and 
surrounding villages. Founded upon violent displacements, the political history of the 
periphery (5.2), characterized by suck in (overtaking the agricultural, cheap labor) and 
expulsing processes (avoiding the proximity of working classes), is central for our 
study. Despite generalized concerns pointing at SCs’ risks to engender ‘total 
conformity’ (Gardels 2018), such paradigm provokes evident inequalities (particularly 
in terms of infrastructure), which are once again challenged; as illustrated through a 
housing rights’ front lead by students and slum-dwellers, who denounced 
Chandigarh’s Slum-Free campaign, a prelude to the SCM. The Municipal 
Corporation, hence, attempts to be backed by wider manifestations/performances of 
public support, such as pictures, diagrams, and votes; which are countered by the 
voices of bureaucrats, journalists, activists, scholars, among further interviewed 
citizens. Neither can the skepticism on functional- yet actually corrupt elites – be 
overcome by e-governance gadgets (apps, i.e.), nor is the trust and politicization of 
slum-dwellers guaranteed by a couple of demonstrations. Hence activists advocate for 
more regular and deeper dialogues, which break the SCs’ logic of digital immediacy. 
 
5.1. City’s ‘uniqueness’ 
 
Chandigarh’s history is majorly told by a modernist narrative that centralizes the role 
of Le Corbusier (Wattas and Gandhi 2018). Even today it is presumably one of the 
most sympathetic cities to master planning in the whole South-Asian continent. 
Hence, the city’s value is encapsulated by its architectural legacy, instead of the 
culture that inhabits such spaces (A. Shaw 2009). Even at the cost of inequalities, 
such overall prestige granted to techno-centric expertocracy encompasses the main 
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reason why I chose Chandigarh as case study (among various cities showing 
resistance against the ‘smart’ paradigma9), precisely since I incrementally recognized 
commonalities between SC discourses and Chandigarh’s foundational elitism (a). In 
Chandigarh, once assumed to have an optimal infrastructure, expediting flows, and 
hence disregarding citizens’ interventions in master planning, Le Corbusier’s ideals of 
a highly hierarchical and functional grid are well protected, since its heritage status 
serves to maintain the city’s socio-spatial distribution in times of widespread 
demographic growth (b). Besides initially being dedicated to bureaucratic elites the 
city’s politico-economical exceptionality relies on its Union Territory status. In 
addition to high incomes and an unsurprising apathy to taxes, Chandigarh’s 
administration’s proximity to the central government exemplarily suggests that the 
institutionalization of PPPs is certainly pushed under the current SC’s framework, 
although such is not a novelty (c). Before passing to the analysis of RTC contestations 
within Chandigarh’s SCP, I consider it is crucial to quickly go over these three points.  
 
a) Pride: a portrait for Independence 
 
Sliced Punjab required a new capital in the Indian side; a modern way of life (in terms 
of work, leisure, spirit and mobilization) defined Chandigarh, in contraposition to 
conservative Lahore (Perera 2006). Flying over Punjab, Le Corbusier and Nehru 
determined the acquisition of the territory (28,000 acres of majorly cultivable land), 
which corresponded to 58 villages. Following such massive displacements, prolonged 
demonstrations of farmers blamed the government for creating “another refugee 
problem” (Kalia 1987, 146). Chandi Mandir-Panchkula, a local goddess, was taken as 
inspiration for baptizing the new capital: Chandigarh. Even more conveniently, as 
displayed in Le Corbusier’s and City Architecture’s museum (pic. 5), rests of the 
Harappan civilization found while preparing the sediments to build Chandigarh, 
directly connected the site, not only to nationalist historiography, but also to a 
tradition of planning. The “authorship of the Chandigarh plan” (Perera 2004), 
however, is an ongoing highly sensitive debate, since, there were certainly plenty of 
architects and engineers involved, although it is widely known that Nehru granted Le 
Corbusier an exceptional, full license to design and construct the city. In 1959, two 	9	Initially	I	also	considered	Dehradun,	i.e.:	https://www.hindustantimes.com/dehradun/uttarakhand-residents-hug-trees-to-protest-against-smart-city-project/story-LkDkZqkuR52jnzZOMf53qI.html	
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years after inaugurating Chandigarh, Nehru said:  
‘It is the biggest job of its kind in India, because it hits you on the head. You may squirm at the impact 
but it makes you think and imbibe new ideas. I do not like every building, but what I like above all is 
this creative approach, not being tied down to what has been done by our forefathers and the like, but 
thinking out in new terms, in terms of light and air and ground and water and human beings, not in 
terms of rules and regulations laid down by our ancestors. Therefore, Chandigarh is of enormous 
importance regardless of whether something in it succeeds or not. Chandigarh is more famous than 
most Indian towns… simply because it is a thing of power coming out of a powerful mind’ (Nehru 1959) 
 
Before, Le Corbusier took charge of the planning commission, Albert Mayer, who 
coined the City Beautiful’s slogan, and Matthew Nowicki, who died in a plane crash 
in 1950, proposed a plan, which departing from organic processes in ‘the 
neighbourhood’ exhibited a much more Indianized experience and vision (Perera 
2006, 232). In contrast, Le Corbusier’s trip to the site in 1951 was his first to India 
(ibid.). Notwithstanding, at that time he was already an international star, whose 
influence was reflected in the CIAM’s manifesto, wherein the modernist city intended 
to transform society through the built environment (ibid. 231). Thus, Chandigarh was 
conceived as a ‘radial, concentric city of exchanges’. This means that because of 
‘fundamentally entailing a decision-making and consumption centre’ sustained by 
‘intersections of flows of transport’, Chandigarh could afford the luxury to be exempt 
from a ‘significant, productive base’, while rather depending on ‘the continuing 
availability of socially produced surplus’. Nevertheless, as a large diversity of 
productive activities involved in giving life to a city were disregarded by the master 
plan, pretty early Madhu Sarin (1977, 200) (one of the first residents of Sector 2) 
questioned the contradictory unsustainability of a functional city, which refused to 
recognize the needs of the working poor, who constructed and served the city. Still, 
among the residents of planned sectors critiques are rather exceptional; as I could 
confirm through interviews in the mall, the heritage of master planning remains being 
an outstunding source of pride for middle-/upper classes (Dewaele 2015). 
 
b) Optimality and change: beyond	Le Corbusier 
 
Around half a century after its inauguration, narratives of uniqueness and superiority 
over the rest of India still stand over the myth of Le Corbusier, either for highlighting 
the maintenance of green spaces, wide high-ways, among other presumed virtues of 
planning, or for rejecting any critiques to the negative consequences of such, 
particularly regarding the highly hierarchized spatial distribution of the city. Le 
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Corbusier’s grid (pic. 6) was analogous to a human body: Sector 1, the Capitol 
Complex clearly resembles the city’s administrative head; Sector 17, the commercial 
and cultural centre represents the heart of the city, while the Industrial Area (currently 
dismantled) implied the viscera. Within each sector ‘innumerable open spaces and 
parks’ would provide the lungs, and cultural and educational institutions, the intellect. 
All of these would be articulated by the circulatory system, a network of seven types 
of roads, would enact Chandigarh’s main feature: flow. Precisely such is at stake, 
considering its population record-breaking car-ownership (Mufti 2014). This explains 
why traffic has been established as Chandigarh’s SC focus. Yet the lifestyle that the 
highest income-earning city enjoys makes it difficult to hamper migration. Initially 
designed for a 5 lakhs population (mainly housing bureaucrats and high officialsi), 
within seven decades, the city inhabitants have surpassed the first million. Even if Le 
Corbusier emphatically opposed the construction of satellite towns at the periphery, 
the tri-city interaction between Panchkula and Mohali established a fertile area for 
residential, business, and educational projects (Chalana 2015, 74). Wide socio-
economic divides (in terms of extension of the lots (pic. 7)) between the north and the 
south of the city, respectively developing in the 50s and 90s, signalize a 
‘psychological gap’, according to the city’s current Chief Administrator, which is 
nonetheless sedimented in heritage discourses(Chalana and Sprague 2013) and 
bureaucratic complexity, unless a big investment project (exemplified below) draws 
the interest of the administration. The valuable landii of Chandigarh, it should be 
remarked, is a constant matter of ambitious contestations for old-settlers (often 
perceived as Partition’s VIP refugees) attempt to defend their hegemony over 
corporates and traders, who moved in solely a couple of decades ago. At least both 
groups coincide in the discrimination of ‘poor immigrants’ (particularly men), who 
are often blamed for rising insecurity, while shanti towns are accused of 
environmental contamination. In sum, Chandigarh is dominated by a mix of urban 
landowners, who despite ‘rural embarrassment’, typically adapt patriarchal habits, 
inherited from feudalist Punjab to a modern layoutiii. Our argumentation points at 
various examples of such behaviours prevailing throughout the SC’s project. 
 
c) “It’s not citizens, but bureaucrats who run the city” 
 
In spite of being considered a “bastion of business and economic activity” (Kalia 
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1987, 9) the impossibility of bottom-up policy-making is well established according 
to most citizens (random, varied age, gender, profession) I interviewed in the mall. “If 
hardly any Indian city is run by its residents- as historian Rajiv Lochan (PU) said -
Chandigarh even less!” From the point of view of young and life-long activists, who I 
interviewed, one of the main reason major administration changes seem unachievable 
through citizen engagement, is the fact that in 1966 Chandigarh acquired the status of 
a Union Territory. This means that in terms of disposition of top-bureaucrats and 
funding it is directly ruled by India’s Central Government guaranteeing, thus, its 
compliance to national policies. “That’s why we’ve been able to build so much more 
social infrastructure than other peripheral states or cities”, as a leading bureaucrat 
highlights: “that gives us [in parallel] a lot more of money and aspirations”. 
Altogether this means that elected representatives have less power within the 
Administration, especially under the SC regime, which pushes the Municipality to 
become a Corporationiv and the Commissioner turns to CEO, altogether relying on 
consultancy firms. Besides some historical closeness, which serves as a justification 
of French cooperation agreements with Punducherry (former colony) and Chandigarh 
(Sharma 2016), it is also understandable that Nagpur (apparently without any 
significant connections to France) was also chosen. The fact that a ‘BJP-led municipal 
body was capable of handing over its water supply to Veolia, a French company, for 
25 years’ (Nair 2017) sheds some light on the SC’s intrinsic politico-economical 
raison d’être: the thirst for privatization harmonizes the interests of local, as much as 
inter-national public-private elites’ (Raman 2016).  
 
5.2.   Chronic of evictions, reclamations and insufficient compensations 
 
Bearing in mind that Chandigarh emerges in a postcolonial scenario, wherein the 
efforts to institutionalize the active confrontation of inequalities were driven by the 
Constitution and much of Nehru’s efforts, i.e., it seems inconceivable that the plans 
for a city, which did not reserve (but displace) housing for the working classes was 
approved. Constantly declared ‘temporal’ or ‘informal settlements’ those, who 
initially constructed the city were restricted to the margins (Sarin 1986, 2011). As this 
vicious circle continues, it is increasingly outraging to maintain Le Corbusier as a 
hero (de Jarcy 2015). If the upward socio-economic mobilization of subaltern groups 
is extremely tough in neoliberal India, in Chandigarh this seems almost unachievable.  
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a)  ‘City Beautiful’: a critical historiography  
 
Between 17 (Sabhlok 2016) to 50 (S. Sharma 2012), the precise number of villages 
displaced in order to construct Chandigarh may be debatable. Yet one thing is certain: 
demands for fair compensations of ‘land, trees, and civic infrastructure’ have been 
constant since the 50s. Almost entirely absent from regional newspapers and 
government reports the demands, repressions, and victories of movements (such as 
the anti-Rajdhani Committee formed in 1948) were hidden from mainstream 
narratives of the overall peaceful and civilized ‘City Beautiful’. A quick reading from 
an alternate ‘Social History of Chandigarh’ (K. Sharma et al. 1999), as provided by 
Soumen Bagchi, accentuates undeniable and reiterating effects of master-planning: 
dispossession, marginalization, ‘neutralization’, and bureaucratic tricks (e.g. deficient 
maintenance of records) either to avoid or diminish compensations, accompanied by 
insufficient expertise on legal tools for reclamations. Still, their knowledge and 
organization improved through justice and rights demands (2001). Altogether this 
history should warn us from ‘smart planning’ romanticizations. Thus, along this 
section, I seek to provide parallels, which suggest that despite a sense of belonging is 
reserved to middle-and upper classesv, Chandigarh, like any other city, strictly 
depends on the labor of the citizens it marginalizes. Therefore, such co-constitutive 
interdependencies, as conceptualized by Ruthie Gilmore, or “assumed duality (as 
described by Sarin) between forces of production and decision-making structures is 
actually a unit” (1986, 199). This acknowledgement becomes the most powerful 
argument for daily laborers, villagers and migrants (herein generalized as the working 
poor) to reclaim their rights over land: in terms of labor (e.g. street vendors) and 
housing. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that Le Corbusier never thought that 
poorer sections could be part of the city. Consequently, as Sarin formulates, “planned 
development produces and perpetuates both, squatter settlements and the informal 
sector” (ibid. 202) by failing to conceive the city’s development organically, in terms 
of needs and rights. Today, the SCs’ endeavour corroborates a legacy, wherein poorer 
citizens of India aspiring life-quality improvements were never welcomed in the City 
of the Open Hand, but rather condemned to socio-spatial categories, such as 
informality or illegality, which deny their RTC. 
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b) Slum-free completion? Connecting ‘smartness’ to housing rights 
 
In initial decades hardly attracting more inhabitants than the ones who got a position 
in the administration, three generations later some suggest it is still possible to 
consider Chandigarh as a ‘city of outsiders’, due to the variety of cultural 
backgrounds that (beyond Punjab and Haryana, increasingly Delhi or Himachal) 
anchor each family (Kumar Teotia 2016). Thus, even if the majority of the population 
has a history of migration, there is an abysmal difference between those who migrated 
much earlier or recently, whether one owns the plot (the rich are either landowners or 
high public officials) or rents it (majorly bureaucrats depending on contract). While 
landless informal workers tend to embody the real outsiders. Sukant Deepak narrates 
how India’s former PM chose Chandigarh as the first Slum-Free City:  
 
“While the unplanned slums had been casting shadows on the City Beautiful for long, two months after 
Singh showed the city promise of a new tag, armed with 10 JCB machines and 2,000 security 
personnel, the Chandigarh administration knocked at the doors of the biggest slum; Colony Number 5 
[and in a harsh winter, 2013] turned a colony housing around 35,000 people into debris. In no time, 
around 7,000 houses were demolished. The publicity wing of the administration claimed to have 
cleared 60 acres of land that boasted of a market price of Rs 3,000 crore. For this 'achievement', the 
UT administration won an award of City with the Best Planned Habitat for Urban Poor.”  (2015).  
 
Further, Deepak emphasizes that the 97% of slum-dwellers belong to unprivileged 
castes. They came from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, and other neighboring 
states, in order to work as gardeners, carpenters, plumbers, domestic helpers… Some 
of them would be ‘rehabilitated’ soon, others were now homeless. Initially proposed 
as a strategy to alleviate poverty (Mathur 2009), the Slum-Free rhetoric (Arabindoo 
2011) quickly turned into a justification for massively dismantling undesired ‘bastis’, 
indeed all across India, yet with particular hurry/pride in Chandigarh. Beyond the 
awards, which according to a sociologist from CRRiD “are given by the central 
government for doing normal things, many cities are not even doing”, the idea of 
rehabilitation did not emerge from RWAs, as a people’s plea, but rather from the 
administration, since “slums create embarrassment”. More than elsewhere this city’s 
aesthetic prestige keep legitimizing the violent ‘erasure of the Ugly from City 
Beautiful’, as activists Navpreet Kaur and Daljit Ami (2014) pose it: 
 
“The city media was completely hostile to the plight of these homeless, who for decades contributed in 
keeping the city “beautiful” with their sweat and blood. Rather than giving voice to these invisibilized 
citizens, some newspapers carried front-page stories about the ‘wealthy slum-dwellers’ with pictures of 
televisions, refrigerators, and even ACs. These slums, though, housed the poorest of the poor”.  
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Another interviewed journalist (2018) illustrates the interests the press represents:  
 
“Street vendors are much lesser humans to middle-/upper classes. It’s much worse in Chandigarh. 
They interact much less; there is no overlapping, but very well demarcated communities. Gated 
communities is a new trend in India, here the city has been built like that. For example, when Colony 5 
was demolished, the next day Times of India had a headline on how upper classes struggled, because 
the maids didn’t come. This sounds like some Orwellian book, but it happened, it’s been published. 
 
 
On top of that, even if Chandigarh’s rehabilitation scheme (pic.8) received a prize, 
Kumar Teotia’s empirical study (2013) leads him to consider it a failure. To begin 
with, the novel condominiums were built around 15 km away from the city. Not 
solely could segregation (brought together under poor infrastructure) potentially result 
in ‘future slums’, but if slum-dwellers need to pay for long transportation, their 
livelihood (the reason why they came to the city) is gone. It makes sense that they are 
not always happyvi for shifting, since they were not consulted when it was decided 
what kind of structure they needed. Providing a room, ‘just one shelter away from the 
city’, according to Kumar Teotia, doesn’t help much. Bearing in mind that poverty is 
a multi-dimensional issue a comprehensive view of other needs such as health, 
education, and water supply is required. Altogether, the demolishment of 12 out of 18 
slums between 2013 to 2015 framed the context for the foundation of Ghar Adhikar 
Sangharsh Morcha (GASM; Union for Housing Right’s Struggle) conformed by a 
diverse set of professionals, yet especially led by students (Students for Society) and 
professors from Punjab University. In 2016, a year since the SCM was launched and 
various critical pronouncements towards ‘smart’ plans arose; GASM became central 
to my research interests, because of directly connecting SCs to the elites’ strive to 
grab land, which by default implies an attack on the working poor’s right to make, 
inhabit, and work in the city. ‘People’s Resistance to the Smart City Project’, to be 
more concrete, is the title of the article written by ‘Pali’, convener of GASM (2016), 
which drew my attention as it seemed to suggest that a certain opposition has not only 
been discussed, but also mobilized, actively and materially. Even though the text does 
not inform about the tacit organization of resistance against the paradigm, the 
clearness in its geopolitical (WB imperialism) and politico-economical (Slum-free) 
critique, motivated me to contact Pali as well as additional funding members and 
broadly follow their efforts to politicize SCP for the next year and a half. How did 
initial articulations of resistance to the SCM evolve across their activist experience to 
the reconsideration of the limitations confronted in such a neoliberal scenario? 
		 57	
From its introductory statement, Pali frames his critique to the SCs’ project around 
the neoliberal agenda it is attached, wherein multiple “policies of liberalization and 
privatization have been introduced” as opportunities for global capitalists to overcome 
the 2008 crisis. This explains why an analysis of the SC’s definition is spared, as well 
as the overview of its deriving services is kept very short; what matters is the World 
Bank and particularly U.S. American corporations are behind. Consequently, even if 
often cited dependency-theory concepts often give the impression of an outdated 
vocabulary, Pali dares to point at what many journalist and academics avoid; on one 
hand the geopolitical anchoring of the ‘smartness’ discourse, and secondly the 
intended extension of financial and technological markets, globally. However, as 
imageries of the 1st -externalizing the responsibility for the issue -and 3rd world are 
generalized, a chance to identify the local (political and corporate) elites profiting 
from the nationalist SCM (homegrown populism and capitalism) is missed. In 
contrast, a victimized representation of Indian citizens (as postcolonial subjects) alerts 
damaging consequences: “through their smartness, they will make us fool once 
again”. Supposing that the opposite of a smart subject is fool, Pali does not challenge 
whose hegemonic perspective dictates such demarcation. The fact that various cities 
have signed understanding agreements with foreign states, rightly locates the source 
(PPPs) and the end (privatization of land and services) of intended investments the 
‘smart’ discourse attempts to enable. Altogether, the way Pali articulates his critique 
to SCs makes Marxist terminology highly relevant and even more contemporary:  
 
“The government is building smart cities by crushing its own people” (…) For whom will smart cities 
be made? …If the land in the smart and other cities (where slum dwellers live) is public land then what 
would be the land of these workers... where they will go? This earth doesn’t belong to the working-
class people. Are they living on earth just to do the labor, for making these smart cities for the elite?”  
 
In 2014, hundreds of citizens came to various demonstrations and a public hearing 
organized by GASM, in order to protest against demolitions. Playing with the 
hopes/votes of the working poor, however, policy makers betrayed their agreement 
and moved forward with additional demolitions. Hence, in spite of already being used 
to distrust the word of politicians, it turned clear for GASM that ‘the real fight’ had to 
be established within the ‘political field’, instead of short-sighted legal reparations. At 
stake are the historical foundations (past/current injustices and future abuses), upon 
which slum-dwellers are not only entitled to respond to demolition notifications, are 
permanently empowered to demand their socio-economic/-spatial rights.  
		 58	
Pali highlights the importance of a collaborative rather than competitive approach: 
“From the first day we communicated that this administration will not give housing to all, this created 
divisions among slum-dwellers, who realized that the administration would only give housing to 25%. 
So many got busy preparing/completing documents, instead of collaborating with each other. Yet, 
eventually they realize that many people with complete documents still didn’t get housing: so, 
documents are not the issue. Out of 25000 houses required, at that moment only 12000 were built.” 
 
The kind of political organization and trust GASM was aiming to construct relied on 
longer, deeper, and patient dedication to bottom-up dialogues. From the beginning the 
idea was fertilizing the grounds, in order to support slum-dwellers to ‘fight their 
fight’. In the initial months, five of the founding members I interviewed visited a 
couple of bastis each, around three days a week on the attempt to understand how 
communities perceived their issues (these were mostly immediate concerns, such as 
water, electricity, schooling) and connect with influential leaders. Theatre 
performances, screenings or medical camps were explored as communication 
channels (pic. 9). Yet most importantly pamphlets and newspapers (in Hindi, 
informing about issues for the working-class in the region from a Marxist perspective) 
produced by GASM, invited the inhabitants of threatened colonies to weekly 
meetings. The goal was discussing government policies, quoting Pali “how they are 
totally anti-worker, anti-farmer, anti-women, anti-people, most of them”. Decisively, 
women played a central role: firstly, women were the majority of participants, 
because of their schedule even if they commonly work, they would have duties at 
home, too, so secondly, women arguably think about the family’s wellbeing in a 
broader perspective, i.e. defending slums, in addition to proximity to work, because of 
education opportunities. And moreover, men were already part of some labour 
organization advocating for better payments and holidays, not for housing. Hence, as 
institutionalized local leaders were avoided an anti-hegemonic structure started to be 
forged. Yet progressively such approach turned unsustainable. Frustration expanded 
quickly once protests (pic. 10) could not stop demolitions and other threatened areas 
were postponed. As the waters calmed, slum-dwellers in parallel with GASM 
members lost the urgency and commitment to meet regularly. They also had to 
respond to study, work or family activities. Pali is very critical of the rise and decline 
of the movement he initiated; the following statements sum up some key learnings: - “We were not able to understand the dynamics. We were not experienced, but we have learnt a lot. 
Especially that you have to work with the working-class and you have to be like them, in each and 
every sense. You are an outsider who comes from the air, meet them for 1 or 2 hours, and then come 
back and go after one day... they won’t trust people who come from the outside, they’re more interested 
on the people, who are from their own people.” 
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- “Slum-dwellers do not stand for all sort of demands. They often say they came to Chandigarh to work, 
not for houses, which I understand honestly… There’s diverse people in slums, some are not that poor, 
but 70-80% are very poor; can’t pay rents, can’t cover children food, hardly imagine they can study”. - “It is very clear that even slum-dwellers don’t care about what’s happening in the name of SCs; Make 
in India, Digital or Skill India, i.e. One reason may be that the working-class comes from many 
different places, so maybe-up to some extent they have their houses in their own villages, this might be 
a tiny portion of land, which is also an option. That is why the working class is not fighting sharply… 
there are struggles to decrease working hours, but not to increase wage”. 
 
How could ‘smart’ technologies help in this regard? Even before digital access, the 
fact that slum-dwellers are often illiterate (in local languages and English) already 
complicates their communication with activists and any bureaucratic or political 
process, in general. Adding to this, the daily labourers majorly focus on surviving, 
they barely find time to organize a revolt in response to immediate alarms on issues 
that affect them, such as the provision of basic services. If activism based on personal 
encounters, already causes trust issues on representatives who are not that seldom 
attached to a longer chain of interests (according to Pali, “bourgeois parties and the 
administration hold local leaders to work through them”); will a much more abstract 
promise of sustainable living through optimized use of ICTs and the beautification of 
certain sectors up to world-class standards, generate hope among slum-dwellers? It 
seems commonsensical to categorically respond “no”, which was indeed confirmed 
by the interviewees in various bastis, during numerous visits, as I will sketch below. 
Yet such recognition is insufficient for GASM and other activists alike, who keep 
busy reflecting about more effective strategies, which despite time and team 
constraints, could be rewarding in a longer term, like education i.e. For now, the 
influence of GASM’s work is manifested in some legal advancements (denouncing 
wrong spelling in applicants’ formularies for housing, as well as independently 
contacting the police in case of (sexual) abuses, instead of solely discussing it among 
commoners), which sporadically favoured some families. These are also long 
processes, which require a set of professionals cooperating with good will, in addition 
to the right documents, and informed clients. Overall, this whole context depicts very 
distanced, say abyssal, possibilities for SC to be subverted towards the advantage of 
subaltern urbanism. Especially since whoever has engaged in public housing, among 
other basic rights, is conscious of the varied ways biometric surveys can be 
manipulated, in order to strike out families that have been waiting up to 10 years from 
the list. Blinding such pressing needs, while re-directing attention to further 
redeveloping some hubs, is a luxury that only certain sections of the city can afford.  
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c) No chance for in situ – ‘digital’ stands for ‘world-class’ 
 
The SC basically enables a regime of exceptionality that, in the same manner, ‘allows 
constructing an IT Park without deep, detailed studies on the relevance and need of an 
IT Park (t)here, just because it’s the in-thing to have’. Further, Jyoti (pseudonym), 
who is an architect and senior activist, fought 10 years for the case, in order to avoid 
the acquisition of 500 acres (a third of the project) for the IT Park. However the 
project is technically not cancelled, since now the area is going to be the third phase 
of Chandigarh’s 2031 Master Plan (CPM). Considering Chandigarh’s distinctive 
history, even prior to SCs, land disputes over ‘Rajiv Gandhi’s, rather known as IT 
Park’ imply a major reference to understand how politicians and corporates take 
advantage of digital trends, in order to deliberately sell or appropriate land at 
exceptionally low prices (10% of its value), without any previous consultation. 
‘Ridiculous’ observes Jyoti, who resides in the area. “One of the main purposes of the 
Periphery was preventing land speculation”- reminds us Manish Chalana (2015, 75) – 
yet “the Chandigarh administration engages in effectively that”. Just like SCs, the 
project was “promoted as a SEZ, PPPs circumvent land’s use laws/local jurisdiction”. 
Interchangeably hence, policy makers and influential citizens re-interpret the meaning 
and purpose of the ‘greenbelt’ established by Le Corbusier in a Garden Cities logic as 
a ‘buffer zone’ around the city, in order to forbid poor migrants to encroach, hence, 
approach planned sectors. Yet commonly this zone is offered in the real estate market 
for middle-/upper classes or indeed for corporate projects. According to Jyoti such are 
mostly arbitrary decisions accompanied by questionable ‘self-cooked data’, which 
justifies it. While the CMP 2031, e.g., mentions “restoring the original city-periphery 
concept is well [-] nigh impossible at this stage”, it also ‘identifies seventeen pockets 
within the Periphery for high-density developments in a variety of uses including 
residential, commercial, institutional and infrastructure’ (ibid. 77). In parallel, under 
the excuse of safeguarding a barely visited park, as well as in view of a metro, which 
is not official yet, slum-dwellers were displaced (Express 2016) in light of 
Chandigarh’s status as India’s “garden and oxygen capital” presumably being 
threatened (TNN 2017b). Thus, it is clear that generally, the City Beautiful elites 
prefer throwing money at roses (the Rose Garden (pic. 11) in Sector 16 is an iconic, 
living monument) and keeping the poor apart, rather than investing in water, 
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electricity, and waste infrastructure for all. Thus, re-activating small-scale economies 
or skilling, just as Smart Cities should be about: improving everyone’s, not solely the 
rich quality of life. These, as other engaged citizens, who have observed how the city 
and broadly how India works can tell, are neither managerial, nor technical mistakes. 
With or without ICT services, class ideology governs. Corruption and undemocratic 
practices have frustrated generations of well-trained citizens, willing to collaborate in 
city governance like Jyoti or Madhu:  
 “According to the master plan: whenever something is redeveloped there should be efforts for 
intermixing social groups, but ultimately, it’s a combination of the market and political power, which 
determine the outcomes, and they get away with it, no one challenges them…it’s just incredible! I think 
the issue is when there is no transparency, no accountability and no clear criteria on which decisions 
are made, then it becomes an old-boys-club… the whole idea of setting the Housing Board was to make 
affordable housing available, especially for those who can’t compete in the market, so it was really for 
lower income groups. First 2/3 years they did build for EWS, afterwards it became high-income 
groups. Over a period of 10 years, when the population grew over a few lakhs, they built so many units 
for non-residents Indians10, with subsidized land, while not even a single unit was built for EWS!  
 
During her tenure (1998 to 2001), Sarin made pressure to reshape Housing Board 
policy according to projections of demand and shortage. But nobody liked it, she says, 
so her contract ended. Similarly, Jyoti got tired of ‘being allotted to a lot of ineffectual 
committees’, so she decided to work outside of a ‘body that has no real political 
intentions to serve needs’. The kind of data SCP aims to collect (more precise 
information about waste and transport management) will not change much for the 
deliberate socio-spatial marginalization of the working poor. Drawing upon a 
conversation with Housing Board’s a high official, I underline some rhetorical and 
practical strategies to (un)recognize the RTC depends on class. While slum-dwellers 
are commonly neglected as untrustworthy subjects, the Housing Board is proud of 
fighting such ‘mafia’: “they actually love slums, but they apply for housing, because 
they want to make business”. Still, public housing is not a gift. In fact: “they can’t sell 
it and then go back to the slums. If they really need a house, then they have to live 
there”. Even if obliged to rent it for 20 yearsvii, improvements through retrofitting 
situated knowledge is entirely sidelined prior, during or after the construction. 
“It is my housing”, the technocrat says, “1000 people will say 1000 things, but, they’re not 
professionals, they don’t know what is right from wrong. They don’t even know what is the importance 
of ventilation, so why should I want them? I don’t think I should” (…) “I am an architect, I am 
professional, I understand LC, they don’t, so who’ll teach me?”  	
10 In addition to CPM 2031, Chalana (2015, 74) points out “Punjab had proposed a township northwest 
of Chandigarh meeting ‘‘international standards’’ for nonresident Indians or Indian expatriates looking 
for a second or retirement home in their native land. The town of Anandgarh (originally proposed as 
‘New Chandigarh’in 1995) aimed becoming “an ultra-modern, futuristic city with global vision, built 
on a 10,500-acre site that contained over two dozen villages and productive farmlands”. 
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Following the architect, Le Corbusier conditioned the city’s exceptionality to the 
degree that the working poor, from anywhere in India, are not legitimated to aspire 
the same life quality than the inhabitants of planned Chandigarh: 
 
“If you ask them, they want the world. They want a hospital right next to their house. But they don’t 
want a slum right next to their neighborhood, right? (…) I cannot allow narrow streets, how will my 
ambulance pass through those shanties? Not in Chandigarh. Migrants (slum-dwellers) come from 
Bihar, UP where the streets are also narrow. We don’t want to propagate it. Dhanas is a planned area. 
When the population is good enough to demand their own hospital, the ambulance will reach there.” 
 
Even if their sole demand is improving the infrastructure, they constructed by 
themselves, instead of being demolished, slum-dwellers and its advocates (GASM, 
e.g.) are not heard. Their contribution is vital for society, yet rehabilitation in situ is 
not a possibility for the administration. Major construction projects around Elante 
Mall, formerly industrial area, used to be bordered by the biggest working-class 
colonies, until Colony 5 and now Colony 4 remain the last ones standing. Jyoti, also a 
professor, remembers an incident at the College of Architecture:  
“Students would suggest creating a three-storied commercial building as a boundary so that they 
(Colony 5) are behind… No one would believe that 33% of the population lives in slums; people just 
don’t want to look. They want to continue making walls, blocking them away… they had this fear…” 
 
“So the character of the area is shifting to a more consumption-based (malls and hotels) place than a 
production-based place- says Aanya, a scholar at IISER Mohali - people feel more safe when only 
their kind of people inhabits the space around them. (…) If you really want to make an area smart 
then pick up a slum area, nicely manage waste in it, put up plants, sewerage, water, electricity 
systems, manage electronically. There one has the potential to put-in systems and actually improve 
citizens lives. But the way they’re doing it is that they’re already picking up areas that are already 
well developed in terms of the services. The SC is meant for the already polished classes.” 
 
In Chandigarh, as it is the case inter-nationally most often than not, SCs pursue a 
classist raison d’être. Hence, expanding a consumption ‘lifestyle’ is favored over 
providing public services, support health and education. Colony nr. 5, initially 
constituted due to the Industrial Area, is now in ruins. It became a very depressed 
area, almost liquidated (pic. 12). Remarkably, in comparison to other bastis, 
inhabitants who do not have access to water nor proper food, immediately got closer 
to me in large groups, because of curiosity, indeed, but especially hoping I could 
provide any kind of help. The biggest mall of the North Western region stands now as 
a huge massive white and glass wall (pic. 13) radically dividing the daily landscapes 
of those who afford buying there and those who barely survive.  
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5.3. Discussing ‘smart city’ plans in the street, not in apps  
 
In parallel with chapter 4, I propose examining the contestation of Chandigarh’s SCP 
by focusing on the three sections that helped us structure the inquiry of the RTC 
within the national SCM. To start with, (a) we will analyze the main justifications for 
Chandigarh’s SC candidacy (Chandigarh Administration 2016b). Its promotion as an 
IDEAL city and the accentuation of a rewarding trajectory confirm that the point is not 
extending services but scaling up in the rankings. It is clear that in Chandigarh’s 
second attempt, (b) bureaucrats have exemplarily employed the concept of Area-
based and Pan-city development, even more decisively expressing capitalist visions of 
master planning (CPM 2031, i.e.) through the SCs’ language. The voices of a diverse 
group of interviewees, either currently working at the administration, or having 
constructed close social relations, serve to counter the SC discourse of transparency, 
efficiency and increased participation. Since, due to the design and low density of the 
city in comparison to other Indian metropolis long residents get to know the majority 
of influential citizens personally. Interviewees often manifest distrust towards the 
consultations that arguably were only performed to vindicate the interventions and 
vision of the city that the administration anyways had in mind, initially (c). Not even 
bureaucrats understand the meaning of ‘smartness’ it is testified; yet they see this as 
an opportunity to grab funds from the central state and private investors. In other 
words, there was never an instance of dialogue, wherein proposals originated from 
social movements, individuals or any kind of associations with diverse, hence, 
conflictive interests (Mouffe 2000) that could bring planning debates much closer to 
citizens’ daily struggles. Nonetheless, comfort with structural privileges, frustration 
outcomes in earlier attempts to participate (as illustrated above), together with the 
UT’s subordination to national schemes disrupt possibilities for citizens’ skepticism 
to lead to active contestations of the ‘smart’ paradigm. On the optimistic side, only 
middle/upper-class citizens (whom I interviewed in the mall or in IT offices) identify 
with the project. Critical scholars, activists, slum-dwellers clearly do not. ‘If 
politicians would care for us then, they would essentially stop demolitions and focus 
on in situ development of schools, e.g. Especially among daily laborers there is hardly 
any appropriation of ‘smartness’, as Datta diagnosed. Their priorities differ radically 
on the way of constructing community networks and reclaiming basic infrastructure. 
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Even one year after the policy was launched in September 2015, instead of 
achievements there was generalized shock, due to the absence of Chandigarh when 
the first SCs’ list was published. This remained the common denominator for citizens 
to follow the Administration’s response until its inclusion in the second list was 
celebrated, hence avoiding what could have become an existential crisis (Rohtaki 
2018b). “You take any parameter, Chandigarh is the best city in India”, the Municipal 
Commissioner reflects, “infrastructure is almost 100% covered and 40% of the entire 
area is green (…) yet that doesn’t mean there’s no path for future development”. 
Definitely, the most repetitive explanation for the later consideration of Chandigarh in 
the SCs’ list is that Chandigarh is a SC already, actually much earlier than the term 
itself. Indeed, the high quality services that its citizens enjoy do not fit national 
parameters, rather the objective (generally, yet particularly amidst the SCM) is 
reaching ‘foreign standards’ (Rohtaki 2017). On top of that, another pragmatic 
explanation may be that on the attempt to stick to the Master Plan 2031, which was 
determined much earlier, the Administration (2016a) failed on aligning to the central 
government’s vocabulary and format of smartness; ironically calling for major 
consultancy reliance. An influential architect who works for the Confederation of 
Indian Industry (CII) said:  
“The first city to be recognized as a SC was Bhubaneswar and that’s the most stupid city as compared 
to Chandigarh… It may be that they gave a fantastic idea, but I could see the entire exercise of SCs: to 
hire a man, who is best on writing in English and coping proposal from somewhere irrelevant from this 
place and they evaluate and rank this”. 
 
 
a) ‘Already smart’, but justified  
As point of departure, in a city where basic services are virtually guaranteed for the 
residents of planned sectors, Chandigarh’s Commissioner explains “our path will be 
totally different”. Although ICTs work as a scapegoat for further comfort, not 
everything is built upon technology in Chandigarh’s SC vision, rather supplying an 
‘experience of a sustainable living’ in line with middle-/upper class lifestyle/desires.  
 
“Instead of basic infrastructure, more towards happiness, healthiness, greenery, better urban 
understanding, better infrastructure and better experience for people. (…) First, there should be an in-
built smartness in the infrastructure and processes related to the citizen. So, whether it’s bus services 
or government services (…) smart system would be if you can apply from your home. Second, you 
should get the status report automatically, on your mobile phone or on your computer so you need not 
visit a certain place and check once and again what has happened. Similarly, when streetlight is not 
working, then detecting it immediately by generating a message coming directly to the concerned 
office. (…) The goal of a city is to provide a certain kind of experience to its citizens, smartness is not 
only technology; but where a citizen enjoys his or her life; a sustainable, healthy and happy 
environment: not that much pollution, space to play, for re-creation activities, such as morning yoga”.  
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A SCP is basically an exercise of city branding, yet tourists are less targeted in this 
endeavor. Rather, describing Chandigarh as the ‘best, happiest, and cleanest city’ 
resembles a presentation card to attract private investment. Further displayed awards 
corroborate this depiction: ‘among the top 25 outsourcing destinations in the world’, 
‘best e-governance’, ‘4th most livable city in India- high HDI’, ‘model Solar City’ or, 
in accordance to the Smart Cities Council, ‘India’s most promising city’ (Chandigarh 
Administration 2016b, 4). Furthermore, as recommended by the NIUA, the analysis 
of ‘Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats’ (ibid. 5) supposes a self-
assessment strategy to simulate critical reflexivity on an overtly abstract conception of 
citizens’ living conditions. Consequently, this works as a self-applauding tool for the 
luxuries middle-/upper classes do (strengths) and could (opportunities) further enjoy. 
While inequality, violence, and further injustices are overlooked, ‘safety concerns’ 
counts among possible ‘threats’ 11 . Other weaknesses (‘limited private sector 
employment opportunities’) and opportunities (‘strategic location, excellent 
connectivity, potential to develop Knowledge and services hub’) point at qualities that 
would make the city attractive for business and a world-class lifestyle. The further 
elaboration of Chandigarh as ‘an IDEAL city’ is sustained by similar superficial 
descriptions, which avoid any concrete compromises. The already “Innovative 
Distinctive & Dynamic Economically vibrant Accessible Livable city” aims to 
comparable abstract goals (ibid.): ‘a Vibrant and Distinct Regional Centre’, 
envisioned as a leader in sustainability, livability, equality and innovation; a City that 
celebrates its ‘Modern Planned Heritage’. Note that equality refers to opportunities 
(Municipal Corporation 2016), hence, opting for accessibility to housing, health, 
education, transport, or welfare, which numerous studies (Duggal 2010; Kumar Teotia 
2013, 2016) have categorically denied to exist. If any improvements for the working 
poor can be identified at the intersection of ABD and Pan-city initiatives, then such 
are always thought in function of service providing, like Transit Oriented 
Development, i.e. Under the slogan of “better preventing than cure”, the plan 
welcomes “strategic blueprint development”, which intends to ‘emerge stronger to 
withstand the 21st Century challenges of climate change and modern-day disasters… 
merely by improving public transport and walking paths (Chandigarh Administration 
2016c). A much direct response to diminish traffic and pollution would be that the 	
11 “Rising traffic congestion, parking, high risk seismic zone, competition for investment, outward 
migration of youth employment”. (ibid.) 
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grids’ residents choose public over private transport. ‘The rich won’t get off their 4-
wheelers, though’. In contrast, within planned Chandigarh the poor already opt for 
the ‘cleanest’ transportation methods: walking, sharing rickshaws or bicycles. Bearing 
in mind that enhancing flow was not the only initial purpose of the grid, yet also one 
of the most relevant commonalities with the SCs’ imaginary, it is understandable that 
sophisticated and exorbitant costly transport infrastructure awakes the interests of 
public-private investors, such as the French proposal of ‘three Tricity corridors’, in 
order to deal with “traffic generators” (Rohtaki 2018c). 
 
An additional source of concern for Chandigarh is, according to a PU historian, the 
constant pressure to catch up with any modernizing trend, such as Navi Mumbai’s 
coins of ‘eco-friendly, sustainability’, which seemed to be missing. Consequently, 
particularly amidst the 2014 elections, there was a need of bringing in a fresh (digital, 
global) vocabulary, which is more attractive than JNURRM reforms. “Only then there 
was a lot of noise about SCs”, says a researcher at IISER Mohali, “it has been thrown 
on us as a panacea for all the ills of the city, but I think it’s a fraud”. Indeed, as 
acknowledged by Praveen (pseudonym) a senior resident, who had the opportunity to 
lead architect and industrial unions, the word ‘smart’ comes from ‘smartphones’, yet 
the mission itself derives from Modi’s pressure to catch-up with the 21st century: 
 
 “In terms of infrastructure, most of our cities are third class. They don’t have systems, electricity 
distribution, medical facilities aren’t available, no transport system, the educational system is also 
deficient… Everything that grew by itself that’s it! ... SCs is about who has the power, that’s it.’ 
 
Aanya, also from IISER Mohali, points at the symbiotic relationship between 
nationalism and modernism: 
“Each time urban planning is seen as a tool to create a certain kind of citizenry and image for the 
country – nationalism pulls on this notion of both being forward looking and reinventing history and 
then proclaiming a bright future. The idea of India shining, e.g., within that notion SCs fit perfectly”. 
 
“While the UT administrator hoisted the National Flag at Sector 17 parade ground on 
Republic Day” the press echoes such bureaucrat’s vision of “Chandigarh, the pride of 
India, turning out to be an ideal Smart City [since] in the area of e-governance it has 
already taken the lead” (HT 2016). Nonetheless, three years after the Mission was 
initiated, almost no changes can be identified in the ground. Efforts and funds were 
physically, not even digitally, concentrated on governance. By building an expensive 
Smart City Office (Express 2018), i.e., bureaucratic governance is literally put at the 
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center. Thus, even if Chandigarh’s Administration (2016b, 2) promotes the changes 
for diversifying the use of ICTs (i.e. through Aadhaar, e-kiosks to pay taxes, citizen 
friendly websites, SCADA for water management, 88 biometric devices in important 
departments), these are rather governance tools, which facilitate management. An 
outstanding minority of citizens interviewed pointed at e-governance as a ‘smart’ 
novelty. Similarly, to Modi’s apps (pic. 14), Chandigarh envisions using ICTs, which 
by no means fulfill deliberative, but solely affirmative means. Aansh (pseudonym), a 
social journalist, asserts how complicated it is to find a story in Chandigarh, because 
‘everything works there’, ‘there are enough paying centers, which are never full’. Yet 
amidst the IT hype, the use of ICTs is a medal to show off: 
 
“A cow loving person-sending messages in Whatsapp fits perfectly. More app downloads give better 
ranking, so the administration encourages people through the radio. They tell you ‘last year we fucked 
up in cleanliness rankings, this year please download the app’. The administration put its website into 
an app and there’s also a police alarm app. Some company sold this idea to lots of cities. These kids 
know business, probably studied in the same college”. 
 
b) The quest for capturing public funds  
 
The fertility of the smart discourse to attract ‘innovative’ business  (digital, real estate, 
services) is not merely invoked by most of the bureaucrats interviewed, who see a 
chance for expanding industries, but it is also supported by young middle/upper-class 
citizens, who already sense growing competition in the labor and education markets. 
“Where will our educated children go?” - asks Praveen – “How can we avoid them 
moving out elsewhere and facilitate them further comfortable living in Chandigarh”. 
In response, the city’s Commissioner reinstates Le Corbusier’s project as a 
‘concentric site of exchanges’, where there is hardly any scope for an industrial area. 
Nonetheless, in spite of observing that in such area ‘land is a very scarce commodity’, 
he does envision a kind of industry, although different from ‘mass-scale 
manufacturing’. Instead ‘knowledge and service industries (i.e. hotels, convention 
centers, offices)’ should profit from the high level of technical education in 
Chandigarh and its surroundings. Hence, the Chief Architect admits that one of the 
central goals within Chandigarh’s SC’s framework is ‘planning an incubation center, 
where start-ups can come’ and together with the already existing technical institutes, 
“these people will park themselves, as interface for the industry and for meeting new 
people”. 
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In a similar arbitrary manner cited earlier, there is the possibility that the percentages 
of public support are in fact ‘self-cooked data’, yet due to the lack of transparency 
such is hard to question. We may be forced to assume the ‘consultation’ results, that 
95% voted for establishing Area Based Development in sectors 17, 22, 35, 43 (where 
‘smart’ services (Rohtaki 2016) should be concentrated), while 98% said ‘yes’ to 
“Greenfield Development for the stretch along Vikas Marg with a proposed Business 
and Financial Centre”. Making himself responsible for the project, Praveen explains 
me how the SCM entails a golden opportunity for pressure groups to attract public 
fundingviii. According to him, among policy makers no one is certain of the history 
and meaning of ‘smart’, but that’s not an impediment to make business and redefine 
it. Anyways many agents attempt to sell services. He poses an example:   
“If I’m in engineer on software from Bangalore I’d come to the government and tell them that what 
you need is big-dat, and computing power, and you know that kind of thing. And I’ll try to ensure that 
all money goes into SCs, which is into data collection… Let’s say I’m selling train wheels; I’d say SC 
means good transportation.” 
 
So very broadly, ABD is about the geographical concentration of ‘essential smart city 
features’ (Chandigarh Administration 2016b, 10). Resembling IBM’s or CII’s 
diversified expositions of offered services, the diagram envisions an area with ‘public 
Wi-Fi hotspots, interactive kiosks, underground wiring, pollution level monitoring, 
police kiosks/e-Beats, smart meters and grids, solar energy, scientific waste disposal, 
GPS enabled bin-tracking system’, among others (ibid.). Nonetheless, some of the 
measures could also be viable without technologies, like ‘designated car-free zones’ 
or ‘100% coverage of path and cycling tracks’. However, the emphasis is put on a 
certain ‘smart’ lifestyle: street cafés and open plazas are part of “Sector 17’s 
rejuvenation”. Shown in a ‘before and after’ aesthetics (ibid. 14); these novelties 
approximate make-up, rather than substantial changes. “Landscaped open spaces” i.e. 
are accompanied with “street furniture”: bus stand, street sign, bench, and led lights. 
Yet if the heritage status already forbids even the smallest interventions, such as 
painting the balconies with another color or shapeix, how are they going to re-shape Le 
Corbusier’s into ‘smart’ sectors? Or did the materialization of such utopia never really 
matter anyways? Two years after the mission was launched, the only differences I 
note in the streets are blue (instead of green) traffic signs with the Smart City logo on 
it (pic. 15), as well as a laser show (with music and projections) in S-17 (pic. 16), and 
wagons selling water (pic.17), instead of making it more reachable (cleaning it, e.g.). 
Yet the privatization of services is also going to affect the middle-classes. Pali warns 
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that the majority is ignorant of such disadvantages at the moment, because of 
identifying with upper mobility aspirations (hegemonic culture). In the same vein, 
‘smart parking’ has meant installing kiosks, where 10 rupees are charged, although 
analogously. Thus, if fighting ‘encroachment parking’ is aimed, in order to give 
middle/upper-class citizens a feeling of security (‘they just want to be among 
themselves’) “Smart Sector Surveillance” might not even be required. The working 
poor, rural migrants are not only stigmatized as the protagonists for robbery or as 
danger for sexual molestation, but, i.e., in commercial sectors their presence remains 
an undecided polemic, since the shopkeepers in S-17 have been protesting and putting 
pressure for informal vendors to leave elsewhere, even if they acquire credentials. 
Thus, it would not be surprising to see ABD, the ‘smart hub’, getting declared as a 
widely privatized area ‘free of informality, free of encroachers’. In a Pan-City 
approach, however, not even the most basic urban facilities, like water supply, are 
displayed in Chandigarh’s SCP’s highlights (ibid). Even if a Housing Board Official 
remarks that ‘whichever superficial scheme has to be there’, because of  “politics, you 
know, they will always have a soft corner for the slum people”, ‘pan-city solutions’ 
demarcate a neoliberal, self-responsibilizing regime, where PPP suppose gains for all: 
 
“The biggest share of public investment goes to infrastructure, such as hotels or convention center, 
says the Commissioner, which is going to bring more egalitarianism. Everyone is going to be 
benefitted out of a better water supply system. Except for illegal encroachers in government’s land… 
the rest of the population will rather be benefitted indirectly, through new jobs (skilled and not).” 
 
Pan-city solutions rely on technology, wherein ‘smart’ traces the line between city-
citizens and city-servants. Hence, any infrastructure that could benefit poorer sections 
is initially thought in terms of the services they could provide (to middle/upper-
classes, legitimate residents), and not in regard to their own living: 
 
“We’re trying to use more working places in that area, so that big development gives them 
opportunities to work (…) this are basically “service sector people”, who are staying in slums, so 
they’ll need less time to travel, and then we’re building 70kms of cycle tracks – trying to promote bike-
sharing process and trying to use technology: implementing an intelligent traffic management system.”  
 
Remarkably, the choice of pan-city initiatives; on one hand the ‘smart integrated e-
governance’ and the expansion of a unified Intelligent Multi-modal command and 
control center (water, police, health and traffic systems, e.g.) on the other, are also 
backed by public support or at least that’s what they say. 68% of votes prioritized e-
governance, understood as “online delivery of citizen services”. “Enhancing the 
safety and security of citizens through tech solutions” comprised the 16%, while 
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“integrated public transport and smart traffic management solutions” got 15% of the 
votes. 1% went to “energy efficient intelligent street lighting” and 0% went to 
“technology enabled healthcare solutions”. Judging from the interviews I held 
nonetheless, I am highly skeptical. The majority of citizens I talked to revealed 
concerns about jobs, increasing rents, and managing to pay study fees. Indeed, safety 
is an issue, especially for women, who feel threatened by newcomers, in light of 
further rape and molestation cases going public (I will return to this in the discussion). 
However, violence is often enclosed behind doors and social structures. Dominant 
subjects are anyways capable of buying innocence, while CCTV cameras fail to 
protect targeted minorities (Pathak 2018). Even technological solutions, it should be 
underlined, are normed by social hierarchies; as illustrated by the following examples: 
 
A scholar from Punjab University argues “whoever implements these policies at a 
very local level has all subjective perceptions and biases when it comes to gender, 
caste, class…” Hence, in regard to ‘safety and security’, she describes how guards at 
PU are entitled to sanction couples or punish women, who come ‘late’ to their hostels. 
Cameras, hence, work rather as tools for imposing fear, for disciplining, although 
rather human decisions matter. “Cameras won’t keep society us safe from the panic 
based on caste (which she calls a ‘collective amnesia’) or religious discrimination, 
that wouldn’t be an issue if the subject is an upper-class male”. At the same time, 
“middle/upper-classboys are also violent, but remain protected by families, concerned 
they will not get ‘well married’ if people find out they consume drugs, which is a 
latent issue in Punjab, and especially in Chandigarh”. The biggest criminals are 
probably those, who profit from someone else’s sweat; CCTV won’t capture that.  
 
“Safety should be part of our culture, says an established architect, cameras and policemen won’t help. 
This is a planned city, if something goes wrong, I would not say it’s unintentional, but intentional. 
(Stratified) planning is one of the tools to promote discrimination…” 
 
Secondly, waste management is an interesting example of how huge investments in 
smart technologies (sensors, e.g.) could be spared if social commitment is prioritized. 
Separation of solid waste, i.e., could start from households. Motivated by the SCs’ 
framework, students at Nitte University, Mangalore, launched an awareness campaign 
last year, which however lasted very shortly, due to meager support of the authorities. 
On the other hand, a PU historian emphasizes how systems for waste collection 
developed at university have failed when implemented in the city, due to the lack of 
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communication of the initiative. “The problem across Indian cities” he says “is 
governance. The decision-taking body is always the state, so if citizens are not there it 
takes always a longer period for the people to accept what the state offers”. 
Nonetheless, citizen engagement was only conceived very superficially in 
Chandigarh’s SCP, basically solely for promotion rather than for tacit implementation 
or follow-up of the policy. In fact, only daily laborers will keep dealing with 
everyone’s waste, which is a fundamental work, indeed, yet very badly paid and at the 
expense of mostly inhuman conditionsx. Principally in this topic, the classist 
connotations of ‘smartness’ related to culture and sanitation arise the clearest. 
Following Chandigarh’s Commissioner: 
 
“You must understand in India, people are very smart in adapting technologies and then there will be 
people who we take as illiterate or semi-illiterate that also use smartphones… The application of this 
smartness in making your surrounding means fulfilling basic duties (saving resources, keeping their 
city clean, understanding the city culture and contributing to it). If a city has to make toilets, i.e., these 
cannot be right next to each other… if the citizens are not smart, not beautiful in using those toilets 
then you cannot make a city open defecation-free. So that is the difference between a SC and a non-SC. 
You go to a developed city and you will find that people don’t even throw a piece of paper on the street, 
they’ll look for the garbage bin and then they throw it there.” 
 
This means that even if laborers are in charge of keeping the city functioning, i.e. by 
maintaining it clean, their socio-spatial category of ‘slum-dwellers’ is used as the 
opposite of ‘smartness’, ironically denying them the right to enjoy such cleanliness 
around their own homes. Despite the conditions, all the houses and residents in bastis 
and rehabilitation colonies I could visit, were very clean. It is, hence, outrageously 
unfair, that the working poor inhabiting in slums, are under constant risks of diseases 
(pic. 18), due to the bad quality of the scarce water they manage to access, which 
obliges the ones who can afford it to spend significant sums on water tankers. Further, 
Datta (2018, 9) highlights Chandigarh’s “smart cleaning strategy” (inspired by 
analogous best-practices in Mohali) as an example of the exclusionary behavior that 
“smart citizenship” dynamics reproduce. While citizens are encouraged to track “the 
attendance, uniform, equipment and performance of sweepers”- ‘by taking pictures 
and upload them in real time to a municipality’s cloud-based software’ - the digital is 
instrumental to prolongue (post)colonial notions of sanitation, it traces an abyssal line 
between ‘smart’ and ‘subaltern citizens’. The former, “claimed their space in a smart 
urban future using their ‘digital acts’ to discipline the latter”, as they are legitimised to 
surveill working-classes, who have “little or no control over their own labor” (ibid). 
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A PU sociologist calls this “absent presencexi”: even if ‘they sustain the economy of 
the city’, slum-dwellers are simply absent from the imagination of residents, ‘absent 
from our discourses, our language, our questions, from everywhere’. She adds: 
 
“We don’t need to talk about them, because they’re there. You throw away your domestic help, another 
one will come, because of the surplus availability of labor in this country. This is all connected to 
global processes, though. Consider labor-chowks, where unemployed laborers keep standing 
throughout the day, waiting for somebody to give them work (many in the city) … And they are talking 
about SCs, when people are not earning the daily wage, the basic minimum they can’t earn. They are 
unemployed in this city and you are throwing them away, even from their slums”. (Emphasis added). 
 
On top of that, while authorities refuse to recognize ‘illegal settlements’ as part of the 
city, slum-dwellers are essentially forced to survive without proper water or sanitation 
systems. The fear that more families arrive, structurally deprives them for their RTC: 
 
“If there are five people in the family, says the earlier cited architect, they call everyone from the 
village… poverty remains a critical issue, but it can’t be used as a business. For them it’s a business’, 
occupying land, which is a mechanism for owning it… and you know what’s the price of land here! A 
rickshaw driver just deserves the right to accept, but not own the shelter (…), because the priority for 
him is not living, not quality of life, it is money.” 
 
c) Pride and shame: constituting a smart caste 
 
At the junction between Le Corbusier’s Chandigarh and Chandigarh as a SC stand 
elites’ efforts to maintain their privileges, considering that intrinsic to modernizing 
urban trends, the growing pressure for legitimating planning and policy interventions 
with citizens’ participation (relying on the (only recent) development of digital ICTs) 
is nowadays not only utopic, but plausibly possible. The deeper we investigate the 
consultations’ process, the more chiefly we confirm that SPVs rely on the guidance of 
consultancies and companies, rather than on pleas coming from mainstream citizens. 
An upper-class caste, conformed by bureaucrats and businessmen, is entitled by the 
SCM to trace the line that defines (non) smart citizenry. Hence, legitimated by 
Chandigarh’s pride discourse and relying on the city’s exceptional history; amidst the 
SCM, a modernist discourse imposes again varied categories of shame, on the ones, 
who materially construct and sustain such infrastructure. Altogether (in epistemic, 
material and civic senses) not only currently, but decidedly, also in decades to come, 
the indifference towards the struggles and needs of India’s majoritarian population, 
the working-classes, is justified by SC planning. Besides being deprived of their RTC 
on a discursive basis, hence, the following performances aim to institutionalize it. 
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The bureaucrats that I interviewed commonly emphasized that the SCP did not appear 
randomly manifesting the interests of the ruling classes, but various steps were 
accomplished, in order to ascertain the consideration of ‘people’s aspirations’. Yet the 
role of consultancy agencies and corporate meetings preponderated in this exercise. In 
fact, it was not the lack of budget, what kept Chandigarh’s SC projects ineffective for 
around two years (up till I held the majority of interviews in March 2017).  
Concretizing negotiations with consultancy firms was a condition for the 
interventions to be launched, since “they are the ones that are going to make the 
project reports, who issue attendance and who are going to help us finalizing the 
company”, says the Municipality’s Joint Commissioner. Furthermore, globally 
powerful agencies (such as AECOM (TNN 2015, 2016, 2017a)) were hiredxii,  in 
order to administer the “social media and public interaction”. Yet besides voting 
platforms (calculated by the ‘reach’ of likes, comments, or polls) on Facebook, 
Twitter, Youtube, and the municipality’s app, ‘mygov’, citizens’ were allegedlyxiii 
encouraged to participate through feedback forms, essay, drawing competitions, and 
within meetings. “So, both online and offline modes are there”, says the bureaucrat. 
However, anytime I requested the possibility of observing some forms, I was directed 
to another official or told to come back tomorrow. No one was capable of showing me 
one formulary. Worse, the only feedback forms I found online12 ridicule whatever e-
governance/e-democracy theoretical discussion as it brazenly asks for affirming with 
the SCP in two out of three questions; whereas in the third one it is possible to suggest 
modifications to be included. Additionally, outraging is the compulsory mandate to 
put personal information, wherein the “father or husband name” emphasize the 
patriarchal and classist associations, which keep ruling the city. 
 
Anyways, it was estimated that around 60% of the population participated 
(Chandigarh Administration 2016b, 6). As a result, the higher priorities are in the 
ranking, the more abstract are compromises, and vice versa, the lower percentages, 
more concrete solutions would be required13. Furthermore, the multiple-choice 
modality implies that both questions and answers are already given. Discussing about 	
12 https://www.mygov.in/group-issue/draft-document-vision-and-sub-goals-chandigarh-ideal-city/; 
https://www.mygov.in/group-issue/give-suggestions-how-make-chandigarh-smart-city/  
13 1) Economy, 2) safety, 3) e-governance, 4) water and electricity, 5) waste and sanitation, 6) 
education, health, city infrastructure, 7) mobility (ibid. 7). 
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taxes, land privatization, or investment (not geographically, but questioning the 
consumption economy vs. transforming bastis into higher life quality areas) is not an 
option. Rather, well framed by a neoliberal ideology, there are only two items under 
economy: access to employment opportunities 62% and the ease of doing business 
38%. Even in regard to e-governance14 (apparently 3rd priority; 16%) 41% voted for 
participation in city planning. Yet, consultations are not foreseen as a long-term 
mechanism for communication between citizens and their representativesxiv, i.e., but 
these are most surely performed in order to pass to the next SCs’ round.  
Expert agencies were hired in order to assure Chandigarh’s selection in the SCM. 
They advised how to display a consultation process (e.g. pictures and attendance lists 
are obligatory for validating meetings (ibid. 9)), which results in seemingly unbiased 
priorities, in spite of encompassing highly political questions. In parallel, this 
explains why the precise content or development of participatory mechanisms are 
irrelevant for current or future policy-making, following the Chairman of the Indian 
Green Building Council Chandigarh Chapter (one of centers of excellence CII):  
 
“There is no file, because otherwise how could you understand what 100000 people want, is not 
relevant. They did invite some people, but it wasn’t very detailed that every citizen should participate. 
No, it can’t be possible... For a person living in a slum the priority is different, than mine… is a very 
complicated process that is not known to you, not known to me, how as a citizen I could know how to 
answer these 15 questions? No, they as an agency will answer it. I’ve been through Mackenzie report 
on what makes cities great; 1: doing more with less, 2: people, 3: governance; 3 issues, if you take 
care of them you will have the city smart”. 
 
The clearest evidence that policy/business elites are expected to embody, “smart 
citizenry” is visible in the task of networking SPVs with handholding agencies 
(French Development Agency and CII) and so-called vendors (Danish, French and 
UK cities, CISCO, and Indian Fair of solution providers) (ibid. 19). Besides, public 
meetings “are formalities, not active participation”, says a sociologist, who in spite of 
working in Chandigarh for 20 years, has never seen a consultation, but read it in the 
newspapers. “Of course, they have to make some proceedings on suggestions”, he 
adds, “but these are ad hoc arrangements”. What is precisely discussed in the 
meetings then? “They are just chatting”- says Jyoti - “high profile citizens, don’t 
understand SCs, but their names matter…depth of dialogue is not there”. Some 
RWAs might indeed attend, says another interviewee, yet “they represent the middle-	
14 The rest of e-governance elements are: “access to government schemes” and “ease of bill payments”; 
hence safeguarding the status quo: top-down city management. 
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classes, who are more politically active and most of the time men, who have some 
political alignment with people in power.” This means, critical or somehow deviant 
subjects would be even sharply uninvited; just like a member from GASM, who 
resides in sector 20: “after 3 days I got to know through newspapers that there were 
meetings in the park just behind my house” – he laughs... Those, who have engaged 
on reclaiming political and legal channels as a relief for subaltern groups, know it’s 
not technologies or new schemes, but political will that grants or restricts the RTC: 
 
“There is no such thing like common decision-making. The SCP was itself made by the WB and it is 
implemented through finance capital. The working class is not included, and they are the real sufferers 
from this plan. Participation is totally fake. The results were published openly, but as I said earlier: 
even the large protests of slum-dwellers were not recognized in the smart city plan. So how can we say 
that the administration will listen to the individual worker when they are ignoring the large protests?” 
 
6. Discussion: do ‘smart cities’ shrink or expand the Right to the City?  
 
Taking the global virality of the SCs paradigm as point of departure, the purpose of 
this research has been inquiring whether such discourse, charged of novel possibilities 
for governance, optimization of resources, and citizen’s participation (just to mention 
a few), is actually reliable for developing into policies that enlarge the RTC by putting 
particularly subaltern struggles at the center. Consequently, a focus on diverse and 
intrinsically stratified forms of exercising citizenship in India, which remains being 
mostly determined by socio-economic positioning (under globalized capitalism, this 
could be generalized elsewhere), implied concentrating on the construction of a 
‘smart citizen(ship)’ – overall an audaciously abstract concept.  For the means of 
approaching the second part of our research question, hence, this section quickly 
summarizes to what extent is the RTC endangered by SC initiatives inter-nationally. 
The illustration and discussion of bottom-up contestations to SCs’ promisy-making 
start by outlining the insights of contextualizing Chandigarh, our case study, in a 
much wider (in fact, existential) tradition of modernist planning (6.1). Nonetheless the 
rhetoric and dynamics of safeguarding or contesting elitism are keen to identify 
similarities across further SC projects. Altogether, this research’s focus on right to 
housing debates and activism suggests abating the pressurized optimism on ‘chatur 
citizen’ formations, since also in contraposition to ‘smartness’ we find fertile grounds 
for (re)constituting subalternity (6.2.), as exemplified by street vendors, women, 
artists, and students - by expanding the field of RTC contestations (6.3). 
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By locating SCs, next to Garden Cities or CIAM utopias, within a broader history of 
repeated attempts to universalize the norms of urban planning, this dissertation has 
attempted to re-think the nature, depth, in sum, the validity of questions we might 
have discarded by assimilating the conclusion of certain periods of paternalistic/ 
managerial technocracy. Nonetheless, what all these enterprises share is a decisive 
trend (hence no mistake, but part of the planxv) towards elitism and segregation. Even 
currently, SC discourses, beyond striving for the financial support of corporates, are 
usefully displayed in nationalist or localized campaigns of city branding. Alike Le 
Corbusier’s Chandigarh, SCs are crucially sustained by the prestige and power that 
scientific clarity/ambition provokes on citizens, “who- restricted to fulfill a certain job 
- are proud of such well-run factory” (Kalia 1987, 43). Accordingly, decades of 
discontentment with the rigidity of Chandigarh’s grid, wherein ‘straight lines and 
single-use zoning did not simply have an aesthetic function, but entail an 
indispensable aid to scientific planning, while transforming formulas into self-
fulfilling prophesies’ (J. C. Scott 1998, 141); planning eventually became a source for 
popular, besides elitist pride. Today, technological solutions are even less considered 
reflections of the eccentric imagination of planners, but techno-culture seems 
unavoidable at any level; work, socializing, education or services. Echoing Cedric 
Price (1979), hence, it remains paramount to inquire: “if technology is the answer; 
what’s the question?” In this vein, Dan Hill (2013), a talented advocator of 
“unlocking the potential of technology in the city” indeed warns us to not generalize 
digital technologies as democratic. “Let’s be careful not to make the same mistakes 
we made 50 years ago- he says -which we are still paying for, and still making.” 
However, widening the pool of citizen preferences and digital interaction channels, 
via feedbacks or crowd funding, is insufficient to assure democracy. Thus, hereby we 
have attempted to sketch the precise relationship between governance and the role 
acquired by citizens, through the use of digital technologies. Some interests become 
even louder, while further cement is thrown over a myriad of struggles already 
dismissed. Instead of fueling certain SC critic’s fears over machines/technologies, this 
research has emphasized that domination remains among groups of human beings. 
Just as the force of natural ‘resources’, which actually cannot be managed, 
technologies simulate control by displaying processes and patterns, useful for their 
exploitation (Halpern 2014). Orit Halpern bridges her critique to Corbusier’s and SC 
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enterprises by denouncing them as simplification exercises, which instead of dealing 
with complexity (by prioritizing dialogues based on practised knowledge), virtually 
displace or at best extremely reduce diversity, in order to predict the completion of a 
function/program (ibid.). The same logics of cybernetics, Orit argues, are now applied 
to SCs. Even though she refers to Masdar and Songdo (paradigmatic Greenfield 
enterprises) the observation that speculation (real estate, e.g.), being the driver of 
these projects, rather than its actual citizens and results, is a crucial commonality that 
we found among PPPs. Infrastructure and surveillance do not need to be materialized, 
in order to awake our concerns for the (ab)use of ICTs in governance. 
 
Engaging in a multiple-scales analysis of the SCs’ debate inter-nationally, in India, 
and in Chandigarh, this research concludes: ‘smart governmentality’ does not depend 
on a control-room’s enactment, in order to exercise a fundamental influence on the 
city. Rather, digital-enabled performances of participation decisively change notions 
of citizenship towards data gathering. This means that, mediated by ICTs, citizens are 
conceived as sensors, whose (un)conscious task is providing feedback. Amidst such 
techno-dependent future, the market determines which choices are available. 
Consequently, even if entrepreneurial neoliberalism is promoted via collaborative 
(fiction of popular consent) endeavors, SCs are fundamentally anti-democratic: the 
algorithmic logic entails a huge black-box (de Waal and Dignum 2017, 267). For this 
reason, Maroš Krivý (2018, 22) insists that “the society of control is not precisely 
another technocratically driven top-down attempt to discipline citizens (…) [which] 
could be challenged by a simple inversion of this relation via a bottom-up liberation 
of technologies in the name of the people ”, nor would it be sufficient to ask for 
inclusion. Such lack of creativity while criticizing SCs, yet remaining within the same 
cybernetic logic, is challenged by Halpern, who observes that being discontent with 
SCs broadly, her colleagues restrain to ‘senseable cities’ improvements (2014, 242). 
Notwithstanding, as theorized by Lefebvre and de Certeau, subordination and control 
are never totalitarian; divergences (often in subalternity) should therefore be taken 
much seriously. The right to land (Sampat 2013, 2016b), i.e., belies myths of urban 
self-sufficiency, since it challenges the legality/morality of accumulation. Land is not 
voluntarily ceded (Sampat and Sunny 2016). Beyond ICTs use for reinstating the 
privileged RTC, what ‘smart’ novelties are foreseeable for the already marginalized?  
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6.1. Generic exceptions: modern, beautiful, smart Chandigarh 
 
Considering the high prestige that techno-scientific discourses enjoy in a society still 
enchanted with modernization, it is especially interesting to analyze SC politics from 
Chandigarh’s historical experience, because much beyond aesthetic and discursive 
layers this city’s socio-economic structure uncovers the SC’s true colors. Chandigarh 
an elitist project from its conceptualization to its materialization should no longer be 
taken as an experiment towards equality that went wrong. The fact that it “now stands 
charged as a socially segregated city, a fortress of privilege” (Kalia 1987) is not a 
mistake, rather it is the accomplishment of a regime of exclusivity that, legitimated by 
planning, is justified to discard equality as desirable. Similarly, the tragedy of 
increasingly automatized cities (through digital technologies i.e.) is not the lack of 
culturexvi, but the possibility of safeguarding socio-spatial and lifestyle privileges by 
confirming, such as the case of Chandigarh, an elitist culture. The obsession to 
concentrate only in the planned sectors by overlooking the region’s history, culture, 
and labor conditions, upon which Chandigarh stands, is hence not a naïve 
miscalculation of planningxvii. Rather, in times of overall demographic growth in 
India, elites are capable of accommodating a feudalist, modernist or smart rhetoric, in 
order to guarantee the feeling of caste supremacy. The city’s size moreover enables a 
smooth transitioning from rural to urban-rural, as a journalist formulates:  
“It’s easy, you own the village. In planned sectors feudal lords don’t compete, they’re friends. And the 
rest of them want to be like you. Delhi would be tough, more moneyed people, Bombay is egalitarian, 
nobody will give a fuck, London can’t be afforded and still is no oasis. The best part is this does not 
even look like India, it’s better than many world countries. If you superimpose this entire structure in 
France it will look absolutely normal, even there people would say ‘what a beautiful city’”. 
 
Chandigarh’s CEO, land owning, policy-making caste, is now entitled to embody the 
role of ‘smart citizens’, whose pictures in meetings- which had no real game-changing 
innovation potential apart from PPPs– will now be used to allege public consultations 
actually took place. In this sense, SPVs are instrumental for gaining terrain over RTC 
reclamations, in order to avoid assuming the responsibility to diminish inequalities 
and guarantee basic services. For this reason, we have forwarded the concept of 
‘generic exceptions’ since, as a JNU sociologist argues, Chandigarh’s “spirit and 
structure is the same than other metropolis. Just that it stands over a planned city, but 
it’s basically a middle-class city like all the others. The core of the city is the rich.” 
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Nonetheless, such visions, performances, and institutionalization of ‘smart citizenry’ 
are not capable of pacifying the unconformity with rising inequalities. Therefore an 
empirical research, which centralized the experience of student coalitions leading 
housing rights’ reclamations in a SC’s framework, could expand our learning on 
‘subaltern urbanism’, to the extent of demonstrating, again, that in spite of the 
‘management’ (control) ambitions of its proponents, such technocratic rationale is not 
as quickly and deeply internalized by critical citizens, whose struggles have and 
continue been defending/enlarging the RTC. Such coalition for housing conformed by 
students, activists, artists, and scholars (hence a very diverse constellation of 
class/caste/gender identities opposing neoliberal policies) extend beyond GASM the 
need to acknowledge alliances in foregrounding subaltern struggles. As illustrated 
below, interviewed activists communicate the importance of building trust networks 
in the bastis, yet in a very patient manner continuously learning to work with existing 
social infra-structures (Chattopadhyay 2012), rather than destroying it. Echoing Scott 
(1998, 144) “strong neighbourhoods, like strong cities, are the product of complex 
processes that cannot be replicated from above”. Hence, bastis should be protected 
from elites, instead of being demolished. Firstly, because knowing each other for a 
while creates networks of solidarity and trust, to say the least security (avoiding 
thefts, sexual assaults and other kinds of violence). Secondly, because once 
communities are marginalized (selected families are now mixed in rehabilitation), the 
absence of this trust seems disastrous. According to a woman I interviewed, it means 
starting from zero. Due to mobility costs and very brief ‘leisure’ time, interactions get 
immediately restricted to new living and working locations. And finally, the working 
poor should have priority over the right to centrality, because (in addition of being 
citizens, already sufficient RTC legitimation) they are the backbone of the city. 
 
6.2.  (Re)constituting ‘subalternity’ – within or against ‘smart urbanism’ 
 
Altogether, the methodologies, matters, and subjects, GASM (among other activist 
groups) engage with, in order to support slum-dwellers’ exploration of varied means 
to reassert their RTC, defy the overall logics of SCs. While SCs opt for immediate 
app-enabled solutions, although eventually leading to material outcomes, citizen 
participation does not involve personal, but abstract (someone else - ‘the system’s’), 
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interactions. While the institutionalization of online services and sharing preferences 
attempt to increasingly validate likes on Facebook or views on Youtube (probably 
even simulated by government agencies/employees) as public support, GASM 
‘tactics’ (Certeau)’ are highly subversive (Lefebvre), because these encourage taking 
charge of one’s-community’s RTC personally. Consequently, rather than hoping to 
work with the grammar of short-term collaborative planning through reserved 
channels (online-polls), most activists opt for deeper, constant dialogues, which are 
capable of building trust relations and constructing long-term alliances. Those 
dissenters, who advocate for diversifying urban policy-making according to basic 
needs, injustices, and rights deserve much broader recognition once conceiving, 
implementing and correcting planning (in terms of expertise and communication with 
the citizens, especially those marginalized) than CEOs. Overall, the decisiveness of a 
common construction in dialogue with various sections of society induces to possible 
bridges between “smart” utopias and everyday RTC struggles, which- it should be 
emphasized – was never considered but stand in an apathetic relation to the plan. 
 
On the other hand, the promptness with which Datta (2018) invokes the emergence of 
‘chatur citizens’ as indication of a “process of decolonization from the hegemonic 
power of the national programme through the rhetorical subversion of smart 
citizenship” (13) seems overstated. The flippancy of her optimism is not solely 
unrealistic, but almost disrespectful to the daily struggles of laborers, whose 
acknowledgment of cognitive capacities, in their own terms, is by no means novel, 
but neither sufficient for tacit (material, civic) differences on exercising their RTC. 
Hence, although Datta rightly points out that “online citizen consultations extended 
social inequalities from the urban to the digital realm” (ibid. 9), it seems too simplistic 
to rely on a ‘speech act’, a vision, in order to suggest postcolonial subjects are capable 
of countering their ‘exclusion from the digital realm’ by reclaiming ‘their right to be a 
smart citizen’ fundamentally on an epistemic basis. “The chatur citizen is yet to come 
in Indian smart cities, but the discursive landscape has been cast for its emergence” -
she says. Further, although Datta describes ‘the chatur citizen’ as a “potential breach”, 
since she/he “finds possibilities of social collaboration across digital and material 
spaces to disrupt how things are done, who by, where and on what conditions” the 
author is not capable of providing any example, especially since she is anyways 
referring to the “future[- not the current PPPs-driven – ]smart city” (ibid. 12). 
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Various incoherencies between the ‘actually existing SC’ and the future ‘smart/chatur 
citizens’ are worth remarking, since these emphasize the paramount relevance of a 
deeper empirical research. On one hand, solely enumerating citizens in the MOUD’s 
consultations is already assumed as a “transformation of a territorial ‘population’ into 
digital citizens” (ibid. 7). Thereafter, ‘ordinary citizens’ are supposed to “be trained to 
become smart citizens”, in order to “articulate and perform their access to digital 
space in ways that serve the demands of SCs” (ibid.). Yet, not any random citizen is 
supposed to be selected for such transformation, but rather CEO elites, as formulated 
by Datta: “tech-savvy, entrepreneurial and judicious citizens working for and on 
behalf of state enterprise, innovation and growth”. They, too, already exist and require 
no process of transformation, since they have appropriated the ‘smart’ identity. In 
parallel, beyond ‘chatur citizens’, the majority of Indian citizens already manifest 
opposite citizenship formations. Accordingly, while ‘smart citizenship’ intrinsically 
constitutes an exclusivist category its counter representation, the ‘chatur citizen’, falls 
into the same trap. The influence on the politico-economic agenda and infrastructural 
planning of the city is no longer defended as a Constitutional right of every Indian 
citizen. Rather “analogous to an urban hacker or a clever programmer”, the ‘chatur 
citizen’, would need to somehow ‘gain access for participating in virtual and material 
spaces of the future smart city, thus subverting the normative subjecthood of smart 
citizenship presented by the state’ (ibid. 12). Throughout this paper I have focused on 
arguing that despite futuristic horizons, SC business and policy-making has epistemic, 
material, and civic consequences for Indian citizens now, hence, subaltern and 
subversive subjecthoods to the category of ‘smart citizens’ already exist. By 
reclaiming their right to centrality to work and reside close to the SC, as exemplified 
by slum-dwellers’ resistance in Chandigarh, the recognition of struggles, which 
challenge SCs should not presuppose a ‘pirate modernity’ (Sundaram 2010) language 
of ‘hacking’ since subversive practices and reclamations outside of the logics and 
language of ‘smartness’ already represent the norm. Moreover, hacking is not only a 
subaltern practice, but Aadhaar (Khaira, Sethi, and Sathe 2018) and cashless 
economies (B. Scott 2018) are example of top-down scams. In fact, as repeatedly 
manifested in interviews across various bastis (Dhanas, Maloya, sectors 52 and 25, 
Khajeri Village, and Col. 4) the “smart” romance flirts much less with slum-dwellers 
and villagers than it does with the middle-classes aspiring to establish within 
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Chandigarh’s bourgeoisie. For that reason, I find very unrealistic to foresee the former 
will adapt to the rhetoric of ‘smartness’, in order to exercise their RTC, anytime soon. 
Instead of seeking inclusion/identification within, the potential for challenging the 
exclusivist nature of SCs relies on taking distance from such paradigm. It is safe to 
generalize, i.e. that besides encountering SCs’ publicity only in newspaper or on the 
radio, the wide majority of interviewees quickly stated that SCs are for the rich. “The 
rich are literally acting as parasites- said a woman -sucking the poor’s blood”. 
Meanwhile municipal workers are considered cheaters. Various interviewees 
denounced the same abuse: as water meters are introduced (instead of “fetching water 
through tankers at our own cost”), “the municipality sends us exaggerated water and 
electricity bills, as high as INR 8000 a monthxviii.” Further, based on decades of 
experiencing the public sectors’ discrimination, the term ‘SCs’ generated immediate 
repudiation, which hampered further conversations with the same terminology. 
Nonetheless, by introducing the topic, a clear line was demarcated between the 
programs’ benefit to “those, who own land, maybe employed as permanent servants” 
and “those, whose life is restricted to earning a one-time meal to feed themselves”. 
Overall, the inhabitants of bastis did not show any interest for a detailed discussion on 
SCs. In fact, they do not even have the time nor the resources to contest their 
vernacular translation as ‘chatur citizens’. They are simply asking for housing 
(applications pending for a minimum of 10 years), otherwise not being evictedxix, and 
fair services. While bureaucrats in ‘planned Chandigarh’ are proud of the city’s water 
and electricity coverage, slum-dwellers face electricity cuts for entire days, especially 
during the summer. The middle-/upper sections might require such energy for cooling 
down, whereas the minority of slum-dwellers, who were capable of getting an AC are 
often accused (e.g. on the media or by a Housing Board official) of being rich. Yet 
amidst today’s alarming global warming (Fleming et al. 2018), considering bastis’ 
dense infrastructure, not only are its inhabitants per se the most vulnerable population 
(Vijayawada 2018), but moreover under a SCs regime the development of SCADA 
technologies for energy management are keen to sabotage EWS. Due to the 
complexity of such systems, an ordinary citizen’s hacking act seems almost 
impossible. Summing up, I have resisted supporting Datta’s optimism on an emergent 
‘chatur citizen’, because requiring any further conditions for citizenship rights to be 
recognized, either as ‘Chandigarh’s modern citizens or India’s smart citizenry’, is a 
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trap. At times aesthetic/cultural values, today increasingly cognitive capacities, all 
these categories of exclusivity are actually a classxx camouflage for legitimating 
privileges and expanding influence. If development policies are to prioritize particular 
groups, then these should support those, whose RTC struggles are the toughest. 
 
6.3. Stretching contestations: education and other aspirations  
 
Altogether, by posing universalizing lectures such as ‘planetary urbanization’ 
(Brenner and Schmid 2013) and ‘smarter planet’(Casile 2011) under question, this 
research has insistently argued that for the sake of inquiring either SCs, the RTC or 
whichever iconic paradigm of ‘the Urban Age’, ontological differences ‘at the 
margins’ become central since these are capable of providing or emptying dominant 
lectures of meaning. Hence, contestations to manifestations of power accumulation, 
are often nurtured by struggles at the margins of the city, which not necessarily point 
at ‘the rural’; although it could very productively do so, as demonstrated by peasantry 
mobilizations against Dholera - SC (Datta 2015; Sampat 2016a) or most recently by 
the imposing march of 30,000 farmers from Nashik to Mumbai (Satheesh 2018). 
Throughout this work, notwithstanding, we have concentrated on marginalized or in-
between categories, whose RTC is not fully recognized. Daily laborers or women, 
(gender, too often attached to class), more concretely, can be present, yet absent, at 
the same time, because their work and rights are not fairly recognized. They are 
regularly excluded from the city’s policy-making, and typically both (land is usually 
inherited through male line) are deprived from owning the land they inhabit or work. 
The claim for ‘azadi’ (liberty) of middle-class women in various demonstrations in 
Chandigarh is a crucial example, because they are not solely asking for access and 
opportunities but demanding what they consider a right. By way of conclusion, I will 
sketch further examples of street vendors’, artists’, women and students’ RTC claims, 
which even though often articulated with different words, such as the accreditation of 
informal laborers, no timing restrictions for women in university hostels or updating 
performing art narratives to stories from the working classes, it can be generalized 
that these actors see themselves as communicating agents. These activists not merely 
pose pleas to the administration, but above all the former are committed to inform 
fellows about their rights and motivate them to reclaim such.  
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Despite the rigid functional distribution of Chandigarh’s sectors, whereupon all 
traders were supposed to be located inside of shops (instead of streets) street vendors, 
chai-walas, hairdressers, food providers, in general, have resisted various policies 
ruling the city’s infrastructure. In response, middle- and upper-classes acting as 
‘guardians of the bourgeois city’ (Shapiro Anjaria 2009) have attempted to forbid 
their right to work in the streets. Else street vendors would not be capable of paying a 
rent, yet the citizens of Chandigarh are particularly harsh to them, as a journalist says: 
 
“A very cultural specific thing about Chandigarh is that they don’t like street vendors, whereas most of 
cities do, even in spite of class; because if you go to books or oral histories you will hear about street 
vendors to be part of our heritage. Not here, they’re aggressively against being like any other city.”
  
Nonetheless, during my research field I did witness plenty of examples, where 
especially for food, chai, or little shopping items street vendors were surrounded by 
clients (pic. 18). Unfortunately, due to my language limitations I was not capable of 
talking to them. However, especially around Sectors 9 and close to the IT Park, the 
proliferation of food stalls has been allowed to some extent. There has been some 
tolerance considering that there are virtually no restaurants around the IT Park (note, 
even if recently planned, also lack recreational areas to walk after lunch, i.e. (pic. 
19)). Whereas food options close to Sector 9 are very expensive (clearly above 
middle-class averagexxi). With the purpose of regulating street vendors in public areas, 
in order to protect their rights, in 2014, the Streets Vendors Act passed nationally. 
Yet, in Chandigarh it has rather been abused for the contrary: entirely getting rid of 
street vendors in Sectors 17, 19 and 22 (Rana 2017). In consequence, especially 
Sector 17, which already had experienced a huge loss of visitors, due to the opening 
of big malls, was entirely empty for some months. When I visited it for the first time 
in October 2016 it was ‘death’ as the cited journalist would say. But resistance has 
been constant. Street vendors, organized in unions, even posed demands to the High 
Court, as they refused to move (TNN 2018). Yet the pressure of shop keepers, also 
demonstrating with candles and banners in S17, has been constant, too (Victor 2017; 
Budhiraja 2018). While discussions about their ‘rehabilitation’ (note the analogy to 
the Slum-Free policy) continue, it is clear that the argument for protecting Le 
Corbusier’s master piece from encroachers (Rohtaki 2018a) is no longer sufficient. 
The novel ‘smart hub’ rhetoric, however, might satisfy the bourgeois desire to 
eradicate street vendors, at least in some sectors. 
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Modern and feudal at the same time, Chandigarh’s consumption and patriarchal 
culture is widely known in the regionxxii. Popular songs about the City Beautiful’s 
women often make reference to the same street: Geri Route (between sectors 10 and 
11). Citing writer Amandeep Sandhu, Aarish Chhabra explains the tradition: 
 
“‘Geri’ is the feminine of ‘Gera’, the term used in Punjab for “the farmer going on horseback to 
survey his farms”. Citing Chhabra: The use of the feminine “is to ascribe gentler qualities to it, make it 
more innocent than its reality While earlier it was a sign of protection and power and vigilance, the act 
has now become a ritual. Within it, the term encapsulated the political economy of large farms where 
the owner has many serfs working for him…” Now that owners are separated from lands and moved to 
cities, changed their steed from horses to SUVs, the necessity has become an empty ritual. You are 
mistaken if you feel ‘geri’ in cities is harmless men having some fun – chicken and rum – without 
harassing women. That is not how women feel…” (2017a, 97). 
 
In parallel, Chhabra tells me about a campaign to rename the route to ‘Azadi Street’ 
(2017b). Accordingly, a march called ‘Bekhauf Azai’ was organized (R. Khanna 
2017; Parul 2017). Remarkably, the march took place at midnight, under the slogan of 
‘reclaiming the city’, considering the increase of sexual assaults on women getting 
public. Even though rape cases take place daily, these were supposedly restricted to 
the outskirts of the city. For this reason, particularly Vernika’s case, the daughter of a 
high official, who was chased by two guys in the attempt of getting into her car, 
shook the city. The class intersections of RTC reclamations are highly complex. One 
of the organizers, i.e., said that “eve-teasing is increasingly happening now, because 
of people coming from the outside, basically with that sole intention; to hang out, but 
it has become toxic, normalized.” On the other hand, the march and the future name 
of the street ‘azadi’ signalize a leftist alignment, which has been censored by the state 
as anti-national. This constitutes a clear political choice, which Chhabra ridicules in 
the same manner that he accuses GASM and SFS (who also participated in the 
demonstrations) of “just adding to the noise, because they are not willing to 
compromise”, he adds, “the new left obsessed with militating against the elite, when 
they’re elite themselves”. Yet particularly in terms of gender politics and fighting the 
privatization of the university, the continuous work of SFS has been translated in its 
first election and, more importantly, the first female president in PU. Amaan (also 
organizer of the march, interviewed by Chhabra above) was the first female candidate 
in the university. She argues the relevance of such institution for women, who gain 
some freedom from patriarchy while studying, yet during their breaks or after they 
graduate, they are pressurized to marryxxiii. 
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Furthermore, the work of young and senior artists to respectively “bring poetry to the 
city open spaces, as well as to slums”, and, on the other hand, to decentralize theatre 
presentation from city auditoriums to bastis, reflects the activist’s dedication to fight 
the wide inequality in education and cultural spaces. They organize workshops with 
women and children, or bring theatre groups (to Dhanas, e.g., a ‘rehabilitation 
colony’), in order to work with schools. “Theatre is conceived as leisure for the 
middle-/upper-classes of Chandigarh. It starkly avoids talking about caste and when 
dealing with gender issues, its rather pseudofeminism is not liberating, but a 
consumerist ideology of how women are supposed to be seen.” This is why working 
in the bastis, with ‘the common man’, is of paramount relevance; they bring a 
substantially different perspective from caste, labor, migration, demolitions, and 
religion. Remarkably, clashes between hindutva and progressive streams are not 
limited to theatre, but significantly in education institutions. PU’s SFS, i.e., stands as 
the strongest opposition to RSS/ABVP’s influence rapidly expanding elsewhere 
(Arshi 2018; Mukherjee 2018). Pali, Amaan, among other activists, who earlier 
concentrated on politicizing slum-dwellers’ housing rights (GASM) now majorly 
dedicate to regional initiatives, such as ‘Mashaal’ the first left magazine in Punjabi. 
 
Intrinsically attached to privileges or restrictions on the exercise of the RTC, 
education has globally been “implicated in solidifying the urban neoliberal agenda 
materially and discursively” (Lipman 2011). It entails a key space in the larger 
struggle for the RTC. Hence, in India, even smaller towns, such as Kota (Puri 2015), 
have centralized educational coaching in their economic agenda. In highly 
competitive cities like Chandigarh, the education field is also highly stratified, 
ranging from advocacy for basic rights, upward aspirations or for securing a 
positional advantage, considering that even government schools are ‘much better than 
many private schools’xxiv. Following Chhabra (2017, 21), whence “the moneyed elite 
set the standards, the ‘EWS types’ are at best patronized, never included.” Further, the 
establishment of IT skills as central currency for social mobility is doubtlessly 
connected to globalized digital neoliberalism, which- besides the SCM -in India it is 
manifested by the significant expansion of Higher Education crediting institutions. As 
formulated by Radhika Menon (2017) “degrees and qualification are vital credentials” 
for surviving in the current economic model. For this reason, various slum-dwellers, 
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expressed their refusal to demolitions or ‘rehabilitation’, since they emphasized the 
relevance of their children’s capability to continue in schooling in their living the 
proximity. “The urban fringe offers a means to escape social hierarchies, caste 
rigidities and patriarchal restrictions”, as argued by Geeta Nambissan (2017). Yet, in 
parallel, social segregation is reflected within government schools, which are 
“overcrowded, dilapidated and are predominantly accessed by the poor and 
disadvantaged groups”. The desperate strive for socio-economic mobility amidst 
highly unequal and insufficient education infrastructure has nurtured the rising 
“shadow economy” market, wherein very low-quality, yet private education targets 
low-income groups. But for Geeta there is still hope “the Right to Education (2009) 
and the Right to Information Acts have encouraged people to approach the courts” 
signalizing that gradually “a new sense of urban community emerges” (ibid.).  
 
Meanwhile, finding a job capable of coping with the costs of living in Chandigarh is a 
highly pressing issue for the majority of young citizens I talked to. In addition to the 
‘great night life, great crowd’ narrative in Chandigarh, work opportunities in the area, 
as well as renown universities are powerful aspirationsxxv magnets. However, it is also 
feasible that the expansion of ICTs will provoke further labour precariousnessxxvi. 
Following Jyoti, ‘for generations they have been told, becoming engineers they will 
earn a good living’. Nonetheless, as the credential economy rises and the labor market 
is incapable of expanding/diversifying, those RTC reclamations (even more 
legitimated through education certificates) ‘will grow a bubble of anger about to 
burst’.xxvii Precisely such revolts might be hampered by SCs, Hindutva politics, and an 
extremely abusive state determined to demonize dissent (R. Kumar 2018). In parallel 
Aarish reflects:  
 
“In the rich there’s always the fear that the poor will someday wake up… Probably in my imagination 
if I’d be rich I’d know I fucked up somewhere. But there’s no need for a strategy, because that’s built 
into the system, they don’t need it.” 
 
Summarizing, beyond surveillance and privacy rights, which for many SCs’ critics 
suppose the main source of concerns, this study has explored a variety of rights 
(education, gender, work, yet in particular the rights to housing and land) that are 
potentially endangered by SC policies. Like past utopian experiments, more than 
epistemology, what is principally at stake in SCs are civic control and material gains. 
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8. Appendix 	
i Praveen: “everyone living in sectors 2 to 11 has huge one-acre houses. And they have all the money and the 
political power to get everything they want. Most of them are not even from Chandigarh. So, for instance, we live 
in Sector 11, my wife’s father used to be a commissioner. All right, big power; his father was chief justice of 
Punjab, brother, Chief Justice of Haryana Court, many brothers, they were all Indian Administrative Services, 
which means they control the show. On my left (neighbor) is an ex-minister, MLA from Punjab, power. Next to him 
is a retired director general from police, power. On this side there’s a person who has managed to come in here 
but with the money, but still he’s got enough connections in the market. I mean, whatever, you have this entire line 
full of power for generations. So, they don’t care. Whatever you want, you get.” 
 
ii Chief Architect: “one of the highest in the region. We have been auctioning our properties for about five decades 
now, so that gives us the best market value”. 
 
iii With the pace of time, citizens born and bred in the city engage even harsher in denying rural connections. 
According to a journalist, Chandigarh offers the best of both worlds, youngsters keep driving jeeps, but prefer 
relating to IT than to agriculture: “This was the manifestation of every feudal lords’ dream: you could be an 
English sahib in Chandigarh. You could wear a tie and jacket, while you go back to your kurta pajama, then you 
go to your fields and live both lives together, absolutely smoothly. You could have a coffee here, then go to the 
village and order your servant to cook chicken for you. Seeing their habits could coexist, they started coming here. 
A lot of them got plots here, big spaces to build houses, because the ruling class was also Jat. For instance, the 
guy who’s credited for building Chandigarh, his family owns the theatre, he was in Congress and his grandson is 
in BJP. But they travel across parties, because they’re Jats, they rule anyways. So, 62% of Punjab is Sikh, 18% is 
Jat, but it’s not that Sikhs rule Punjab, it’s Jats within the Sikhs. 
 
iv Praveen: nobody knows what to do with the SC… our administrators are totally out of touch with reality, but 
they don’t care. The Indian Civil Service is a colonial legacy to control natives, and they have been trained in such 
a way that they don’t give a damn. They say, ‘let’s get an airport, or a stadium, or horse racecourse or a super 
fancy railway station’, which probably they don’t even use, but they get the money, and they sanction it. In other 
states politicians have to be re-elected, for that they have to do some work for the poor, etc., so the politician is 
answerable to the people, bureaucracy is not. On paper Chandigarh does everything that’s right, because it’s a 
totally bureaucratic place. 
 
v “There are people here that haven’t been to sector 40, sector 42, which is not slums, but they haven’t been there, 
their whole life is here, so the class structure militates against newcomers, like any class or caste system. Me: but 
they might not be necessarily newcomers, they might have been there for decades as well... J: no, that’s a class 
system that exists within the city, the ones that come from outside face a very strange resistance, even from sector 
42’s people… Now the generation of 25-30 years old (born and bred here) have become vocal, they now say 
they’ve hardly ever been to their hometown. Everyone used to have a hometown before, because Chandigarh has 
been built of nothing. That generation resists outsiders from any kind, there’s a clear Chandigarh class. The 
actual ones enjoying the Chandigarh life live in the northern sectors, the southern ones are just trying to identify 
with the city while living in the same conditions, slightly middle-/upper-class. So they’re very strange people, 
economically they earn the same than I do or maybe even less, physically they live in a space which is not prime in 
Chandigarh, culturally they’re Punjabis and they cannot afford to go to the kind of places, the clubs which are 
elite culture. What they’re militating against is that they’re neither ‘me’ nor ‘them’. There’s a constant state of 
brutal competition with themselves, wanting to be someone else, a clear manifestation of what we disrespectfully 
call ‘yuppies’. They want to delink themselves from Punjabi culture… and they’re very right in doing so, because 
it’s a very crude culture. But crude can also work, because it can be cute, rural can also be cute, but the 
aggression is what they disown, if you notice.” 
 
viHousing Board official: “nobody will be happy with a small house; they want a bigger house. Only thing is they 
should be happy, because they have moved from a slum to a house, which has got supporting infrastructure: water 
supply, electricity, light, and ventilation. Me: have you talked to any family? HB: No, absolutely no direct contact. 
See their requirements will vary from person to person. I don’t think they are going to be a right judge of what 
they want. They want the world; the only thing is we can offer them whatever we can offer. See whatever the land 
is made available to me and whatever I can do within that so my/that land will be optimally utilized, and the 
beneficiaries rises to the maximum number of people. So, there is a point I cannot go beyond.”  
 
vii Resident of a basti: “It’s a private company affair. If my house/flat costs some 2.5 lakh INR, then this amount 
has to be divided in 20 years and paid monthly. Each 5 years the amount of the installment will increase and 
eventually after 20 years the house will belong to its dweller. So, you will have to protest for it. They are 
constructing these houses, getting rent, but eventually making the rich, richer.” Pali: “under private-public 
partnerships, half of the amount is funded by the government, and the rest by private players. In China as well, 
private owners construct buildings and then rent it out. R: But these houses will not sustain 20 years. The walls 
and roof have started decaying now only. People living on top floors face water-dripping issues during the rain 
season." 
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viii Praveen: “I said, ‘why can’t we just designate a piece of land and call it an IT city?’ Unless you designate 
areas for certain jobs you won’t get it. So immediately when you set up an IT area the industry comes, because IT 
enables resources. Then we thought, nowadays you call things like this, you have a Food Park, SEZ, along with it 
we wanted to have a Film City. The industrial area is now called Industrial Campus Park. Rules changed, which 
means that now you can even have hotels… SCs, they started figuring out what it should be. Nobody knows as yet. 
It is just a listing. Most government organizations, to be more precise the MC, they are the ones who are 
maintaining the city, so basically, they’re trying to find ways and means to take money from the center, 1000 
crores. So, what officials try to do, as soon as they get the money, he wants to put it here (makes sign: pocket). 
That is where the trouble starts… What happens is that different pressure groups are trying to snatch the SC, 
having the bottom gold. A Spanish/Canadian company comes to Chandigarh trying to take money from the side of 
metro… You have to do something no one knows the price of. (Example of sweeping machine - such special 
products cannot be bought by anyone, but the state). So, you’ll have a laser show in sector 17 plaza, the machine 
costs 5 lakhs, I will spend 500 lakhs, that’s the way to do it.  Is it directly useful (like internet)? No. Next example; 
promoting project as as parking lot, then using it for a hotel. So, who gets the money? Some chap sanctioned it in 
the Municipal Chorporation (‘chor’ means thief). It is shown as a public utility, but actually used by somebody 
private; everybody is trying their business grows to take more money into their pocket. So, IT companies from 
Bangalore get together and say: ‘ok, here’s one lakh each, so let’s all go and have a party in Chandigarh and 
invite the administration’. These guys come and organize some sort of SC conference or summit, and invite 5 
jokers from here, 5 jokers from there. Suddenly you end up having 200 people there and each of these guys gives a 
speech and everybody feels good, but their interest is: graving a share of the pie. So, then I invite to the mayors of 
10-20 cities. They take them to Sweden, e.g., permanently spoiled them and then I show them the factory 
presentation. These guys are impressed. Then I send them back with the gift and probably even invite their wives: 
now I have 5 mayors in my pocket. What is the mayors’ job? - To buy my machine. Me: EU prepares the ground 
for businesses with discourses of ecological sustainability, energy, stuff like, and that is the way to legitimate to do 
business with people. P: especially Germany is thick in the CII. You scratch my back I’ll scratch your back. 
 
ix Aarish Chhabra (2017, 37): Sector 17’s fate was sealed the minute a mall big enough came up. (…) One thing 
everyone agrees on, let’s use the vast space – the plaza – for something that sets the market apart. Open-air cafes, 
fancy flea markets, seasonal fairs, licensed vendors, gazebos for people to sit and chat, and probably some more 
trees to counter Corbusier’s sizzling concrete! Ideas float around like a mild breeze that never leaves Chandigarh. 
But the obsession with a so-called heritage has meant Chandigarh’s heart has grown older than the city is. The 
minute the government plans to shift the parking space to a new underground lot, there are protests. The minute 
there are talks of allowing vendors, the elite of the city is worried about this ‘Paris-like’ city losing its sheen. The 
minute someone talks of the new in a city that claims to a symbol of modernity, the ghost of Corbusier pops out of 
one of the many imposing, borderline-ugly behemoths that he built. 
 
x Chhabra (2017, 110,111): Don’t throw that banana peel on the road! Wait until you spot a garbage bin. Put it in 
there. And feel good about yourself. That’s the essence of the drive called Swachh Bhrat as we, the people, led by 
the Grand Saviour of the Nation, begin this journey towards Clean India. It’s a different matter how the prime 
concern after the demolition of a slum is the non-availability of maids for a few days. This is about something 
severe, something more uncomfortable. This is about life and death. This is about Satbir Singh and his ilk. Satbir, 
35, was a sanitation worker of the Chandigarh public health department. He died after accidentally inhaling toxic 
gas rising from a manhole near Lake Club late in the August of 2014. He left behind his wife and four children. 
The family would still have been in celebratory mood, for it was just two months ago that Satbir had got a regular 
job after remaining on contract with an outsourcing agency. It wasn’t to last. As is the tradition in our large-
hearted country, it would be seen as God’s will. But this death was avoidable. If only man had safety gear, like a 
basic gas mask. 109 (…) Satbir’s death came barely two months after the fire in Sector 17 that killed two 
firefighters. But no heroism was attributed to him, even as the firemen were rightly seen as martyred while 
carrying out a life-threatening public duty. No cries of bravery awards are being heard. No one is saluting Satbir 
on Facebook either. He was a sweeper, not even a trained sewer man assigned for the job that he was doing. There 
is no group insurance policy for these workers, so each case has to go through repeated requests, patronizing 
officials and the ever-present red tape. Cleaning filth is no hero’s job. In all, there are around 2,700 sweepers for 
Chandigarh, of which nearly 1,500 are under outsourcing contractors. There are just 73 technical sanitation 
employees, including 53 sewer men. Most work under the aegis of the municipal corporation, and some under the 
administration [earning between 8,600 to 15,000 per month]. (…) It’s not surprising that the Safai Karmachari 
Andolan, a national movement for sanitation workers, has slammed the Clean India campaign strategy, saying that 
if Prime Minister Narendra Modi was serious indeed, “he would have begun by improving the lot of sanitation 
workers, who have a life expectancy of only 52 years” as against an all-India average of 66. “The Swachh Bharat 
Abhiyan is a way for the middle-class India to get over its guilt,” Wilson Bezwada, national board member of the 
Andolan has said. He’s right. For now, the ruling class remains distant as ever, and more didactic than ever. The 
‘heritage’ manhole covers of Chandigarh sell for lakhs abroad, further underlining a cruel irony. And we feel 
better by putting that banana peel into the nearest garbage bin. Let someone else deal with the serious shit.” 
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xiResearcher from IISER-Mohali: “If a woman wouldn’t come to cook and clean in my house, it would not be 
possible for me to work. Autorikshaw, restaurant employees, they’re present anywhere in the city! But for us, they 
are absent… For me the biggest danger is that they (policy makers) speak of the welfare of the city and city 
residents, and at the same time are able to do whatever they want to and have been doing for ages (like 
demolitions, not taking poor into account when making policies) as if, for whom are you making this city ‘smart’?? 
Who needs SCs? This language is very dangerous, now they’re giving us some data, but if you look at ground and 
go and speak to the poor of this city, then there is no change, because bureaucratic processes are same, right? 
Institutions are the same; I mean how can you talk about change in such a superficial level?? Nothing is going to 
happen, and nothing is happening… It’s really hollow!  
 
xii Chief Architect: “It was a democratic exercise, have you gone through the program? - Me: yeah, definitely. - So 
that says that you have to go through the aspirations of people and then we have to build our agenda. So, if you 
start comparing parametrically on all aspects of the city we are pretty ahead, most of them, because there were at 
a different socio-cultural level and the political situation… We are the capital of two states, which brings a lot of 
priority to doing works here. Me: certainly, Chandigarh highlights meetings with RWAs, consultations… how can 
I have access to see them… CA: what all happened there? I think in the MC, they have hired agencies, especially 
for the social media and public interaction situations. Me: any issues to access money because of demonitisation? 
CA: no, it is not that we do not have the capacity to handle the money; we haven’t had the capacity to hire a 
consultant for the last 7 months.  
 
xiii Praveen: “Either you collect or cook up data. In Chandigarh they have their own people on Facebook. See most 
data is a farce. That is a fact of life. The Municipal Chorporation, they’re here just to grab money. Surveys come 
from the heads of departments, nine in total. Me: how can I prove that? P: So, it’s a crazy situation. When they do 
a thing like this, they hire a consultant, and all the blame can be passed on to him. In Chandigarh it’s the same 
consultancy working for Amritsar and Ludhiana. I don’t know the name but it’s from Gurgaon, basically 
somebody with political connections. The administration is inaccessible, zero e-governance/e-democracy (even if 
Praveen participated from the SC’s app). You have a consumer handbook, roads, parks, elections, Chandigarh 
Administration directory with personality names, all that junk. Me: this is the irony of a SCs’ ‘transparency’, 
online national SCs page puts the UT Home Secretary’s phone number as well, is he going to pick up the phone? 
P: Of course not. 	
xiv CRRiD researcher: “if they organize meetings regularly and institutional mechanisms for participation evolve, 
then that can help, but they don’t want to do it. “  
 
xv Kalia (1987, 43) In the Plan Voisin for Paris, the place of each individual in the great urban hierarchy is spatially 
coded. The business elite (industrials) will live in high-rise apartments at the core, while the subaltern classes will 
have small garden apartments at the periphery. One’s status can be directly read from one's distance from the 
center. But, like everyone in a well-run factory, everyone in the city will have the "collective pride” of a team of 
workers producing a perfect product. “The worker who does only a part of the job understands the role of his 
labor; the machines that cover the floor of the factory are examples to him of power and clarity, and make him part 
of a work of perfection to which his simple spirit never dared to aspire.” Just as Le Corbusier was perhaps most 
famous for asserting that "the home is a machine for living," so he thought of the planned city as a large, efficient 
machine with many closely calibrated parts. He assumed, therefore, that the citizens of his city would accept, with 
pride, their own modest role in a noble, scientifically planned urban machine. 
 xvi	Kalia (ibid.): Chandigarh was the dividing line between the past and the present. It is no accident that there are 
no statues commemorating India’s past. (…) It was meant to be something beyond a new state capital. But it lacks 
culture. It lacks the excitement of Indian streets. It lacks bustling, colourful bazaars. It lacks the noise and din of 
Lahore. It lacks the intimacy of Delhi. It is a stay-at-home city. It is not Indian. It is the anticity. With all 
shortcomings though, Chandigarh provokes the interest of people far beyond the borders of India.” 		
xvii Kalia (ibid. 145): “The government naively believed that the creation of a capital would resolve other social, 
economic, and political problems of the state, but there was no study on the impact on the region as a whole. 
Chandigarh is a designed city, not a planned one”. 	xviii	Resident	 of	 a	basti:	“It	is	a	flawed calculation, basically they take reading from the meter, but the price we 
paid is not analogous to the amount of water we use. Me: Where do you think this extra money you have been 
charged eventually go? R: How would we know? It must be going to government’s account only. We people are 
uneducated or semi-literate. The people we deal with are not only educated, but they are doing it for years. So 
whatever they do, they do it very sharply.” 	
xix Ankit: “I don’t think they’re continuing their fight as such, because it’s more like a psychological war right now 
between the administration and the residents. They’ve been given some homes in the rehab colonies, then they’ve 
started demolishing those people’s houses, not the whole colony. So, people who don’t have proper places get 
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stressed. Between one-third and half of the population (3 lakhs) gets housing, so these are demolished and you’re 
psychologically dismantled. One-lakh households should be constructed, but they are not planning to do more. 
Moliyagra already stopped because of funding.” 	
xx Amaan poses question. “In case elected, will there still be demolitions or is she going to stop that” A man raises 
to interrupt, he rather changes the question to: “tell us when all slums will be demolished so this city can finally be 
peaceful and beautiful.” A: “So how can we look for alliances in an environment, where people is openly 
advocating for demolitions? M: “even more complicated when people are pro-slum–free. Supposedly there is hope 
but they get uncomfortable, when asked if rehabilitation could be in the same space of demolishment.” 
 
xxiPali: “See, now even the middle-classes don’t know the disadvantages of this smart city plan, so till then they are 
the supporters of this, because in comparison to other countries they want more advancement. But in the long run 
the parking fee is going to be high, the electricity, energy and even basic food will be more costly for them. The 
administration is abolishing the street-vendors, which are a cheap source of food for many citizens, and when they 
are not allowed then the people will have to feed themselves from Dominos, McD, KFC etc. They are very costly 
and till then they would also establish their monopoly in their competitive market. Infrastructure and services are 
going to be improved and still they are improving. But the mechanization of services is also spreading more and 
more unemployment, especially in a kind of country that has more than 1 billion population.” 
 
xxii Amaan: The notion of Punjab being very rich probably comes from the lack of a reading culture. Reminiscence 
of feudalism will always remain in Punjab. The glorification of weapons, mustache, branding clothes, and 
objectified women is characteristic of Punjabi songs. 	
xxiii Amaan: “Research is the only chance to not marry, yet. However, in university there are still plenty of 
limitations for women, whose entries to the hostels are controlled. Still, at least this gives some credentials to 
leave home, talk to different people, and formulate a strategy to pursue inquiries of one’s own. Boys have one or 
two years of relaxation after they graduate, women don’t. That’s why you encounter many of men socializing in 
PU, they’re ex-students… When PU attempts to arbitrarily multiply the fee, they are not cutting funds like JNU, in 
order to destroy a culture, but increasing costs assures there will always be people, who want to get inside. So, 
they are actually changing or confirming an elitist culture… Women in powerful positions are immediately seen as 
feminist, hurried to marry soon, because otherwise it will be hard to find a man, who is more educated. If a man is 
a bureaucrat, for example, the woman has to be a schoolteacher. 	
xxiv Aarish: “the big gulf between Chandigarh and the rest is that government schools are much better than private 
schools elsewhere in India. So even the worst schools have ‘smart’ classrooms. They have a projector, a TV, 
digital blackboard and stuff like that. That could have happened much earlier, but anyways what’s the government 
doing about SC? Nothing, they’re putting blue boards in place of green boards. At least in Chandigarh I haven’t 
seen anything else. They’re getting money under new heads… “ 
 
xxv In his book Chhabra writes: “In this city if over 11 lakh – 12lakh if we count Panchkula and Mohali, even more 
if the villages-turned-suburbs like Mullanpur are counted in – it is hard to meet a ‘Chandigarh native’ other than 
hyperbole-infected yuppies who proudly hide where their parents actually come from, or simply refuse to engage 
in a thoughtful conversation about home and homesickness as they are too busy being awesome instead. (…) But 
this writer is part of the overlooked majority, the young aspirant from Punjab who is too much of an insider to find 
a place in such a series, yet the quintessential outsider who is driven by the ambition that defines Chandigarh. An 
island in terms of its clean streets, non-savage police force, green cover and genial vibe, the city is the hub of 
opportunity for those escaping the clutches of drugs and desperation that continue to deprave Punjab.  There was a 
different hope this time. Of shifting into a flat in Zirakpur, where thousands who can’t afford Chandigarh real 
estate have bought houses with the hope of finding a home again…” (2017, 18). 
 
xxvi Pali: “There are many platforms on paper but not applicable to some special category of people i.e., workers. 
The middle-class is excited about e-governance but the working class has not so much facility of smart phones, 
and illiteracy is also there, so they are not the beneficiaries of the e-governance. Rather e-governance would 
replace their jobs in many aspects. More e-governance means less number of workers required for governance.” 
Chabbra: “economy of outsourcing jobs even in the government, they’re diminishing posts gradually… so e-
governance helps you not to interact with the system, you’re sick of the system (distrust), but participation of the 
people in building those systems decreases, people are no longer the system, the system is artificial intelligence… 
It also creates a joblessness that is irritating after a while.” 
 
xxvii Me: “bubble of anger might exploit soon, due to certificates acquisition but no job, as Jyoti said...” Amaan: “I 
hope that happens, because to what extent will they tolerate? Even if they earn less, they want to get to 
Chandigarh, Mohali, Panchkula… not back to their places. Especially since it is so hard to find jobs, I think the 
anger is inside, it is bubbling, but it needs to have a good leadership as well to have a good direction… It should 
culminate in a way that people have something in their hand, so not simply protest and that was pretty much it.”  


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